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Financing Welfare States and the Structure of Taxation
Pierce O’Reilly
This dissertation examines how countries fund welfare states in a context of increas-
ing globalization, structural unemployment and changing demographic and eco-
nomic structures. The dissertation focuses on two taxes that have seen significant
growth over the period of welfare state expansion, and now finance large fractions
of the social welfare system in continental Europe and elsewhere: income taxes and
social security contributions. As both of these taxes are levied largely on wage in-
come, I show evidence that these two taxes are substitutes. I explain variation in
these two taxes using a formal model of insider-outsider politics based on a model
of tax and transfer by Moene and Wallerstein (2001). In my argument, labor market
insiders, facing little risk of unemployment, prefer social security contributions, and
while outsiders with irregular employment patterns prefer income taxes. Insiders
prefer social security contributions because they allow them to ring-fence benefits for
themselves. Outsiders prefer income taxes because the progressivity and broad base
of income taxes allows outsiders’ high levels of unemployment to be cross-subsidized
by the wealthy and the regularly employed.
More broadly, I argue that the tax mix countries choose is part of a broader equi-
librium including labor market structures as well as employment outcomes. Echoing
the arguments made by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) concerning non-encompassing
unions, I argue that rigid labor markets and high social security contribution levels
lead to a dualized labor market with high levels of outsider unemployment, which in
turn leads powerful insiders to prefer social security contributions that help dualize
the labor market in the first place.
The argument proceeds as follows: negative employment shocks, combined with
non-encompassing unions, leads to these unions to demand job security, which re-
sults in unemployment being visited largely on outsiders, who then become part of
a ‘structural unemployment problem’. This chronic underemployment leads to a re-
newed focus on job security on the part of insiders. This in turn leads to insiders
being reluctant to cross-subsidize welfare for the chronically unemployed, and to de-
mands for increased ‘contributoryness’ of the tax system. The resulting increasing
reliance on social security contributions (over say, broad-based income taxes or in-
direct taxes) raises the marginal cost of labor and contributes to the unemployment
problem.
This combination of a tax code that reinforces unemployment, and a high level of
unemployment that leads to demands for a contribution-financed insurance system,
results in a policy equilibrium that can be very hard to reform. By contrast, where
unions are encompassing, consequent labor market flexiblity and active labor mar-
ket policies means that insider-outsider employment cleavages do not result. This
means that the pressure on social insurance systems to become more ‘contribution-
financed’ remains low, and thus the tax burden on labor remains consistent with high
employment.
I evaluate the theory in two ways: first, I test the theory qualitatively, by examining
the preferences of unions and politicians in Ireland and France since the 1970s. I
examine the preferences of French unions in response to reforms to pensions and
other benefits in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the Jospin reforms in the 1990s,
focusing particularly on a cleavage between the largest French union confederations.
In Ireland, I examine the votes of the constituent unions in the ICTU in response to
the five national pay/policy agreements in the from 1987 to 2003, as well as the 13
agreements between 1948 and 1979. I also examine the Irish budgets introduced in
those years, as well as paying particular attention the reform of social insurance in
1974.
Secondly, I evaluate the theory at a cross national-level. The specific hypothesis I
test is that trade-union density as well as employment outcomes should impact on
tax mixes across country years. I employ panel data from the OECD and IMF for this.
Measures of trade union density are taken from the OECD. I run a seemingly unre-
lated regression analysis correcting for the compositional structure of tax mix data.
There are five dependent variables per country-year; the share of revenue raised from
Income Taxes, Social Security Contributions, Taxes on Goods and Services, Property
Taxes, and Other Taxes. I demonstrate evidence that trade union density is positively
associated with increases in social security contributions, and decreases in income
taxes in the tax mix.
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This dissertation examines how countries fund welfare states in a context of in-
creasing globalization, structural unemployment and changing demographic and
economic structures. I focus on two taxes that have seen significant growth over
the period of welfare state expansion, and now finance large fractions of the social
welfare system in continental Europe and elsewhere: income taxes and social security
contributions. I will show that these taxes account for large amounts of cross-country
variation in the structure of taxation. I will argue that the extent to which countries
use these two taxes countries has significant consequences for who pays for the state,
who receives from it, whose income is secure and whose is left unsecured, and who
is employed and who becomes unemployed.
The impact of the tax code for redistribution from rich to poor is commonly ac-
knowledged, indeed, such redistribution is generally conceived as being the most
important cleavage that obtains with regard to taxes. With this dissertation, I want
to show that other cleavages begin to matter when we think about the structure of
the tax mix as a whole: cleavages between those in secure employment and those
not, between those who are well-represented by the political system and those who
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are not, and between those who become well-insured by the state and those who do
not. In examining these cleavages, I will trace the expansion of the welfare state in
modern economies through the prism of who has paid for it, and thus, who it serves.
In this introduction I will briefly outline the contributions the dissertation makes
to the study of taxation and political economy, then outline some stylized facts about
taxation. I will use these stylized facts to motivate my focus on income taxes and
social security contributions. I will describe the differences between these two taxes,
then give an outline of the theory that I use to explain variation in their use. Fi-
nally, I will motivate the dissertation further with a discussion of the consequences
of taxation for economic development, equality and employment.
1.2 Contributions of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I hope to make a series of contributions to the study of political
economy. Firstly, I hope to expand on our understanding of the cleavages that obtain
over taxation. The rich-poor cleavage has been a staple of political economy since
even before the seminal work of Meltzer and Richards (1981) but it is only lately that
the comparative political economy of taxation has started to focus on other kinds
of cleavages (Ganghof, 2006). I argue that an insider-outsider cleavage obtains over
taxation that has thus far not been examined.
In addition to this exploration of the cleavages that obtain over tax policy in mod-
ern economies, I hope to show how these cleavages, as well as the institutional struc-
tures that accompany them, can lead to policy calcification and inertia that can be
very detrimental to economies undergoing structural shocks. Specifically, the main
policy message of the dissertation is that social security contributions can have inef-
ficient outcomes from employment and equity perspectives, but that these contribu-




Methodologically, I build on the models of Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Pis-
sarides (1985) and Gill and Haurin (2001) to explore more fully the relationship be-
tween taxation, employment, and politics. Political economy models usually move
from preferences to policy, (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001) while models in economics
tend to move from economic policies to worker behaviour (Pissarides, 1985; Gill and
Haurin, 2001). I develop a theory that integrates these two perspectives on tax, poli-
tics and work, moving from preferences, to policy, to behaviour. Empirically, I also try
to develop a richer perspective on the tax mix than has heretofore been empirically
studied. I do this by using new theoretical variables, transformations that account
for the nature of tax-mix data, and techniques to account for the error structure that
can result in the data from the fact that tax decisions are taken simultaneously.
1.3 Tax Mixes in a Changing World: Some Stylized Facts
Over the last fifty years, a series of external forces have impacted on the structure of
taxation in the developed world, posing many dilemmas for policymakers. Increased
worker incomes and decreasing job security have arguably generated increased pref-
erences for social protection and resulted in welfare state expansion. However, poli-
cymakers have had to finance increasing levels of spending without any easy means
to do so. Capital and corporate income has proven increasingly mobile (Rodrik, 1997;
Ganghof, 2006) and thus harder to tax, while economic theory has argued that capital
tax rates should be set to zero to encourage investment.1 Governments have increas-
ingly relied on taxes on consumption (Kato, 2003), economists’ traditionally-favored
solution, but these taxes are regressive and even potentially inflationary. Many coun-
tries have instead placed the burden of welfare state financing on labor, through
income taxes and social security contributions (Bonoli and Palier, 2007).
1This conventional wisdom has been challenged of late, see Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) and
Piketty and Saez (2012).
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Income taxes and social security contributions together account for more than half
the total taxes raised in the OECD in 2009, and also the account for more that 75% of
the variation in taxes in the OECD over the last fifty years.2 We can see this variation
in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. These two figures present a time-series of average revenues
gained from various taxes as a share of revenue (Figure 1.1) and GDP (Figure 1.2).
The centre lines of each color display the OECD average amount gained from each
tax category. We can observe the pattern that social security and income taxes have
grown as a share of GDP, while other taxes have remained roughly constant. In-
come taxes (the dark blue line) grew as a source of revenue quite sharply until the
mid-1970s, and social security contributions (the light blue line) continued to grow
steadily for some years after that. As a share of government revenue, (Figure 1.1) in-
come taxes and social security contributions have increased, and indirect taxes (such
as VAT) have slowly fallen as a share of government revenue. We can moreover note
that none of the other tax categories (capital gains - the dark purple line, corporation
- the light purple line, property - the yellow line, and non-social security payroll taxes
- the green line) make up a significant portion of total OECD taxation, nor have they
since the beginning of the time series.
These figures also show that social security, income and goods and services also
account for much of the cross-country variation in tax revenue too. In these two
graphs, one-quarter standard deviations are presented around the mean for each tax.
Thus ‘thick’ lines correspond to a lot of cross-country variation in a given year, while
‘thin’ lines mean that tax revenues were similar across countries in a given year. Here
again variation across taxes is striking; revenues from taxes such as capital gains -
the light green line- while negligible in their contribution to the public purse, also
have negligible variation across countries. Revenues from payroll taxes, property
taxes and corporation taxes also vary insignificantly compared to other categories
2On average across the OECD in 2009, the categories ‘Taxes on Individuals:Income and Profits’
plus ‘Social Security Contributions’ were, on average 53% of total taxes raised in 2009. In an OLS
regression, the R-squared of regressing ‘Taxes on Individuals:Income and Profits’ and ‘Social Security
Contributions’ on ‘Total Taxes’ raised was .76. All data are from OECD (2003).
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like social security contributions and income taxes. By contrast, variation in revenues
from goods and services taxes, social security contributions and individual income
taxes across countries is considerable. The variation in social security contribution
levels (the light blue line) is particularly large.
The two figures also make two important points as regards to the study of taxation
and its consequences for welfare state funding. The first concerns the importance
of various tax categories as a funding source. While much of the literature on tax-
ation and welfare states has focused on the negative consequences of globalization
and capital mobility for tax revenues and welfare financing, these figures illustrate
that capital and corporate taxes have never been a significant source of government
revenue, even during the comparatively-less-globalized 1960s. This point and its con-
sequences will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. By contrast, income taxes,
social security contributions, and indirect taxes (largely VAT) have done, and con-
tinue to do, the bulk of government financing. Secondly, it is clear from Figure 1.1
in particular, that indirect tax revenues, the third main source of revenue for OECD
economies, have been falling as a share of the tax mix since the 1960s. They ap-
pear to be slowly being replaced by income taxes and social security contributions,
and particularly by social security contributions, as the main source of financing for
governments. These stylized facts motivate my focus on income and social security
contributions and the tradeoffs between them.
There are of course, negative consequences attached to all these three main tax
categories. Income taxes and social security contributions have potentially nega-
tive employment consequences compared to goods and services taxes. Goods and
services taxes and social security contributions have comparatively negative distribu-
tional consequences compared to income taxes. Nonetheless, countries seem to raise
revenue from these taxes as their welfare states expand. We can thus conceive of the
tax mix as following something approximating a quasi-linear function with regard
to total tax revenue; for moderate states, revenue raising seems to be spread fairly
evenly across income tax, social security contributions, goods and services tax, prop-
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erty tax, corporation tax and so on. However, as states expand the former three taxes
become more and more important. The tax burden on property, corporation and
capital thus seems to be linear in the size of government, while the burden exacted
through income taxes, social security contributions and indirect taxes is rising in the
size of government.
These patterns of variation are borne out in Figures 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. In these figures,
IMF data from 1998 to 2000 is used to map tax revenues as a share of GDP against
total taxes as a share of GDP. Colors of the individual country-year observations
represent GDP per capita; darker colors are richer countries. These figures show that
countries with higher revenue as a fraction of GDP also tend to have higher income
tax revenues as a fraction of GDP (Figure 1.3), higher social security contribution
revenues (Figure 1.4), and higher VAT revenues (Figure 1.5).
These countries also tend to be richer. In the top corner of Figures 1.3 and 1.5, we
see the Scandinavian welfare state category of Esping-Andersen (1990), while poor
countries with lower revenues from total taxation and income taxation occupy the
bottom left of the graph. We can contrast these patterns with Figures 1.6 and 1.7,
which show that little relationship between corporation and property taxes and total
taxes as a share of GDP. Most countries, rich or poor, and with large or small states,
seem to raise between 2 and 6 percent of GDP from corporation taxes.3 Similarly
variation in property taxes seems low, and unrelated to the size of the state. It thus
seems that these latter taxes have comparatively low variance across time (from Fig-
ures 1.1 and 1.2), across countries, and have little relationship with the size of the
state.
While the relationship between income taxes and goods and services taxes is quite
strong, in respect of social security contributions there is quite an amount of cross
country variation that is not explained solely by taxation as a share of GDP. Figure
3Norway is obviously a significant outlier here, collecting 8 to 10 percent of GDP from corporation
taxes. It is possible that this is due to their large amount of oil revenue.
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1.4 shows that a relationship between state size and social security contribution rev-
enues exists, but is by no means uniform. Many of the countries we think of as
being typically expansive welfare states, such as Sweden, Finland, and Norway in-
deed have comparatively large social security contributions. However others such as
Denmark - which has one of the heaviest tax burdens in the sample - raises very little
of its revenue from social security contributions. Continental welfare states like Ger-
many, the Netherlands and France raise even more, despite their comparatively less
expansive (or less decommodifying, in Epsing-Andersen terminology) welfare states.
Similarly, Denmark, a very expansive welfare state raises a large share of its revenue
from income taxes, but so do so-called ‘liberal welfare states’ such as Australia and
New Zealand. Why, even among countries usually classified as economically and
institutionally similar, are tax mixes so different?
Figure 1.8 provides some insight to these questions. It plots income tax revenues
as a share of GDP against social security contributions as a share of GDP, and shows
which countries rely most on which tax categories. Again, each three-letter obser-
vation is a country-year. We can see that very few countries raise large amounts of
income taxes and social security contributions, in fact, there appears to be a fron-
tier, along which countries lie, from France in the top left corner to Denmark in the
bottom right. This frontier, which evidences that few countries raise large amounts
of revenue from both taxes, probably stems from the fact that both taxes are levied
largely on the same base; labor income.4
1.4 How are Income Taxes and Social Security Contributions
Different?
Given that these taxes are such important funding sources for modern govern-
ments, and there is such a wide cross-country variation in them, it seems pertinent




to consider the differences between them. These differences are summarized in Table
1.1. Firstly, income taxes tend to be significantly more progressive than social secu-
rity contributions. This is illustrated in Figure 1.9, which shows tax rates at various
income levels for four EU countries. We can see that throughout, social security con-
tributions are less progressive than income taxes, indeed, in some instances, these
taxes are regressive.
Secondly, social security contributions are ring-fenced for the provision of social
insurance, and carry with them a requirement to provide benefits to the taxpayer.
The OECD (2010a) defines income taxes as ‘taxes levied on the net income or profits
(i.e. gross income minus allowable tax reliefs) of individuals and enterprises’, while
defining social security contributions as ‘all compulsory payments that confer an
entitlement to receive a (contingent) future social benefit. Such payments are usually
earmarked to finance social benefits and are often paid to institutions of general
government that provide such benefits.’
Thirdly, social security contributions tend to be levied exclusively on payroll or
salary income, while income taxes are levied on income more broadly. In the lan-
guage of tax policy, the tax base of social security contributions is narrower. This
means that income from self-employment, much irregular or temporary income,
some contract income, and income from capital such as dividends is usually not
subject to social security contributions, while these kinds of income are usually sub-
ject to income tax. The kind of income subject to social contributions varies from
country to country.5
Fourthly, social security contributions are generally tied to benefits that are paid
in some connection to a workers’ contribution record; workers who have contributed
more, and contributed more regularly will get more (Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and
Naczyk, 2012). Finally, we can note from Figure 1.9 that social security contribution




rates tend to be higher than income tax rates on workers earning lower wages and
workers earning the minimum wage. These are workers whose value in the labor
market is not that much higher than what they could earn from claiming unemploy-
ment benefits. This fact will be important when we consider the impact of the tax
system for extensive labor supply responses (Saez, 2002).
1.5 The Argument
In this dissertation, I argue that which of these two funding sources countries
choose depends on the structure of the labor market, and the structure of unions in a
country. Some labor markets are relatively free, with relatively easy hiring and firing.
Other labor markets are more rigid, which can lead to them becoming dualized.
These latter labor markets feature sectors and groups of workers characterized by
high levels of job security, due to high firing costs placed on firms. Other sectors
and workers, however, have temporary contracts with low levels of job security. As
will be discussed more in Chapter 2, these two groups are known as insiders and
outsiders respectively.
I argue that the variation in these two taxes across countries is a consequence of
‘insider-outsider’ politics, divisions between two kinds of workers. Insiders are those
with low levels of job loss and high access to entitlements, and outsiders are those
with poor job security and low levels of entitlements. In this, my work follows the
insider-outsider theories of Rueda (2005), Mares (2006) and Häusermann (2010) as
well as Emmenegger et al. (2012). In short, I argue that insiders tend to prefer more
social security contributions to outsiders. This is because social security contribu-
tions can be ring-fenced for spending on insiders. They usually flow into a social
insurance fund linked to a social insurance system where disability benefits, unem-
ployment benefits and pensions are paid in accordance with years of work and salary
upon request of benefits. Often, these funds are controlled by unions or union-linked
organizations. By contrast, income taxes are usually paid into the general government
exchequer, and are used to finance benefits that are not as tightly linked, if linked at
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all, to union membership, years of work, or wages before receipt of benefits.6 In Ger-
many for instance, while the Federal Insurance Institute supervises federal accident
insurance institutions, they are managed by elected representatives of employers and
the insured (Arcanjo, 2012).7 Similar situations exist in France. A noted Irish trade
unionist told me ‘we see that money [money in the social insurance fund] as our
money’ (Sweeney, 2012).
These structural factors mean that workers with more secure employment prospects
prefer a higher ratio of social security contributions to income taxes than their less
secure counterparts. The reason is effectively that by paying social security contri-
butions, they preserve the benefits from the taxes they have paid for their own use,
instead of ‘squandering’ their taxes on outsiders who will pay less in taxes and claim
more benefits over their life-spans. These divisions are most stark in countries such as
France, where the male-breadwinner model of social protection means that women,
those with irregular employment histories, and part-time workers, face considerably
lower replacement rates than male breadwinners with regular employment histo-
ries.8 There is thus a clear distinction between those who benefit from being ‘inside’
the system and those who do not. These differences are accentuated in the labor
market, where adult employment is often relatively secure but youth unemployment,
for instance, can be significantly higher.9 In effect, many countries featuring high
levels of social security contributions have dualized welfare states in addition to du-
alized labor markets - there is a more generous social contribution-financed system
for insiders, with a less generous, tax-financed system for those with no contribution
history.
6(Mares, 2003). See also Häusermann and Schwander (2012) who write that ‘Social insurance was
created for standard employees with standard employment biographies.’
7http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2010-2011/europe/germany.html. By ‘wages
before receipt of benefits’ I mean wages before retirement, job loss, becoming disabled et cetera.
8Replacement rates are the fraction of benefits paid when unemployed as a share of wages when last
employed.
9In France, youth employment was 18% in 2008, compared with 7.4% over the whole population.
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The key variable for determining the extent of insiders’ preferences for social se-
curity contributions is the degree of dualization. Where dualization is low, insiders
face similar possibilities of job loss to outsiders - thus everyone would like the same
amount of social protection, and no one group is likely to be paying more for it than
any other. In these contexts, we expect preferences for social security contribution
financing to be moderate. By contrast, where dualization is high, then those seg-
ments of the economy that are outsiders - long-term unemployed, irregular workers
and the like - are a burden on the system paid for by insiders. In these contexts, we
expect insiders to want more social security contribution financing, with a view to
ring-fencing benefits from outsiders.
Moderating these preferences that insiders can have for social security contribu-
tions over income taxes is the fact that income taxes are usually more progressive; in
accordance with the status of social security contributions as ‘insurance payments’
(See Figure 1.9).10 Social security contribution schedules are often flat or nearly flat
(as in France), exemptions are low or non-existent (as in Finland), and ceilings exist
beyond which no tax is paid (as in Ireland).11 In addition, social security contri-
butions are usually levied on wage income only; capital income is not taxed. This
means that middle-class or working-class unionized workers faced with high levels of
inequality will prefer to use income taxes to ‘soak the rich’, be they high wage earn-
ers or people receiving large fractions of their income from capital returns (Meltzer
and Richards, 1981).
The extent to which insiders prefer social security contributions (to ring-fence ben-
efits from outsiders) or income taxes (to redistribute from the the wealthy or the
owners of capital) depends on the degree of inequality, the size of the non-unionized
10Social security contributions are ostensibly ‘contributions’ that, like an insurance premium, entitle
the payer to a certain level of coverage. The idea behind a cap for social security contributions is that
once a payer has paid up to a certain amount that is sufficient to earn the maximum level of benefits,
he need pay no more. Thus contributions are often capped.
11Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, when the ceiling was removed in an effort to raise more revenue.
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sector, the relative progressivity of the two tax schedules, and the relative security of
insider employment compared to outsider employment. A very stylized version of
the theory, which will be formalized in chapter 3, is summarized in below.
• The Wealthy want no social protection of any kind, as they face low risks of
requiring social protection.
• Insiders want moderate levels of social protection; financed by a mix of income
taxes and social security contributions. They want income taxes because they
redistribute to them from the rich, but they don’t want the income tax burden
to be too high, as more of the proceeds from these taxes go to unemployed
outsiders, who are unemployed too often to make high income taxes worth-
while. They would rather ring-fence social protection through social security
contributions for their own use.
• Outsiders want high levels of social protection (as they face higher risk of un-
employment than insiders), but want it financed entirely by income taxes. This
is because social security contributions go into funds to which they do not have
access, and so there is no utility for them from having non-zero social security
contributions.
1.5.1 Preferences into Policy
I argue that in the presence of both powerful unions that protect insiders only, as
well as dualized labor markets, social security contributions will form a particularly
large part of the tax mix. The key variable here is the extent to which unions rep-
resent outsiders too. Rueda (2005) and others have traditionally seen trade unions
as bastions of insider representation, but I argue that where union umbrella organi-
zation are sufficiently encompassing, they will internalize the interests of outsiders
as well. In these contexts, we should see less ring-fencing than otherwise. Thus,
dualized labor markets such as France or Germany, with powerful unions who are
not however ‘encompassing’, we should see a lot of social security contributions. I
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hypothesize, but do not formally model, this outcome as resulting from a broad coali-
tion of insiders and the wealthy, who prefer social security contributions to income
taxes because they ring-fence (in the case of insiders), and are less progressive than
income taxes (in the case of the wealthy). By contrast, in countries with relatively free
labor markets such as the United States, we should see income taxes predominating.
The same is true in countries with unions that are encompassing, such as Sweden.
This is because, where there are encompassing unions, the preferences of outsiders
(those with irregular employment histories) are internalized by unions. In the case
of free labor markets, there is no sector of very ‘secure’ workers who benefit from
ring-fencing.
This analysis comes full circle however, when we consider the effects of taxation
on employment outcomes. Income taxes differ from social security contributions in
that marginal income tax rates are lower on lower-earning income workers. Social
security contribution rates tend to be flatter, and as such higher on lower earning
workers, such as those earning the minimum wage. This tax structure means that
countries that rely heavily on social security contributions face higher labor costs
than countries relying on income taxes, and these costs are proportionally larger for
lower income workers than they are in countries relying on income taxes.12 As these
lower income workers are the workers most likely to leave the labor force, the tax mix
causes certain workers to shift out of the labor force altogether. Thus the tax structure
spawned by labor market duality can actually exacerbate the duality in turn.
The dissertation thus makes broadly three sets of predictions
• Countries with medium-sized but powerful unions may cause high-levels of
labor-market duality, with consequent high levels of social security contribu-
tions, which then exacerbate duality problems.
12Indeed, some countries like Sweden and the United States use refundable ‘Earned Income Tax
Credits’ that make the tax rate negative over those parts of the income distribution that are most likely
to be characterized by people at risk of leaving the labor force.
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• Countries with low unionization levels and consequent low levels of job secu-
rity, result in low levels of duality and high levels of ‘churn’ in the labor market,
and thus will have no significant constituency seeking to ring-fence benefits,
and thus will face a largely income-tax-financed (or indirect-tax-financed) so-
cial welfare system.
• Countries with encompassing unions, even where there exists some labor mar-
ket duality will internalize the impact of social-security financing on labor
market outsiders and so are less likely to favor them than non-encompassing
unions. They will have low or intermediate levels of social security contribu-
tions.13
I argue that the consequences of non-encompassing unions can be problematic for
labor markets and welfare financing in developed countries. In this I echo the path-
breaking work of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), who argue that non-encompassing
unions can have negative consequences for wage setting mechanisms, and thus for
price outcomes. My argument proceeds not through wage-bargaining to price out-
comes, but rather through the tax code and welfare state to employment outcomes.
• Where they argue that strong non-encompassing unions lead to inflation be-
cause they do not internalize the overall effects of their wage demands, I argue
that non-encompassing unions also lead to unemployment because they do not
internalize the overall effects of their financing demands on employment.
• Where they argue that encompassing unions lead to wage moderation and thus
price stability because they internalize the consequences of wages on prices
across the economy, I argue that encompassing unions prefer income-tax-financed
(or even VAT-financed) welfare states because they want a broad-based welfare
13The evidence seems to be that these encompassing unions focus on bringing down the level of
outsider employment through active labor market policy instead, presumably to make them less of a
fiscal drag on the system and the comparatively over-paying insiders.
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system, internalizing risk across the economy. This leads to higher levels of
employment than a social-security-contribution-financed system.
• Where Calmfors and Driffill argue that low levels of union density allow wages
to be set by the market which results in wage moderation, I argue that low
levels of union density means that no group of workers has more job security
than anyone else, and thus, no empowered group of workers wants to ring-
fence benefits from anyone else. These similarities are outlined in some more
detail in Table 1.2.
I argue that this logic, specifically the relationship between the structure of financ-
ing (as opposed to the structure of benefits, which has been well-studied by the
dualization literature (Emmenegger et al., 2012)) and unemployment has not been
explained yet. In the concluding part of my dissertation, I will argue that it is po-
tentially a reason why many economies such as France and Germany, though they
have significant structural employment and public finance issues, find it so hard to
reform.
1.6 The Consequences of Taxation
Scholars of comparative political economy have historically devoted considerable
attention to the size of the state and to the composition of government spending;
arguing that these factors had important consequences for distributional outcomes
such as poverty and inequality (Milanovic, 2000; Bradley et al., 2003; Bandyopadhyay
and Esteban, 2009). However, the details of how revenue is raised also have signif-
icant distributive consequences (Atkinson and Leigh, 2004; Doerrenberg and Peichl,
2012; Bargain et al., 2013). Large amounts of redistributive spending are of little con-
sequence if such spending is financed using regressive taxation. The question of tax
progressivity - the extent to which tax codes redistribute income and thus contribute
to economic fairness - thus been of enormous interest to tax policy scholars. Kemmer-
ling (2005) writes that ‘tax mixes are an important ingredient of welfare state regimes
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in OECD countries. [They] are a product of institutional and ideological factors and
are deeply intertwined with the expenditure side of public social budgets.’ A key
problem for scholars of tax policy is how to boost tax progressivity while at the same
time ensuring that the tax code remains conducive to economic growth.
Also of increasing import to tax policy scholars is the consequences of tax code for
unemployment. While the distributional consequences of the tax code of course mat-
ter, perhaps the biggest problem with the preponderance of social security contribu-
tions and income taxes in modern economies is their negative effects on employment
and on labor market participation (Tamayo and Tumino, 2013). The impact of the
tax code on labor supply has increasingly focused on those with lower incomes. The
pioneering work of Saez (2002) has shown that those on lower incomes are far more
likely to leave the labor force in response to taxation than those on higher incomes.
There is widespread acceptance of the idea that income taxes should be negative (that
the government should refund money to taxpayers) where wages are low, to provide
sufficient incentives for workers to remain in the labour force (Blundell et al., 2000;
Saez, 2006; Blundell, 2006)
Of late, however, there has been an increasing focus on payroll taxes and social se-
curity contributions and their impact on labor supply.14 Thomas and Picos-Sánchez
(2012) cites a wide variety of other studies that find that payroll taxes are particu-
larly punishing to employment at low wages. Ángel Melguizo and González-Páramo
(2012) find that labor bears a significant burden of labor taxation, and of payroll taxes
in particular, through lower wages. In contrast to the rest of the literature, however,
Lehmann, Marcial, and Rioux (2012) find that the response to payroll taxes is actually
lower than that to income taxes.
14Recall that the difference between payroll taxes and social security contributions is that social secu-
rity contributions confer on the payee some entitlement to a benefit from the state, whereas payroll taxes
do not. Both taxes, however are levied on the same base. Because of this, social security contributions
are often referred to as payroll taxes in the labor supply literature. In this thesis we maintain the OECD
distinction between payroll taxes and social security contributions.
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Findings from several cross-national studies support the idea that payroll taxes are
potentially damaging to labor supply. Fiorito and Padrini (2001) find that ‘both the
labor force and employment shrink when taxation on labor increases’. Similar results
are found by Hutton and Ruocco (1999), Planas, Roeger, and Rossi (2007) and Berger
and Everaert (2008, 2010). García and Sala (2010) argue that among labor taxes,
payroll taxes are most egregious in impacting negatively on employment, specifically
that ‘the [payroll tax bias] plays a significant role in explaining unemployment in the
continental European countries’.15 Kemmerling (2005) finds that ‘[t]he overall impact
of income taxation is considerably lower than that of social security contributions
and, with some caution, indirect taxes’. Sachs (2010) find similar results, and in
some specifications finds that income tax has no significant effect on employment,
while the negative effect of payroll taxes is robust. There is also evidence that labor
taxation presents problems for growth; Widmalm (2001) finds that ‘there is a robust
negative correlation between the share of total taxation levied on personal income
and economic growth.’
In the next chapter, I will outline why, from an academic perspective, social secu-
rity contributions and other payroll taxes are an understudied aspect of tax policy. I
will argue that as the major taxes funding large welfare states, their sustainability is
deeply intertwined with the sustainability of the welfare state as a whole. But from a
policy perspective, the necessity to study the politics behind payroll taxes and social
security contributions is clear - the pervasiveness of structural unemployment in the
developed world demands an increasing focus on those taxes that are most problem-
atic from an unemployment perspective. Why do countries continue to finance their
states using taxes that have such obvious negative employment consequences?
15These authors define this as ‘the proportion of payroll taxes paid by employees with respect to the
one paids by firms’.
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1.7 A Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 examines the current thinking on tax policy, welfare, and labor markets.
I will examine both empirical and theoretical approaches to the structure of taxa-
tion, while also reviewing economic research on the structure of labor markets. I will
examine the literature on the comparative political economy of the welfare state, pay-
ing particular attention to the literature on labor market duality and its causes and
consequences. Chapter 3 develops a model of individuals’ preferences over social
security contributions and income taxes, based on the model of Moene and Waller-
stein (2000). Therein, I derive a series of comparative statics outlining how inequality,
discount rates, job security and demographics impact on the preferences of stylized
groups of insiders, outsiders and wealthy people for different kinds of social pro-
tection financing. I then theorize about how the preferences of various groups are
translated into reality.
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the theory as to how preferences are aggregated into
policy by examining France and Ireland. Chapter 4 examines both countries as they
responded to the oil crisis and the resulting inflation and economic slowdown in the
1970s. In Ireland, I document how unions tried to increase the pay-relationship of
social insurance, and to reduce income taxes that bore down on their workers. I
note, however, that the fractionalization of the Irish social insurance system meant
that reliance on social contribution levels stayed comparatively low. In France, by
contrast, I demonstrate that as unemployment rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
unions increasingly sought to separate insurance systems for insiders from those for
outsiders. I also document early efforts on the part of unions to increase subventions
from the general exchequer into the social insurance system.
Chapter 5 document the various agendas that French and Irish unions pursued
in the 1990s. In Ireland, unions saw their influence on public policy-making in-
crease dramatically with their involvement in successive partnership agreements that
touched almost every aspect of policymaking. In France, I document unions’ attempts
18
Chapter 1. Introduction
to retain their control of the various social insurance funds that they administrated,
in the face of increasingly strident unemployed persons’ organizations who wanted
more influence.
I also document differing levels of dualization in France and Ireland. These levels
of dualization in France resulted in the French unions increasingly trying to subvent
more and more revenue from the state with view to securing the sustainability of the
social insurance system. This most notably took place with the massive increase in the
Contribution Sociale Généralisée, a tax levied on all income - not simply payrolls, that
flowed into the social insurance funds. In contrast, the more outsider-friendly ICTU
pursued, sometimes in the face of resistance from constituent unions, reductions in
income taxes, as well as increases in tax credits that benefited insiders and outsiders.
Chapter 6 carries out a cross-national, across-time study of tax mixes. The de-
pendent variable is the share of a given tax in total government revenue in a given
country-year. I use a compositional data procedure developed by King, Tomz, and
Wittenberg (2000) and Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg (2002) to correct for the com-
positional nature of the tax mix data. In addition, my key dependent variable will
be trade union centralization and density which has not been previously studied in
a tax study. In supporting evidence for the theory, I find that increasing trade union




1.A Figures and Tables
Characteristic Income Taxes Social Security Contributions
Progressivity More Progressive Less Progressive
Recipient General Exchequer Social Security Fund
Base All Income Payrolls
Welfare System Generalized Benefits Higher Replacement Rates
Marginal Workers
Lower Marginal Rates on
Marginal Workers
Higher Marginal Rates on
Marginal Workers
Table 1.1: Differences between Social Security Contributions and Income Taxes
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Calmfors and Driffill (1988) Dissertation
Outcome Prices Employment













Unions demand higher income
tax or VAT
High Density Outcome Low inflation Low structural unemployment
Medium Density Union
Utility
Unions do not internalize
consequences of wage
demands on inflation




Unions do not moderate
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Governments choose how to
fund social insurance, low
levels of social security
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TAXATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE EXTANT
LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction: Financing the State in a Changing World
This chapter situates the dissertation in the context of the broader literature on tax
policy, dualization and welfare states. I first outline how other scholars have dealt
with the issue of how to finance the welfare state. A key concern for all kinds of
scholars, variously arguing that the welfare is in crisis and has been since the early
1990s, is that the welfare state is unaffordable. Thus a important point of investigation
for social scientists is how the welfare state is financed, and thus whether its financing
can be sustained (Kemmerling, 2005). Scholars have discussed this especially in the
context of the new social risks that have come with modern, service-based economic
activity, increasing competition from abroad, and increasing labor market insecurity.
Given these factors, scholars such as Kato (2003) and Ganghof (2005b) have argued
that some taxes are more or less important, or more or less sustainable, as forms of
welfare state financing. I use this discussion of these previous authors to motivate
the focus of this study on social security contributions and income taxes.
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After this discussion of the literature on welfare state financing, I turn my atten-
tion to the major independent variable in my analysis, the key paradigm that has
dominated the study of the welfare state in social science over the past five years:
labor market dualization. I argue that scholars of dualization have yet to address
how dualization impacts financing concerns, and perhaps more importantly, how the
way we finance the welfare state can make dualization worse. It is this idea of the reci-
procity of labor market characteristics and tax structure that I argue is of key import
in understanding the challenges facing large welfare states today.
In Section 2.4, I outline the literature on tax structure as it has developed separately
from the literature on comparative welfare states. I argue that previous studies, while
identifying several important variables impacting tax structure, have either left out
key political elements, or studied the tax mix ‘a tax at a time’ as opposed to focusing
on tradeoffs between taxes. I highlight how this problem leads to some quantitative
problems in the regression-based studies on taxation. In Section 2.5 I try to highlight
the methodological and theoretical contributions of the dissertation in light of the
literature to date.
2.2 Globalisation and the Crisis of the Welfare State
Much of the literature argues that this crisis in welfare states has been exacerbated
by increasing economic globalization. Early debates in this literature (Rodrik, 1997;
Garrett, 1998) focused on the extent to which the global marketplace and increased
economic competition placed in jeopardy national governments’ ability to implement
independent policies. Those arguing that ‘globalization had gone too far’ averred
that tax competition drove down tax revenues, while increased insecurity resulting
from firm mobility gave rise to demands for increased welfare spending. States find
themselves caught between a rock and a hard place.
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2.2.1 Tax Competition
In recent years, this debate has re-mainfested itself with a new focus on tax policy.
In several contributions, Ganghof (2006, 2005b) has argued that increasing globaliza-
tion has placed modern tax systems in jeopardy. Specifically, increasing globalization
has made it harder and harder to tax capital or corporations. Following on from this,
top labor income tax rates have also had to fall. This has happened for two reasons.
First, as capital taxes have fallen, more high-earning employees have shifted their
compensation from wages to forms of capital income such as share options. Indeed
many high-earning workers are able to set themselves up ‘sole-trader’ companies
and thus benefit from lower tax rates on their services. This phenomenon is referred
to as the ‘spill-over’ from income to corporation tax (Ganghof, 2004).
Second, high-earning labor has increasingly become almost as mobile as capital.
With increasing globalization and dominance of multinational companies in many
economies, higher-earning workers can move from country to country in response
to taxation. These two factors together have driven down top tax rates in many
developed countries, which Ganghof demonstrates. He argues that this places the
funding basis of modern welfare states in jeopardy. Countries face a dilemma; they
can sacrifice progressivity or economic efficiency in their tax code, but a combination
of both is increasingly hard to sustain.
These issues have been raised further from an economic perspective by Hines and
Summers (2009), who write
Changing world economic conditions, the globalization of production and
markets, and the economic awakening of much of the world’s population
have contributed to the problems confronting governments of affluent
countries......The relative ease of international trade, capital movement,
and communication makes it possible for production to locate in many
places around the world and for tax burdens to be avoided through inter-
national transactions. Since location choices, activity levels, and taxable
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incomes are sensitive to local tax rates, it stands to reason that govern-
ments would feel intensifying international pressure to reduce tax bur-
dens on business activities, investors, and possibly high net worth indi-
viduals. [pp. 123-124]
Both Hines and Summers and Ganghof argue that these problems are most egre-
gious in smaller countries which face stiffer competition with one another for larger
multinationals to help boost their economies. While larger countries can attract multi-
nationals solely on the basis of their size (multinationals may want to be near larger
markets and larger pools of resources), smaller countries, without these advantages
must attract companies and investment through other means such as the tax code.
While Ganghof, Hines and Summers, and Rodrik are correct in the sense that
increasing globalization has reduced top tax rates, and that the elasticity of firms in
response to the tax code is likely higher in a globalized world than previously, this
dissertation argues that their perspective suffers from a series of shortcomings. These
studies focus on corporate taxation and capital taxation, and naturally argue that
capital and corporate mobility has made this taxation more problematic. However, a
basic examination of the share of corporate taxation in the structure of taxation in the
OECD renders this conclusion problematic. First, corporate and capital taxation have
never been a significant source of revenue for developed economies, as demonstrated
in Chapter 1; thus reductions in these taxes should not significantly jeopardize the
welfare state. Second, over the course of the last thirty years - a period of heavy
international economic integration, these taxes’ share of total government revenue
and of GDP has either remind constant or risen. Thus the supposed impacts of
globalization on tax revenue has not materialized.
To see this more clearly, we can turn to Figures 1.1 and 1.2. These figures, as
mentioned in Chapter 1, are the average share of various tax categories out of total
government revenue and GDP respectively. We focus on the two purple-coloured
lines in the graph; the darker purple line along the bottom of both graphs is revenue
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from capital taxation. Clearly governments in the OECD have historically raised close
to zero income from capital taxation since the 1960s, either as a share of the total tax
mix or as a share of GDP. Thus the idea that increased difficulties with capital tax-
ation renders the financing of modern governments more difficult is problematic;
we can see that governments are not funded in this way, nor have they been. A
second important factor is represented by the lighter purple line slightly further up
both graphs; this is revenue from corporation taxes. We can see again that corpo-
ration tax revenue has not been a very significant source of government funding,
especially compared to the ‘big three’ tax categories: income tax, social security con-
tributions, and indirect taxes such as VAT. Moreover, since the mid-1990s the share
of corporation tax revenue in the total tax mix has actually broadly risen. Thus, while
Ganghof’s conclusions regarding corporation tax rates falling are correct, the same
cannot be said of corporation tax revenues.
2.2.2 The Sustainability of the Welfare State - which taxes matter?
Another author who has addressed issues of welfare state sustainability in the con-
text of global retrenchment is Kato (2003). She argues that the size of welfare states
are conditional on states being able to fund themselves in an economically sustain-
able way. This requires the use of efficient taxes such as VAT. She argues that welfare
states that introduced high VAT rates early were able to sustain higher social spend-
ing, while those countries that did not introduce these taxes early struggled with the
sustainability of their welfare models. Thus the sustainability of welfare states is path
dependent on the early introduction of indirect taxes. While she is right that indirect
taxes are commonly regarded in economics as the most efficient form of taxation,
her narrative of indirect taxation being the key component of welfare state develop-
ment is, in part at least, more misleading. I argue that social security contributions
have been the tax category that countries have turned to more and more, and thus
have been more crucial to large welfare states than indirect taxation. We can see this
demonstrated in Figure 1.2; indirect taxes such as VAT have remained constant over
the period of welfare state expansion from 1960 to 1980, and have also remained con-
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stant since then. By contrast, government spending has been increasingly supported
in the OECD by social security contributions, which rose sharply in the 1960s and
early 1970s, and again in the 1990s. Thus the idea that indirect taxation has been the
crucial source of funds for welfare state sustainability can be called into question.
This section has demonstrated that many of the current theories as to how the
funding of the welfare state interacts with contemporary economic change are vari-
ously lacking. I argue that these shortcomings manifest themselves in two key ways;
concerning the nature of modern welfare states, and relatedly, concerning the key
problems that they face today. Firstly, I argue that previous authors have misdiag-
nosed the nature of welfare states in many modern economies. They argue that the
funding basis for modern welfare states has been capital taxes or corporate taxes
or indirect taxes. But, as can clearly be seen in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, as welfare states
have expanded, they were expanded principally through taxes on labor - income taxes
and social security contributions. Social security contributions have financed a large
part of the expansion of modern welfare states, particularly of those welfare states
in continental Europe. Where they have not, this slack has been taken up by income
taxes. In sum, the literature on taxation and welfare state financing has not focused
on those taxes that actually do most of the the financing.
Secondly, they misdiagnose the problems facing modern welfare states, arguing
that these problems center on states being unable to finance the welfare state because
globalization is eroding their tax base. In this narrative, corporate, capital and per-
sonal income taxes are the key sources of funding for large states, and globalization
is placing this in jeopardy. These issues have spawned a large number of papers in
political science and economics (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004; Kittel and Winner,
2005; Adam and Kammas, 2007; Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). How-
ever, as we have seen, much of the increase in welfare states total financing has come
not from capital and corporate taxes but from social security contributions - though
indirect taxes and personal income taxes continue to play a large role, too. As I will
demonstrate later, social security contributions tend to be less progressive than in-
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come taxes, and place a large burden on labor, and particularly on low-income labor
- the kind of the labor that has a high elasticity. More specifically, social insurance
contributions encourage structural unemployment, and structural unemployment is
a chronic problem across the OECD (Bonoli and Palier, 2007). Thus, I argue, the
key dilemma in modern welfare state financing is not ‘how can we finance the wel-
fare state when multinational companies, capital and labour increasingly mobile and
hard-to-tax’, but rather ‘how can we finance the welfare state while keeping the bur-
den of taxation on labor low enough to maintain full employment’?
As discussed in Chapter 1, I argue that countries have faced a tradeoff in how they
level taxes on labour - they can use income taxes or social security contributions.
It seldom occurs that countries have high levels of both - because high income taxes
and high social security contributions would place too high a burden on employment.
Thus countries with large welfare states tend to use these two tax categories as sub-
stitutes for one another. I argue that which tax countries come to rely on is a function
of unions and labor markets, and specifically, labor market dualization.
2.3 Dualisation and the Welfare State
Outside of the literature on welfare state financing, arguably the key development
in the study of welfare states over the past decade has been the explosion in insider-
outsider theories of welfare states. These theories argue that the provision of social
protection, particularly in continental Europe, has become bifurcated; some members
of the population have good job prospects, low risk of unemployment, and high
coverage from social insurance. Other members - outsiders - have poor job prospects,
low job stability, high risk of unemployment, and most importantly for our purposes,
are not covered by many forms of social insurance. This division between insiders
and outsiders is not seen by scholars as being orthogonal to inequality - it is not
wealth that divides insiders from outsiders, but rather the degree to which they are
protected from economic and social risk. The increasing pervasieness of this division
is known as dualisation.
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Though this literature has exploded in recent years, in particularly in the aftermath
of work by Rueda (2005), examination of bifurcation in economic outcomes precedes
his work. Early work by Saint-Paul (1996) building on work on search frictions by
Pissarides (1985) has argued that in modern economies, labor-markets can easily
become ‘dualised’, with one group facing very low levels of unemployment risk,
while other demographics face very high unemployment risk. Saint-Paul argues that
faced with high costs of layoffs from permanent employees, as well as economic
uncertainty, companies hire short-term workers who are easily laid off in the event of
a downturn and a reduction in output. Thus there develops two classes of workers,
some with secure jobs and permanent contracts, and others with insecure jobs and
temporary contracts, who are used by firms to smooth out production. He argues
that this phenomenon is particularly evident where labor market rigidity is high, and
firing permanent employees is difficult.
Later, Rueda (2005) extended the phenomenon of dualization to politics and eco-
nomic policy; and argued that in many countries, capture of social democratic parties
by insiders resulted in the propagation of social and labor market policies that ben-
efited insiders over outsiders and thus exacerbated earlier labor market problems.
Insiders favored labor market policies that focused on employment protection, pre-
serving existing jobs. Outsiders, by contrast, favored costly active-labour market
policies (ALMPs), which focused on improving the labour market prospects of those
who were unemployed, and in particular, the long-term unemployed. He argued
that in the presence of high levels of employment protection, insiders were more in-
sulated from unemployment, and thus less likely to favor policies designed to help
the unemployed. This very important cleavage is one that will be the basis for my
study of preferences over tax policy.
Indeed, so compelling has Rueda’s logic proved that it has been applied to a wide
variety of other political economy topics. The salience of the insider-outsider cleav-
age in modern European societies has been commented on by many political econ-
omy scholars and has been used to explain pension reform (Häusermann, 2010), job-
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security regulations (Emmenegger, 2009a) and party-political support (Lindvall and
Rueda, 2013). A collected volume (Emmenegger et al., 2012) brings together many of
these perspectives. A much-debated question in this literature is the identity of the
insiders and outsiders, as those who enjoy labor market protection in various soci-
eties are by no means uniform. Work in this area has been done by Oesch (2008) and
by Häusermann and Schwander (2011). Collectively, these authors have confirmed
the increasing importance of the insider-outsider cleavage for social policy in the
developed world, particularly in continental Europe. However, none of them have
focused the political economy of tax policy. Moreover, none of them, with the possi-
ble exception of the original work by Rueda have given sufficient thought to how the
insider-outsider cleavage is exacerbated by public policy. In this dissertation, I will
examine how labour market and other social risk cleavages are at the roots of, and
exacerbated by, tax policy measures.
2.4 The Political Economy of Taxation
In addition to these aforementioned works, there is a large literature focused on
tax policy without a heavy welfare state concentration. The seminal books in this
tradition are Levi (1988) and Steinmo (1993). Levi argued that the development of
income taxation resulted from predatory rulers seeking to maximize revenue, subject
to political and administrative constraints. Her focus however, was largely on the
total size of the state’s revenue, not the mix, though she did discuss individual taxes
and issues surrounding them as part of her discussion of the states’ revenue-raising
capacity. Steinmo argued that the differing tax structures of Sweden, Britain and the
United States resulted from differing institutional configurations in each country. In
the United States, high levels of policy fragmentation and interest group involvement
in politics resulted in a tax code with many loopholes which made raising revenue
difficult; Britain’s majoritarian, centralized system of government led to a tax system
whose revenue sources varied dramatically from government to government, and
Sweden’s long period of Social Democratic government led to a consolidated and
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efficient VAT-based tax code.
Subsequent empirical investigations of the tax mix abound. Volkerink and de Haan
(1999) run separate fixed-effects regressions on income taxes, social security contri-
butions and goods and services taxes, each as share of total revenue. Their indepen-
dent variables include inflation, income, EU membership, economic openness, the
employment-to-population ratio, the share of elderly people in the population, the
share of left wing government, and the frequency of governmental changes. They
find that left-wing governments tended to increase taxes more rapidly than other
governments, and that political instability has been a source of increased taxes. They
also find that right-wing governments tended to increase the share of personal in-
come taxation and social security contributions, but that this effect mainly stems
from the period between the two oil crises. Moreover they conclude that ‘political
and institutional factors are not important explanatory factors for the actual shape of
the tax mix’.
In spite of these negative findings by Volkerink and de Haan, more recent research
has developed in the tradition in what was termed the ‘New Political Economy of
Taxation’ (Swank and Steinmo, 2002). More often than not, these studies focus on
the Average Effective Tax Rate as the dependent variable of interest, and occasionally
the top tax rate on a given tax base. Swank and Steinmo (2002) find that statutory
tax rates on corporations falls with capital mobility, but that the effective tax rate (the
percentage of the base’s income raised in taxation overall) on corporations does not.
They also find, predictably, that unemployment reduces income from labor taxes.
Angelopoulos, Economides, and Kammas (2012) finds that left-wing governments
rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase
consumption taxes. Tosun (2006) focusing on the non-OECD Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region, finds that the quality of governance has a positive and signif-
icant effect on social security contributions and other tax shares and a negative and
significant effect on payroll tax, property tax and goods and services tax shares. He
does not however, incorporate political factors - other than the quality of government
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- such as the share of left-wing parties, or ttrade union density.
Oliva et al. (2007) choose as their dependent variable two proxies for the structure
of the tax mix; the ratio of corporate taxes to personal income taxes, and the ratio
of income taxes to consumption taxes. Their dependent variables include income
inequality, labor as a share of population, informality, GDP growth, inflation, regime
type, taxes as a share of total revenue, share of left wing parties, share of right wing
parties, and a dummy for election years. They find that none of their four political
variables (elections, right wing parties, left wing parties, and regime type ) have a
statistically significant impact on the income tax/consumption tax ratio, and only
one of their economic variables (GDP growth) had a significant marginal effect in all
their estimations. Regarding the ratio of corporate income tax to personal income
tax, they find that the share of labor income in national income, and the growth rate
both have a positive effect. They find less robust outcomes regarding the corporate
income tax/personal income tax ratio. Countries with higher levels of informality
tend to collect more taxes from businesses with regard to overall income tax revenue.
However, somewhat contradicting expectations, right-wing governments result in a
higher ratio of corporate taxes to income taxes. These authors do not study social
security contribution rates at all, moreover, given that their dependent variables are
somewhat arbitrarily defined ratios of parts of the tax mix, it is not clear whether the
effects of their independent variables are a function of the numerator or denominator.
Mares (2006) studies direct taxation in somewhat more detail than these above-
mentioned authors. She argues that labor traded off wage moderation in exchange
for reductions in income tax rates which allowed countries to keep wage inflation
in check, to boost employment, while maintaining industrial peace. She does not,
however, focus in detail on the mix of taxes, but rather on the overall tax burden on
labour. Nor does she focus on the trade-off between social security contributions and
income taxes. Nonetheless, her theory provides support for the idea of labor unions
as being key actors in the tax policy process. Moreover, as we will see in the context of
the Irish case (see Chapter 4), the interaction of high inflation with progressive income
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taxes versus relatively regressive social security taxes had important implications for
where labor perceived its interests to lie over the tax code.
Kemmerling (2009, 2010), also focuses on the role of organized labor in tax policy,
but does not link labor to wage bargaining, or to labor market duality. He argues
that skill differentials are a the key driver of income tax progressivity levels. Like this
dissertation, he highlights the shift to payroll taxation, but focuses on the implications
of this shift for tax progressivity, without examining its roots in and consequences
for labor market duality. Finally, a promising recent unpublished paper by Martin
(2012) highlights - as does this dissertation - the role of trade unions and employers’
organizations in formulating tax policy. However, like Volkerink and de Haan and
others, she does not fully examine the effects of labor market structures on taxation.
In addition to these studies, the political economy literature has not confined itself
to direct taxes. Beramendi and Rueda (2007), following on from the research on
indirect taxation by Kato, argue that social democracies are the key driver of indirect
taxation, needing efficient taxes in order to fund the expansive welfare states that
they favor. However, they argue that social democratic parties required the absence
of corporatism in order to implement these policies.
Timmons (2010) follows up on this research and finds, using a panel of countries
from 1970 to 1999, that both democratization and voter turnout induced a modest
but highly systematic increase in revenue from regressive taxes on consumption. He
posits a tension between two theories arguing that ‘the neoclassical theory of the state
posits that representation of [a] citizen allows for more taxation of [that] citizen; the
median-voter model of the state, by contrast, loosely posits that representation of [a]
citizen allows for less taxation of [that] citizen.’ While his main source of interest is
political representation, he includes controls for a wide range of variables including
war, GDP per capita, value added in manufacturing, economic openness and some
demographic variables; as well as indicator variables for federalism, presidentialism,
and single-member districts, various measures of district magnitude, including the
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seat-to-vote ratio and average district magnitude; and finally measures of graft and
government efficiency. He finds that higher voter turnout generates a modest increase
in consumption taxes, and less robustly, more overall tax revenue.
2.5 Building on the Literature
We can see that the early work of Levi (1988) and Steinmo (1993) has spawned an
large and very rich literature on the determinants of tax policy. What, then has this
study to add? The contributions of this dissertation are several-fold. I hope to:
Focus attention on social security contributions as a ‘key tax’ especially in conti-
nental Europe. As I have tried to demonstrate in my discussions of the literature
on tax policy and globalization, the literature on taxation has been largely preoccu-
pied with the consequences of globalization. I have tried to preliminarily show -
using Figures 1.1 and 1.2, that these taxes have not, since the 1960s at least, been a
significant source of revenue for OECD countries. In addition, there are large amount
of - very necessary - studies on indirect taxation, but few on social security contri-
butions, even though social security contributions have grown as a source of revenue
since 1990s while indirect taxes have shrunk. While this tax category has received
attention from other welfare state scholars, (Baldwin, 1990, ch.3) it has been broadly
neglected by the tax policy literature. The literature on direct taxation such as it is,
focuses mainly on income taxation, and specifically on income tax progressivity, as
the key ground over which tax policy battles are fought. While I do not reduce the
importance of class-based cleavage over tax policy, nor do I dismiss the importance of
tax progressivity as an object of study, other cleavages merit discussion, particularly
given their consequences for the decision on how to tax labor.
Focus on the trade-offs between different categories of taxation. As mentioned,
there are a variety of important theoretical contributions to the tax policy. However,
most of these studies focus on one tax at a time - Beramendi and Rueda and Kato
on indirect taxes like VAT, Ganghof on income taxes, and authors like Devereux,
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Lockwood, and Redoano on capital and corporate taxation. But the reality of tax
policymaking is that decisions are made simultaneously. Most European countries
have a single budget bill that amends the entire tax code at once; the United States
sees sweeping reforms like the TRA in 1986 or the Bush tax cuts (the EGTRRA) in
2001 - once every ten years or so. Most citizens of parliamentary democracies are
familiar with the tradition of ‘budget day’ where the entire tax code is amended in
a single bill. Thus from a political and practical perspective, tax policy decisions
happen across the tax mix simultaneously. Theoretically, this simultaneity is seldom
explored. A principal theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to formally allow
economic actors to have preferences over two taxes, acknowledging the trade-offs
between them.
Econometrically examine the mix as a whole. As I have mentioned, the bulk of
theoretical studies examine taxes one-at-a-time, and thus a contribution of this study
is to go some way towards exploring the trade-offs between taxes, and the simul-
taneity of tax policy decisions. There is of course an empirical equivalence to this
theoretical goal. Most tax policy studies use one tax policy variable as a dependent
variable, without properly accounting for interdependencies between taxes. Econo-
metrically, the fact that taxes are simultaneously determined means that errors that
affect one tax may also affect other taxes in the tax mix. Statistical approaches that
do not account for this potential correlation of errors will potentially lead to mis-
leading results. By using an SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) procedure we can
account for the fact that each tax is determined at the same time as other taxes. While
some previous studies have used an SUR procedure to account for the error structure
that obtains from tax mix data (see Table 2.1) these studies fail to account for the
compositional nature of tax mix data.
Econometrically account for the nature of tax mix data. To my knowledge, all
existing empirical studies of on the tax mix (Timmons, 2010; Oliva et al., 2007; Ash-
worth and Heyndels, 2001; Volkerink and de Haan, 1999) have treated data on shares
of government revenue derived from various sources as separate variables, as dis-
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tinct from ‘shares’ that are never negative and must sum to 1. Data of this sort are
known as compositional data. Reductions in the share of revenue raised from one
tax mathematically increase the share of revenue taken from other taxes and visa
versa; empirical methods that do not take this into account can result in incorrect
estimates, as outlined by Katz and King (1999). Previous studies of taxation have not
accounted for the problems presented by this kind of data. The problem is analogous
to using standard OLS on discrete data - the resulting estimates may yield predicted
values that are logically impossible. The econometric approach used here deals with
these issues using a logistic transformation; this will, to my knowledge, be the first
time such a technique has been applied to the political economy of taxation. These
techniques have been developed by Katz and King, and applied to the study of vote
shares in elections. Honaker, Katz, and King (2002) offer a modified, and I believe
slightly superior approach, that I follow.
In sum, there is a large and growing literature in tax policy concerning the tax mix.
However, I have tried to demonstrate that this material suffers from some method-
ological shortcomings. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this literature is es-
sentially divorced from the wider literature on the development of the welfare state,
and in particularly its relationship to the labor market and the structure of economic
representation. In this chapter, I have argued that increases in the welfare state has
been largely funded by labor, using taxes on labor. Therefore I seek to develop a the-
ory for the tradeoff between the two most significant tax categories - taxes on labor,
both - by looking at the labor market, and at the structure of the labor representation.
Specifically I focus on unions, and on labor market dualization and their impact on
the structure of welfare state financing. While these topics have been well-developed
in the welfare state literature, their relationship to tax policy has not been explored.
It is to this relationship that we turn in the next chapter.
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Log of population Y
Population Growth Y Y
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A THEORY OF PREFERENCES OVER TAX MIXES
3.1 Introduction
The introduction to the dissertation has outlined key stylised facts regarding how
governments finance their spending. I have argued, following Kato (2003); Kemmer-
ling (2005); Ganghof (2005b); Mares (2006); Beramendi and Rueda (2007) and others
that the tax mix is a key public policy parameter with significant distributional, labor-
market, and growth consequences. I have argued that a key source of variation in
the tax mix is that between income taxes and social security contributions, which to-
gether have financed more government spending than any other tax category in the
OECD. As these taxes are levied largely, though not entirely, on the same base - the
labor force - there exists a trade-off between them; governments cannot raise signifi-
cant amounts of money from both taxes. I have graphically shown the existence of a
rough ‘possibility frontier’ in the trade-off tax mix, particularly with those Continen-
tal European and Nordic states that have expansive welfare states, and shown how
countries vary across it.
This chapter proposes a new theory as to how countries will manage the trade-off
between these two taxes; i.e. where they will fall on this frontier. I will argue that,
in modern economies, tax mix outcomes are a function of citizen preferences. These
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will be determined by citizens’ incomes, the incomes of their peers, their lifetime em-
ployment expectations, and those of their peers, as well as their risk-aversion and in-
tertemporal ‘discount rates’. I will also articulate how these employment expectations
and perceptions of risk are mediated through the structure of labor representation in
a country.
I argue that whether countries rely more on income taxes or social security con-
tributions depends on the degree of dualization (Rueda, 2005; Emmenegger et al.,
2012). In this context, I refer to dualization as the degree to which some workers
(insiders) have secure jobs and work prospects - even in the presence of temporary
unemployment - while other workers (outsiders) are either unemployed with little
prospect of work, or are in temporary or insecure employment. Dualization impacts
the preferences of workers in the model because it determines the extent to which
each actor anticipates being employed over the course of their lives, and also because
it determines the extent to which they expect others in society to be employed over
their lives. Where there are low levels of dualization, the differences in expected
employment levels between insiders and outsiders are low, or even zero. Where du-
alization is high, insiders expect to be employed for most if not all of their lives, while
expected unemployment levels among outsiders are much higher.
In dualized contexts, I argue that insiders prefer social security contributions to
income taxes. This is essentially because a social-security-contribution-based system
provides them with greater expected returns than an income-tax-financed system.
By paying social security contributions, they can build up entitlement to benefits
when they are unemployed, retired, or sick. This is not the case with income taxes.
Secondly, by paying social security contributions, they can ring-fence funds for them-
selves by restricting access to social insurance funds to people who have long contri-
bution histories.
Thus I argue that dualization increases insiders’ preferences for social security con-
tributions. The other major group in the model (the outsiders) prefers income-tax-
50
Chapter 3. A Theory of Preferences over Tax Mixes
financed social insurance, for three reasons. Firstly, they have access to the income
tax benefits regardless of their work history.1. Secondly, outsiders’ receipts from the
income-tax-financed system are subsidized by insiders who are working more over
time than the outsiders are. Finally, income taxes are assumed to be more progressive
in the model than social security contributions are, so benefits for outsiders (and in-
siders) financed by income taxes are partly subsidized by the wealthy, thus increasing
outsiders’ expected returns.
How these preferences are translated into policy, I argue, has to do in part with the
structure of labor representation (Zagelmeyer, 2007). I argue that in countries where
unions are powerful, and even more so when unions and employers are involved in
the collection and administration of social insurance, we will see increased influence
of unions on social insurance financing. What matters, then, is who unions represent.
The argument here is quite simple, where unions represent insiders, we will see more
social security contributions, as that is what insiders want. Where unions represent
outsiders as well, we should see more income taxes and other forms of social insur-
ance financing. Within different aspects of the trade union movement, we should see
increased preferences for social insurance financing - and less easy access to social
insurance - amongst those unions whose members have secure, regular employment
histories. Within those unions whose members’ work is more likely to be temporary,
short-term, part-time or otherwise irregular, we should see increased preferences for
income tax financing and a bolstered non-contributory social welfare system. Who
the trade union movement represents as a whole thus depends on how encompassing
the trade union movement is - does it represent all workers, or just insiders? It also
depends on how centralized it is - can those parts of the union movement that might
favor income or other forms of financing persuade those elements that might prefer
ring-fencing away using social security contributions?
1This feature of the model follows reality, where tax-financed social benefits are either universal or
means-tested - one does not earn entitlement to them through having paid tax.
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It is important to bear in mind that, as we will see in the model, the preferences
of insiders are not for a solely social-security-contribution-financed system. The ef-
ficiency of indirect taxation and the progressivity of income taxation render these
taxes appealing for insiders too. The extent to which this appeal overcomes the
incentive to favor ring-fencing will depend largely on labor market duality - just
how much leakage will there be in an income-tax-financed system from insiders to
outsiders? Thus, how much do insiders stand to gain from ring-fencing through a
contribution-financed system? If there is very little job security amongst any section
of the workforce, then income taxation might be favored overall. But where there
is a stark division between protected and non-protected sectors (Rueda, 2005), we
should see agitation on the part of insiders (and insider-controlled unions) for social
contribution financing.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discussed the previous literature
on preferences over the welfare state. Section 3.3 introduces the model, Sections 3.4
and 3.5 outline preferences and explains how they change in response to changes
in discount rates, employment prospects, and inequality. Section 3.6 begins a more
informal part of the theory, articulating how trade union structures can result in
unions advocating for the preferences of insiders and outsiders to a greater or lesser
degree. Section 3.7 discusses how the tax code can interact with the labor market and
exacerbate dualization, and Section 3.8 concludes. The details of the model, proofs,
and a discussion of the Moene and Wallerstein (2001) model on which this model is
based, are in the Appendix.
3.2 Exploring Welfare State Preferences
In addition to the studies discussed in Chapter 2, this part of the dissertation has
particular relevance to the growing body of literature on ‘welfare state preferences’.
Building on increasing data availability from sources such as the European Social
Survey and the World Values survey, more and more political scientists are devoting
attention to those political, social, personal, economic and cultural factors that cause
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voters to favor varying degrees of redistribution, social protection, and labour mar-
ket security. These studies often use hierarchical modeling techniques to examine
the preferences of various demographics over a variety of issues. These include so-
cial democratic voting (Walter, 2009), job security regulations, (Emmenegger, 2009b),
welfare spending in general (Häusermann and Schwander, 2011; Sørensen, 2013), re-
distribution (Finseraas, 2008; Guillaud, 2008; Busemeyer, Goerres, and Weschle, 2009)
and unemployment insurance (Kuhn, 2012). Kuziemko et al. (2013) presents experi-
mental evidence on taxation for the rich, transfers to the poor and inheritance taxa-
tion, while Margalit (2013) present time-series evidence from a panel of respondents,
mapping their preferences for redistribution as their economic fortunes change.
A lack of questions on perceived economic insecurity, means that there is little
evidence (an exception is Margalit (2013)) on the effects of economic insecurity on
preferences for redistribution. Moreover, while there is a significant literature on the
effects on demographics and income on preferences for redistribution and taxation
generally, there is very little evidence on preferences over how this redistribution
and taxation should be carried out. In this chapter I present a theory concerning
these preferences. Importantly, this theory is based on formal microfoundations of
expected risks and returns; a theoretical underpinning that is absent from much
of this (largely empirical) literature. I do not however, test these predictions using
survey data as these authors do.
3.3 The Model and Hypotheses
I base my model on the work of Moene and Wallerstein (2001), who analyse pref-
erences for social protection when workers are at risk of unemployment and want
the state to provide social insurance. The model here differs from their paper in
several respects. Here, two social groups face different likelihoods of becoming un-
employed; insiders are more likely to be employed over the course of their careers
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than outsiders.2 Secondly, there exists the facility to pay revenue as income taxes,
benefits from which go to the entire unemployed population, and as social security
contributions, the benefits of which are ring-fenced in a social insurance fund, to pro-
vide social insurance to unemployed insiders only (outsiders to do not have access to
the social insurance fund). A final difference is that income taxes redistribute from
rich to poor while social security contributions do not. This captures the idea that
social security contributions are often capped at a ceiling above which no social in-
surance taxes are paid; once one has made one’s ‘contribution’, extra earned income
is untaxed.
We divide a hypothetical population into three groups. A share σO are labor market
outsiders, who we assume are more likely to be laid off than insiders. The share σI
is the group of labor market insiders who have greater job security than outsiders.
We can imagine that outsiders are temporary or contract workers, where the costs of
firing or contract non-renewal are low. We can imagine insiders as being permanent
employers for whom severance payments might have to be paid. This would increase
their job security.
Both labor market outsiders and labor market insiders earn wL when employed
and when unemployed rely on transfer payments from the state.3 Finally, there is a
share σH of high-income workers (or perhaps capital owners) that earns wH in each
2For simplicity I follow Häusermann and Schwander (2012) simplify and say that insiders have high
job security and outsiders have low job security, ignoring complexities concerning skills, unionization
and age.
3In this version of the model I abstract from different wage levels that may exist between insiders and
outsiders, as I want to focus on differences in preferences that come about through differing perceptions
of economic risk as opposed to differences in wealth between these two groups. Allowing for labor
market outsiders to have different earnings than labor market insiders should not change my results
substantively, but should add an interesting potential comparative static. In addition, allowing for
different levels of return to labour (and concordant different skill levels) will help the model to speak
to those literatures on the welfare state that argue that key cleavages in welfare states are between the
skilled and unskilled.
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period, with wH > wL. These better-paid workers face no risk of job loss. I assume
that the three groups exhaust the population, so that σO + σI + σH = 1.
Labor market insiders and outsiders may be employed or not. I assume that the
probability of employed labor market insiders losing their source of income (whether
due to layoff, injury, or illness) within period dt is αIdt. By contrast, labor market
outsiders are more likely to be laid off (they have less job security), so they have a
probability of job loss in period dt of αOdt, where αO > αI . I assume that the proba-
bility that any worker who has lost their job will find a new job within period dt is
βdt. For simplicity, αI , αO and β are assumed to be constant.4 Thus, the employment











. Alternatively, ββ+αI and
β
β+αO
can denote the fraction of time that a labor
market insider and outsider respectively expects to be employed over their (assumed
infinite) lives.5
The population without earnings consists of the unemployed labor market insiders
and outsiders, σO[αO/(β + αO)] + σI [αI/(β + αI)]. As in Moene and Wallerstein, it
simplifies the notation to introduce a symbol e for the employed share of the popula-
tion.











Thus the unemployed share of the population is 1− e. I also introduce the notation
eI to denote the population of labor market insiders who are employed, and eO to
denote the population of outsiders who are employed.
4The Markov process described by the parameters αI , αO and β converges to a steady state distri-
bution of wage earners in which the fraction β/(β + αI) of labor market insiders are working and a
fraction β/(β + αO) of labor market outsiders are working.
5An important limitation of the model is that employment is assumed here to be exogenous, partic-
ularly to the tax code. We can imagine a situation in which that parameters αO and αI are endogenous
to the tax code.
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I represent fiscal policy with two parameters. The first is a flat tax rate on earnings,
t, levied on all earners that in this instance is used solely to finance unemployment
insurance for all. We write the requirement that tax receipts equal spending as fol-
lows:
T(t) = τ(t, s)ew (3.4)










, τ(t) represents tax rev-
enues after taking into account deadweight losses and the like.6 There is also the
possibility for the employed to contribute to a ‘social security fund’, which is used
to finance unemployment insurance for insiders only. We write the requirement that
the social security fund can only spend what it takes in as follows,
S(s, t) = ξ(s, t)ewL (3.5)
At this point it is important to note that the lower wage, wL, is taxed by social
security contributions, not the average wage w. This is to represent the idea that social
security payments are often ‘capped’, once a worker has paid enough into the fund
to ‘earn’ his insurance from it, he does not pay any more of his extra earned income.
As noted previously, social security contributions are usually less progressive than
6Specifically, we can assume that τ(t) = tλψs−φ, λ < 1, φ < 1, and that ξ(s) = sλψt−φ, which
allows for the tax return to be increasing in the rate of taxation, but for the deadweight loss to be
increasing. Moreover, this formulation allows for the tax return to be decreasing in the rate of social
security contributions, as deadweight losses from one tax compound the other.
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income taxes. We assume that no lower paid worker reaches this level, but that the
wealthy pay social security contributions on the first wL they earn, with the remaining
wH − wL of their income remaining untaxed by social security contributions. This
captures the idea that social security contributions are often seen to be slightly less
progressive than ordinary income taxes. We also incorporate deadweight losses into
the taxation function; as taxes rise more and more citizens either choose to earn less,
or engage in tax evasion or avoidance that efficiently reduces the size of the tax base.
As mentioned, social security insurance and unemployment insurance accrues to
labor market insiders when they are unemployed, labor market outsiders receive in-
come only from ‘ordinary’ unemployment insurance when they are unemployment.
This could be conceived of as capturing two ideas. Firstly, that in many countries
the level of income replacement is related to the quality of the previous job, ‘bet-
ter’ unionized jobs carry with them higher rates of replacement when unemployed.
Secondly, it could capture the idea that only those who have paid into a social se-
curity fund can expect any unemployment insurance, the insurance that comes from
taxation is rather ‘poverty relief’ income.7
Bringing these factors together, the post-tax income of an employed labor market
insider is
cIE(wL) = (1− t− s)wL (3.6)
The post-tax income of an employed labor market outsider is
7In Ireland, for instance, a ‘Job-seekers Allowance’ is paid to all those who are unemployed, condi-
tional on being of age, available for work and so on, while a larger ‘Job-seekers Benefit’, is paid to those
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cOE(wL) = (1− t)wL (3.7)
The post-tax income of the wealthy in society is
cH(wL) = (1− t− s)wL + (1− t)(wH − wL) (3.8)











We assume that all individuals have linear utility functions, so that u(c) = c. . This
leads to utility function of the wealthy and (employed) insiders and outsiders that
are shown in Table 3.1.
We note that αO > αI , so employed outsiders, being less likely to be employed in
general, are likely to be more concerned with the benefits available when unemployed
than employed insiders will be, even if they are employed today. The other difference
between them and their employed insider counterparts is that they do not benefit
from, or pay into, the social security fund, and so s only enters into their utility
functions once; in terms of its effect on the deadweight losses caused to income tax
receipts raised. Other than this, their utility functions are more or less the same as
employed insiders.
3.4 Deriving Preferences of Social Demographics
In this section I derive propositions which outline the policy ideal points of the three
main groups in the society outlined above; the wealthy (H), employed insiders (IE)
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and employed outsiders (OE).8 The propositions will also outline how these prefer-
ences shift given discount factors, inequality and unemployment probabilities.
3.4.1 Preferences of the Wealthy
We note briefly that the wealthy pay income taxes and social security contributions,
but receive benefits from neither. Thus their utility function is
VH = (1− t− s)wL + (1− t)(wH − wL) (3.11)
Thus it is trivial to show that utility is maximized for this demographic when
t = s = 0. We summarize this in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.4.1.1 Regardless of the circumstances, the wealthy prefer all tax rates to be
set to zero.
3.4.2 Employed Insiders’ Preferences
Taking the utility function of employed insiders from Table 3.1, we can derive implic-
itly ideal income and social security contribution rates, given in the following two
























Following Moene and Wallerstein, we note that the left hand side of the equations
in 3.12 represents the marginal rate of substitution between consumption when em-
ployed and consumption when unemployed, and the right hand side term represents
the marginal rate at which income can be transferred via the welfare system from
a workers’ earnings when employed to income when not employed. The difference
8Preferences of the unemployed, insiders and outsiders both, are kept in the appendix.
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between this model and their model is that here income can be transferred through
generalized redistribution, or through an insider-focused social insurance system.
There is much intuition to be derived from these two equations. As the discount
rate falls, t and s rise, as workers become more far-sighted about the possibility of
future job loss they demand more social insurance.9 There are also distributional
implications. As the ratio of the average wage rate w to the working wage wL rise,
inequality increases. This implies that τ′(t) shrinks, which implies that taxes rise.
Thus an increase in inequality prompts demands for more redistribution from the
wealthy on the part of wage earners. We summarize these, and other comparative
statics in the following propositions.
Proposition 3.4.2.1 Employed insiders’ preferred income tax rate is rising in inequality and
in their discount rate. Controlling for wages and deadweight losses, it is falling in the number
of employed insiders.
The intuition behind this proposition is that income taxes are the instrument of re-
distribution, and that as inequality rises, raising income taxes will result in greater
benefits for the employed insiders at steadily less cost, as these benefits will be fi-
nanced by the very wealthy. The same rise does not take place with respect to social
security as, in this model, social security contributions are not as redistributive. Here,
increasing tax rates improves the state utility of those currently unemployed and re-
duces the utility of those currently employed. Valuing the future makes insiders care
more about future states where they too will be unemployed, and so they increase the
weight they place on the state utility of the unemployed. As higher tax rates improve
this utility, so the preferred rate rises for the employed person.
Proposition 3.4.2.2 Employed insiders’ preferred social security contribution rate is rising
in their discount rate.
9Details of these comparative statics require use of the implicit function theorem, and I consign them
to the appendix first section for ease of exposition.
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The ratio of social security to income taxes will be determined by combining the two
































Again, we have several key intuitive implications. The first thing to note is that the
β+r
αI
term does not feature in this equation. Thus the overall desire to transfer income
from the employed to the unemployed is not related to preferences over the tax mix.
The left-hand side of the equation provides us with intuition on the demographics
behind the tax mix; the first term in brackets deals with contributors, the second
bracket with beneficiaries. In the numerator of the first term is the fraction of the
population contributing to the income tax, the denominator is the fraction of the
population contributing to the social security contribution. In the numerator of the
second term is the fraction of the population contributing receiving social-security-
based benefits, the denominator is the fraction of the population receiving income-
tax-based benefits. It is important to note as this point that e = eI + σH + eO, thus the
difference between the numerator and denominator of the first term is the fraction
of the population that is employed labor market outsiders. We can thus reexpress
equation 3.13 as
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On the right-hand side, we can see that the numerator is the amount that can be
raised through social security contributions, while the denominator is the amount
that can be raised through the income tax system. Again we note that the income tax
is levied on all income w while the social security contribution system is levied on
only wL.
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Thus we can see that as eO (the population of labor market outsiders who work) in-
creases, the more income taxes labor market insiders should want and the less social
security contributions. The reason for this is as follows: eO represents the population
of labor market outsiders who work, who contribute to the unemployment benefits
they receive. If unemployment is high, then labor market insiders will not want to
contribute to general tax revenues that will be spent more on labor market outsiders
who are constantly out of work; they will rather contribute to social security funds
used to insure insiders when they fall out of work. Thus the greater eO the smaller the
‘burden’ that labor market outsiders or perhaps the long-term unemployed place on
the welfare state, and thus the greater the extent to which labor market insiders are
prepared to contribute to general income tax revenues, as these benefit both insiders
and outsiders.
As the mean income rises relative to the income of wage earners (that is, as wage
inequality increases) the preferred ratio of income tax rates to social security contri-
butions rates rises. Thus more unequal societies should see employed labor market
insiders demanding more income taxes over social security contributions. The intu-
ition is clear; in this model, income taxes redistribute more than social security con-
tributions, and so the preference for increased redistribution in the face of increase
inequality follows a straightforward Meltzer-Richards logic.
A key comparative static that we find in this analysis is thus not the inter-class
conflict that is commonly seen in research on taxation in advanced industrialized
countries; redistributive conflict between the rich and the poor. Rather, in this model
the distributional conflict is between labor market insiders with relatively secure jobs
and good replacement rates, and labor market outsiders more at risk of long-term
unemployment. The conflict is between the unionized and non-unionized, or between
the risky and non-risky.
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3.4.3 Employed Outsiders’ Preferences










We note that our assumptions on ξ(s, t)s imply that second first-order condition
holds when s = 0. Thus, outsiders prefer social security contributions to be set
to zero, due to the deadweight loss they impose and the fact that they make regular
income tax collection more costly. We note the following comparative statics, omitting
intuitions as they are so similar to those in previous sections.
Proposition 3.4.3.1 Employed outsiders’ preferred income tax rate rises when inequality
rises, when their discount factor rises, and - controlling for deadweight losses and wages -
when outsider unemployment rises.
Proposition 3.4.3.2 Employed outsiders want social security contributions set to zero.
3.5 Comparative Statics
These ideal points are illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows a contour map of
utility for each of the five types, along with ideal points graphed in the final panel.
Each of the five maps shows utility at various combinations of income taxes (t, on the
y axis) and social security contributions (s, on the x axis). Lighter colors mean more
utility. Thus the bright yellow areas correspond to ideal points, while the green/blue
areas are the policy points of least utility for each actor. Parameters are given on the
right. The wealthy, who want social security and income tax rates to be zero, have
their ideal point in the bottom left corner. Employed insiders want higher rates of
both income taxes and social security contributions, and so have an ideal point that
is further up and to the right of the wealthy. As we have discussed, they want social
security contributions to self-insure, but want income taxes to redistribute.
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Unemployed insiders have similar preferences to employed ones, they also like
income taxes from a redistributive and insurance perspective, and they like social
security contributions as these taxes allow for ring-fenced benefits. However, the fact
that they are unemployed means that they want more social protection than their
employed counterparts. Their ideal point is thus a little further up and to the right
of their employed counterparts. They agree with their employed counterparts on
how these benefits should be financed; some income taxes due to their redistributive
benefits, some social security contributions for ring-fencing, but the fact that they
are unemployed now means that they want a higher income tax rate and a higher
social security contribution rate than their employed counterparts. Because the un-
employed are dependent on the system right now, they want overall taxation (and
thus spending) to be higher.
Employed insiders, however, are only interested in taxation insofar as it provides
benefits for them that they might need in the future. Thus in the model, these two
demographics disagree on levels of overall taxation, but not on the composition of the
tax mix. The extent to which these two demographics do disagree is determined by
the discount rate; unemployed workers who value the future infinitely will recognize
that they too will one day be employed, and will internalize the views of their em-
ployed counterparts. Similarly, the employed insiders who value the future a lot will
internalize the fact that they will one day be unemployed, bringing their preferences
closer to their unemployed counterparts. The larger the discount rate, the further
away the ideal points of these two groups will be.
In Figure 3.1, we can see the ideal point of the unemployed insiders is further up
and to the right from the ideal point of employed insiders; they want more income
taxes and social security contributions. The fact that this ideal point is on a ray from
the origin with the ideal points of the employed insiders reflects the fact that these
two groups do not disagree on the composition of the tax mix in the model, but
only on the levels. The intuition that the subgroups disagree on levels based on their
respective discount rates is illustrated in Figure 3.2 and 3.3. As discount rates rise (as
64
Chapter 3. A Theory of Preferences over Tax Mixes
r rises), ideal points of the employed and unemployed move further apart, that of the
employed toward the wealthy, and that of the unemployed toward an encompassing
tax system, as the employed and unemployed find their interests diverge.
Outsiders receive benefits from general tax revenue only; thus they naturally favor
higher tax rates than insiders. In addition, the fact that they receive no benefits
from social security contributions means that these taxes do not enter positively into
their utility functions at all. The fact that these taxes increase deadweight losses
on income taxes and make income taxes more expensive and economically costly
causes outsiders to want social security contribution rates to be zero. This is true
whether they are unemployed or employed. As is the case with insiders, unemployed
outsiders will want a higher tax rate than employed outsiders; but all outsiders want
social security contribution rates to be set to zero. The extent to which intra-outsider
preferences vary, again depends on the discount factor.
Again we also note that divergence among outsiders is over the levels of taxation,
not the composition of the tax mix. Thus, in general, inside the groups of insiders
and outsiders (i.e. among the employed and unemployed), there is divergence over
the size of the state. But between groups (the wealthy, the insiders and the outsiders)
there is divergence not only on the size of the state, but on how it is funded. Three
of the five demographics want social security contributions set to zero; the wealthy,
employed outsiders and unemployed outsiders.
Figure 3.1 has given an idea of what preferences might look like, and Figures 3.2
to 3.3 has examined how preferences of various groups change with various dis-
count factors. In Figures 3.4 and 3.5, we see further illuminations of the intuitions
of Propositions 3.4.2.1, and 3.4.3.1. As inequality increases (in the simulation, we
do this by raising wH from 1.5 times wL to fifty times wL), the preferences of all
parties for income tax rise (except, of course, for the wealthy), while preferences for
social security contributions are comparatively unaffected, as these taxes are not re-
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distributive.10 This comparative static indicates that the standard political economy
‘Meltzer-Richards’ model is contained within this model; inequality does increase the
preferences of the poor for more taxation and for more redistribution. In this instance
however, this preference for increased redistribution manifests itself in a change in
the preferred tax mix, away from those taxes that do not redistribute, and towards
those taxes that do.
Similarly, where outsider unemployment rises, we can see in Figures 3.4 and 3.5
that insiders prefer more and more social security contributions, while outsiders pre-
fer more income taxation; so the gap between the two groups becomes larger. In
the simulations in the figures, this is manifested as an increase in the outsider un-
employment level from 5% in Figure 3.4 to 14% (in Figure 3.5). In both figures the
insider rate is fixed at 4%. Again we can see that both the preferences of employed
insiders and unemployed insiders shift towards social security contributions; both
ideal points move downward in the graph. Again, this is because the high outsider
unemployment level means that large fractions of insider payments into the tax sys-
tem are being paid to outsiders. In such contexts, insiders would rather insure using
social security contributions. Thus in countries with higher levels of outsider unem-
ployment (labor market duality), we should see conflict between these groups over
tax structure.
3.6 Translating Demographics into Policy
These figures give us a sense of what the preferences of various workers may
be, but they do not give us a sense of how these preferences are translated into
policy. Standard ‘median voter’ models of political economy have been shown -
in the famous work of McKelvey (1976) - to suffer from core emptiness, and thus
from cycling, and consequently from a lack of predictive power. Political economy
10Insider’s preferences for social security contributions will fall slightly as a result of the increased
deadweight loss presented by increased taxation.
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of models attempting to overcome these issues by relying on various institutional
features of the policy-making process abound, and have included many formal and
informal approaches. Some political economy models take the median-by-median
approach of Laver and Shepsle (1990), others take the probabilistic voting approach
popularized by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001), and
still others take a coalition-bargaining approach popularized by Baron (1991), and
developed by Austen-Smith (2000) and Baron and Diermeier (2001).
3.6.1 The Structure of Labor Representation
I follow the theories of Austen-Smith (2000); Mares (2006); Iversen and Soskice (2006);
Häusermann (2010) and argue that given the preferences of voters, the manner in
which this happens depends crucially on insider organization. Mares (2003, 2006)
and Rueda (2005) argue that the principal means through which the preferences
of workers concerning social policy are translated into policy by governments is
through interaction with organized labor. In Chapters 4 and 5, we will see exam-
ples of Irish and French unions’ deep involvement in social policy, through either the
administration of social insurance funds (France) or through regular negotiation with
the government and public demonstrations (France and Ireland) or through regular
national-level social partnership agreements (Ireland). Thus, the structural-level vari-
able that I will focus on in explaining variation in social policy outcomes is who these
unions represented. Specifically, I will argue that where unions favor insiders over
outsiders, then we will be more likely to see social security contributions (conditional
on the existence of labor market dualization), but where unions encompass the inter-
ests of outsiders as well as those of insiders, we will be more likely to see a balance
of income taxes and social security contributions.
These, are however, conditional outcomes; the political strength of insiders or out-
siders could vary, the extent to which an insider-outsider cleavage is outweighed by
other social cleavages can vary, and as mentioned, the level of dualization in the labor
market may mean that outsiders present less of a threat. Nonetheless, I argue that
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increased outsider unemployment should result in higher levels of income-tax-based
social protection where insiders are weak or where outsiders are well represented in
trade unionism. However, the presence of high outsider unemployment should result
in more social-contribution-based financing with strong insiders. Increased inequal-
ity, by contrast, should result in higher levels of income taxes, because both insiders
and outsiders should want to ‘soak the rich’ the greater the income disparity, and
progressive income taxes do this better than social security contributions.
This logic is illustrated in Table 3.3. As before, where dualisation is high, we should
expect more social security contributions as insiders will want to use them to ring-
fence funds from seldom-contributing outsiders. Where dualisation is low, we should
see no express desire to ring-fence funds from outsiders, and income taxes should be
attractive because of their redistributive nature.
However, as Table 3.3 illustrates, another logic is also at work here. The above
discussion outlined how economic forces in the form of job insecurity can influence
preferences over income taxes and social security contributions. However, these fac-
tors are mediated through political and social institutions. I argue that the structure
of trade unionism interacts with other political and social institutions in producing
policy outcomes. Trade unions are often treated as being synonymous with insiders.
Typically, those in heavily-unionsed sectors in modern economies are public sectors
workers, workers in public utilities like electricity, water, and telephony, and workers
in large-scale manufacturing. These workers, in part because of the strong influence
of unions, have higher job security than non-unionized sectors. Thus unions are often
supposed to represent the interests of those with high levels of job security (though
this is not always the case (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012), as some sectors with
large numbers of insecure workers are often quite heavily unionised). Thus unions
are often the key actors in the political process through which insiders influence pub-
lic policy, and their actions in this respect often favor insiders (Rueda, 2005; Palier
and Thelen, 2010).
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I argue that where the trade union movement in a country is centralized we will
see a lower dependence on social security contributions. This is because the more
centralized the union movement is - the more workers that senior trade union of-
ficials represent - the broader is the view that they take over public policy. Where
unions are decentralized, each individual union is concerned only with the effects
of policy on its members. Thus, while in encompassing unions, unions leaders may
internalize the preferences of outsiders to some extent, in union systems where each
union represents a smaller fraction of the labor force, the preferences of outsiders
are likely to matter less to trade union leaders. Moreover, in such situations of union
fragmentation, unions are often in competition with one another for members and for
influence. In this context unions have little reason to compromise with one another,
and more specifically, unions that heavily represent insiders have little incentive to
consider the effects of their preferred policy on outsiders.
By contrast, where unions are centralized at the national level - often through
‘umbrella’ organizations that bring many constituent unions together - they are more
likely to internalize the effects of their policy on other elements of society. Specifically,
large, encompassing, centralized trade union confederations, are, I argue, likely to
consider more workers, insiders or outsiders, as ‘falling under their remit’. This is
not least because larger unions will have a broader diversity of members. Smaller,
less economically diverse unions, will be more likely to aver more self-interested
policy positions.
This argument suggests that where union confederations are encompassing and rep-
resent diverse interests they will be more likely to support policies that benefit out-
siders. As regards to tax policy, we should thus see more encompassing unions
support income taxes over social security contributions. By contrast, where unions
are less encompassing and economically homogenous they will be more likely to support
income taxes.
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Other comparative statics matter also. A key factor is the level of dualization,
the extent to which the insider-outsider cleavage is salient relative to the rich-poor
cleavage that is usually conceived of as important with regard to taxation. Where
labor market dualization is low, or inequality is high - such as in Figure 3.6 - we could
can see that a left-wing, redistributive coalition between unionized insiders and those
with less regular labor market histories could result, and such would feature a high
level of income tax-based redistribution as well as moderate levels of social security
contributions. By contrast, in a world such as that in Figure 3.7 with low levels of
pre-tax inequality and high levels of labor market duality, (the top 1% earn only five
times what the median worker earns, and unemployment among outsiders is around
14% compared to just 4% among insiders) the picture looks quite different. Here,
a coalition between insiders and the wealthy looks significantly more likely, while
outsiders, suffering from high levels of unemployment, are marginalized.
We can see here echoes of Rueda’s (2005) argument concerning how insider-outsider
politics manifest themselves in the party system. Where insiders are protected by
socialist parties of the ‘old left’, outsiders are caught between voting for ‘new left’
parties or for the far right. Similar arguments are made in Oesch (2008). Rueda also
argues that where the left becomes concentrated on the interest of labor market out-
siders, it presents an opportunity for traditional right-wing parties to capture some
traditional insiders; thus we can conceive of an alliance between the wealthy and
the insiders as a ‘CDU’-style coalition, while we can potentially see an outsider-only
party as a Front National-style group, depending on whether left-wing parties choose
to maximize the interests of the insiders or outsiders. Thus the model generates some
predictions as regards to the coalitions than may form in response to various kinds
of economic fundamentals.
3.7 Taxation and Labor Market Outcomes
In the formal model unemployment is cyclical not structural, in that it simply hap-
pens stochasitically to voters. However in reality, unemployment is likely to also be a
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function of the tax code, which impacts all forms of economic activity in many ways
and, as has been documented in Section 1.6, has negative consequences for unem-
ployment. This is particularly the case at the lower end of the income distribution,
where many workers are likely to opt out of working if their potential earnings are
not high (Saez, 2002). Given relatively generous benefits, intensive (working less) or
extensive (ceasing to work altogether) labor market responses can result from heavy
taxation. Saez (2002) demonstrated that amongst the lower paid, extensive (ceasing
to work) responses to taxation are most likely.
Thus the assumption of the exogeneity of labor supply in the model is a strong
one indeed. Higher taxes will result in individuals - especially those whose earning
potential in the labour market is low - ceasing to work, or at least working less
(Feldstein, 1999; Saez, 2001). This is particularly the case if marginal tax rates are high
(the marginal tax rate being the tax rate paid on each extra dollar earned). Thus it is
not only the overall rates of taxation that matters, but also the ‘steepness’ of the tax
code over certain income ranges. Typical ‘Ramsey’ tax theory argues that marginal
tax rates should be lowest where the response to taxation are greatest. Thus, we
should set marginal tax rates to their lowest levels where labor supply responses are
at their highest. Recent research in taxation has demonstrated that these responses
are highest for those with least attachment to the labor force: women, the young, the
old, and the lower-paid. Thus optimal tax theory argues that taxes for these groups
should be lower.
This is particularly problematic when we consider the shape of a social security
contribution curve relative to the typical income tax curve. As seen in Figure 1.9, not
only are social security contributions usually less progressive than income taxes, but
they are generally at their steepest over lower income levels. That is, the marginal tax
rate from social security contributions is highest at the levels where workers are most
likely to be incentivized to leave the labor force or to cease employment in response to
taxation. As such, and as has been documented by García and Sala (2010) and Sachs
(2010), payroll taxes have negative employment consequences. Thus social insurance
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contributions may actually exacerbate the labor market conditions that this chapter
has argued helps to cause them.
Specifically, where revenues are raised mainly using income taxes, (or even using
other taxes such as VAT (Kato, 2003)) the burden of these taxes falls less on low-
income labor: those who the literature suggests have less attachment to the labour
force. By contrast, marginal social security contribution rates are higher on those
with low incomes. Thus, social security contributions may exacerbate structural em-
ployment issues specifically among outsiders, those wth less attachment to the labor force,
assuming outsiders typically earn less and typically have less attachment to the labor
force. This reasoning implies that social security taxes both cause and are caused by
labor market duality.
This logic in turn implies that high levels of social security contributions could exist
in a reciprocal relationship with labor market duality in a pattern that can be hard
to break. Where labor market duality exists, insiders will demand more and more
contribution-based financing, which will in turn make it more and more expensive for
firms to hire, due to the high cost of labor, and also make fewer and fewer outsiders
willing to work due to high taxes. This will in turn exacerbate the labor market
duality in the first place.
Such a system could be hard to reform as labor market insiders will not coun-
tenance tax reform without reducing the unemployment rate and levels of welfare
dependency, but the level of unemployment cannot be reduced without reducing
real net labor costs, which require some measure of labor tax reform. By contrast,
we can also consider a reciprocal situation featuring full or nearly full employment,
as well as low levels of long-term unemployment, either due to high levels of labor
market flexibility or to extensive labor market activation policies. In such a system,
the appetite for social security contributions on the part of protected sectors would be
moderate, which would keep down labor costs, especially for low-income workers.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter set out to develop a theory that explains variation in states’ reliance on
two major taxes to fund welfare states: income taxes and social security contribu-
tions. We have seen that these taxes are significant revenue-raisers for most modern
economies, as well has having seen some evidence that they are substitutes. I have
presented a formal theory that argues that countries reliance on one or other of these
taxes depends on the strength and organization labor market insiders, the extent to
which unions are encompassing, the degree of labor market duality, and the degree of
inequality. The model implies that where labor market duality abounds, insiders will
want to use social security contributions to ring-fence benefits from outsiders with
lower average levels of employment. By contrast, high inequality means that insiders
and outsiders alike will prefer more income taxes as they are more progressive.
Naturally the model oversimplifies. In reality, the distinction between insider and
outsider is not likely to be nearly as clear cut as it is in the model; the regularity of
employment biographies and the job security felt at any given time is likely to be a
spectrum. Moreover, the predictions of the model are very stark as to the outcomes
that obtain for various kinds of coalitions.
The model abstracts from pensions and healthcare, both significant avenues of
welfare spending. In the model the divisions between insiders and outsiders come
from both the revenue side (outsiders pay less) and the spending side (outsiders
receive more). However, it is straightforward to imagine an equivalent model of
pensions or healthcare (insiders and outsiders being equally at risk of old age and
sickness) that has the same features as this one, but with the divisions on the revenue
side (outsiders are paying less) even though the risks involved are the same. A fully-
developed model of labor market duality - featuring an tax code that is endogenous
to the state of the labor market - is left to further research. In the chapters that follow,
we examine how this model can illuminate the behavior of trade unions, as well as
the policy outcomes in France, Ireland, and the rest of the OECD.
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3.A The Moene-Wallerstein Model
I briefly present the Moene-Wallerstein model, to contrast it with the model devel-
oped for my own purposes. Much of what follows in this section is taken directly
from Moene and Wallerstein (2001). They divide the population population into
three groups. The share σ0 is permanently outside the labor market and has no in-
come other than transfer payments. The share σL is the group of wage earners who
receive a wage of wL when employed. The share σH is the high-income group and
receives wH, with wH > wL. It is assumed that σ0 + σL + σH = 1.
Wage earners may be employed or not. It is assumed that the probability of em-
ployed wage earners losing their source of income (whether due to lay off, injury, or
illness) within period dt is αdt. The probability that workers who have lost employ-
ment will find a new job within dt is βdt. For simplicity, both α and β are assumed
to be constant. The Markov process described by the parameters α and β converges
to a steady state distribution of wage earners in which the fraction βα+β are working.
The high income group faces a lower risk of losing earnings than do wage earners,
for simplicity, this risk is set to zero.
The population without earnings consists of the share who are permanently out-
side the labor market, σ0, plus a share who are temporarily without employment,
α
α+β σL ; the workforce consists of high-income earners, σH, plus the share of low-
income earners who are employed, βα+β σL. It simplifies the notation to introduce a
symbol e = σH + σL
β
α+β for the employed share of the population. They assume that
the majority of people are employed, or e > 12 . In addition, they assume that the
high-income groups constitutes a minority, or σH < 12 . It follows that the employed
wage earners are the median income earners.
Fiscal policy is represented with two parameters. The first is the flat tax rate on
earnings, t, that determines aggregate government spending per capita, T(t). The
requirement that tax receipts equal expenditures can be written as T(t) = τ(t)ew
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where w is the average wage, and τ(t) represents tax revenues as a share of earnings,
which incorporates the deadweight cost of taxation.
The second policy parameter, γ, represents the share of welfare spending received
by employed persons. The remaining share, (1− γ), is assumed to go to programs
aimed at those without earnings. Thus, the posttax and transfer consumption of a
person with a pretax income of w is:








If γ = 0, then welfare policy is targeted at those without work. If γ = 1, then the
benefits go exclusively to those with earnings. A universalistic policy that pays the
same benefit to all, regardless of employment status, is implied by γ = e. Utility is
the same across persons u(c), with the following characteristics:
• u′′(c) < 0




Assuming that individuals live forever, the expected lifetime utility for a wage
earner can be derived from the asset equations:
rVE = u(cE(w))− α(VE −VN) (3.18)
rVN = u(cN) + β(VE −VN) (3.19)
where VE is the expected lifetime utility of a person currently employed, VN is the
expected lifetime utility of a person temporarily not employed, u(ci) is the instanta-
neous utility of consumption when employed (i = E) or when not employed (i = N),
and r is the discount rate. Solving these two equations, we have
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rVE =
β + r
α + β + r
u(cE(w)) +
α
α + β + r
u(cN) (3.20)
3.B The Amended Model
This model used in this thesis has several major differences from the model discussed
above:
• For simplicity, utility is linear in consumption u(c) = c.
• There is no permanently unemployed demographic, σ0 = 0.
• There is no targeting; all tax revenue is spent on the unemployed.
• There are two kinds of taxes, not one, income taxes as well as social security
contributions.
• There are two kinds of ‘worker’ demographics; insiders and outsiders.
The population is divided into three groups. The share σO are labor market outsiders,
who we assume a) are represented by labor unions to a lesser extent and b) are more
likely to lose their jobs than labor market insiders . The share σI is the group of labor
market insiders who are better represented by unions and in policy-making more
generally, and who hare less likely to lose their jobs. Both labor market outsiders
and labor market insiders earn wL when employed and when unemployed rely on
transfer payments from the state. Finally, there is a share σH, which is a high-income
group that earns wH in each period, with wH > wL. These better-paid workers face
no risk of job loss. I assume that the three groups exhaust the population, so that
σO + σI + σH = 1.
Labor market insiders and outsiders may be employed or not. I assume that the
probability of employed labor market insiders losing their source of income (whether
due to lay off, injury, or illness) within period dt is αIdt. By contrast, labor market
outsiders are more likely to be laid off (they have less job security), so they have a
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probability of job loss in period dt of αOdt, where αO > αI . I assume that the proba-
bility that any worker who has lost their job will find a new job within period dt is
βdt. For simplicity, αI , αO and β are assumed to be constant. The Markov process
described by the parameters αI , αO and β converges to a steady state distribution of
wage earners in which the fraction β/(β + αI) of labor market insiders are working
and a fraction β/(β + αO) of labor market outsiders are working. Thus, the unem-











. Alternatively, ββ+αI and
β
β+αO
can denote the fraction of time
that a labor market insider and outsider respectively expects to be employed over
their (assumed infinite) lives.
The population without earnings consists of the unemployed labor market insiders
and outsiders, σO[αO/(β + αO)] + σI [αI/(β + αI)]. As in Moene and Wallerstein it
simplifies the notation to introduce a symbol e for the employed share of the popula-
tion.











Thus the unemployed share of the population is 1− e. I also introduce the notation
eI to denote the population of labor market insiders who are employed, and eO to












I represent fiscal policy with two parameters. The first is the flat tax rate on earnings,
t, levied on all earners that is used solely to finance unemployment insurance for all.
We write the requirement that tax receipts equal spending as follows:
T(t) = τ(t, s)ew (3.23)










, τ(t) represents tax rev-
enues as a share of earnings. There is also the possibility for labor market insiders
and the better paid to contribute to a ‘social security fund’, which is used to finance
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unemployment insurance for insiders only. We write the requirement that the social
security fund can only spend what it takes in as follows,
S(s) = ξ(s, t)(eI + σH)wL (3.24)
Two notes are important at this point; firstly that labor market outsiders, even when
employed, do not pay into the social security fund. This is to represent the idea that
labor market outsiders are more likely to be employed in occasional or informal work,
where they are less likely to pay into a social security fund. Moreover, social security
payments are likely to be higher in more-secure jobs.11 Secondly, the wage that is
taxed by social security payments is the lower wage, wL, not the average wage w.
This is to represent the idea that social security payments are often ‘capped’, once a
worker has paid enough into the fund to ‘earn’ his insurance from it, he does not pay
any more of his extra earned income. We assume that no lower-paid worker reaches
this level, but that higher-paid workers pay social security contributions on the first
wL they earn, with the remaining wH − wL of their income remaining untaxed by
social security contributions. This captures the idea that social security contributions
are often slightly less progressive than ordinary income taxes.
The two functions τ(t, s) and ξ(s, t) implicitly incorporate the deadweight cost of
income taxation and social security contributions respectively. In addition, they allow
for the fact that increases in the income tax rate increase the total tax rate on labor, and
thus raise the deadweight loss from social security contributions. Similarly, increases
in the social security contribution rate increase the total tax rate on labor, and thus
raise the deadweight loss from standard income taxes. We assume, that both of the
functions have the following properties; τ(t, s) and ξ(s, t) are both strictly concave
functions (the deadweight cost of taxation rises at an increasing rate as the tax rate
11In addition, not all types of work are covered by social insurance. In Ireland social insurance
was introduced incrementally to various categories of worker throughout the first half of the century,
until participation became the norm in 1974. Even today, the self-employed do not pay social security
contributions or received benefits from the national Social Insurance Fund.
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rises), so τ(t, s)t (which will henceforth denote the derivative of τ with respect to t)
being positive, and τ(t, s)tt < 0. Moreover, we assume τ(t, s)s < 0 (raising social
security contributions increases the difficulty of raising revenue from income taxes).
We assume τ(t, s)ss < 0 τ(t, s)ts < 0. Thus a higher social security contribution
rate has increasingly negative implications for the revenue raised from income taxes.
Moreover, a higher social security contribution rate increases the negative impact of
a rise in income taxes.
We assume similar properties for ξ(s, t), but in the reverse. Increasing social secu-
rity contributions increases the revenues raised, but at a decreasing rate; ξ(s, t)s > 0,
and ξ(s, t)ss < 0. Increasing the income tax rate lowers the social security contribution
take (holding the social security contribution constant); ξ(s, t)t < 0, and this effect
grows stronger the higher the social security contribution rate becomes; ξ(s, t)tt < 0.
Finally, a higher income tax rate increases the cost of increases in the social security
contribution rate; ξ(s, t)st < 0. We also assume that τ′(0, 0) = ξ ′(0, 0) = 1 (there is no
deadweight cost when tax rates are zero) and τ(t = 0) = ξ(s = 0) = τ(t + s = 1) =
ξ(t + s = 1) = 0; tax revenues are zero when either tax rate is zero or when taxes are
confiscatory).
This leads us directly to the utility functions expressed in Table 3.1. We assume
that all individuals have linear utility functions, so that u(c) = c. Again following
Moene and Wallerstein, we assume that individuals live forever, and thus the ex-
pected lifetime utility of a labor market insider or outsider can be derived from the
equations
rV IE = cIE − α(V IE −V IN) (3.25)
rV IN = cIN + β(V IE −V IN) (3.26)
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rVOE = cOE − α(VOE −VON) (3.27)
rVON = cON + β(VOE −VON) (3.28)
respectively, where V IE and VOE are the expected lifetime utilities of a currently-
employed labor market insider and outsider respectively, V IN and VON are the ex-
pected lifetime utilities of a labor market insider and outsider who is not currently
employed. c refers to the instantaneous utility of consumption when employed (E),
unemployed (N), insider (I) or outsider (O). Using these equations, we can solve for




αI + β + r
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αI + β + r
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αO + β + r
cOE +
αO




αO + β + r
cOE +
αO + r
αO + β + r
cON (3.33)
(3.34)
These equations indicate the the wage earners care about their incomes when they are
employed and when they are unemployed, with the extent to which they care about
wages when unemployed increasing with the ease of job loss α. In addition, workers
care more about the state they are currently in as the discount rate increases; higher
r means that employed workers will care more about the income of the employed,
while unemployed workers will care more about the incomes of the unemployed,
while low r values will mean that both the employed and unemployed will care
about the other more equally. In addition, our assumption that αI < αO implies that
80
Chapter 3. A Theory of Preferences over Tax Mixes
labor market insiders care more about wages when employed; this will be important
presently.
3.C Deriving Preferences of Social Demographics
In this section I show the full derivations of the propositions which outline the policy
ideal points of the five groups in the society outlined above; the wealthy (H), em-
ployed insiders (IE), unemployed insiders (IN), employed outsiders (OE), and unem-
ployed outsiders (ON). The propositions will also outline how these preferences shift
given discount, factors, inequality and unemployment probabilities. These proposi-
tions are previewed in Section 3.4, and are discussed in more detail here. The prefer-
ences of the wealthy were discussed fairly comprehensively in the above section, and
so will be omitted.
3.C.1 Employed Insiders’ Preferences
We state the full utility function of Employed Insiders here for simplicity.
rV IE =
β + r
αI + β + r
[(1− t− s)wL] +
αI








Thus the preferred level of income and social security contributions are given by the
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Which were expressed in the main text as well. Following Moene and Wallerstein,
we note that the left hand side of equation 3.38 represents the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption when employed and consumption when unemployed,
and the right hand side term represents the marginal rate at which income can be
transferred via the welfare system from a workers’ earnings when employed to in-
come when not employed. The difference between this model and their model is
that here income can be transferred through generalized redistribution, or through
an insider-focused social insurance system.
There is much intuition to be derived from these two equations. As the discount
rate falls, t and s rise, as workers become more far-sighted about the possibility of
future job loss they demand more social insurance. There are also distributional im-
plications. As the ratio of the average wage rate w to the working wage wL rise,
inequality increases. This implies that τ′(t) shrinks, which implies that taxes rise.
Thus an increase in the income distribution prompts demands for more redistribu-
tion from wage earners. We summarize these, and other comparative statics in the
following propositions.
Proposition 3.C.1.1 The employed insiders ideal income tax rates and social security con-
tribution rates are given by Equation 3.38.
Proposition 3.C.1.2 As inequality rises, employed insiders’ preferred income tax rate rises.
Proof Throughout, we deal with t’s and s’s specified as those resulting from maxi-












ξt = 0 (3.39)
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In order to investigate the effects of inequality, we follow Moene and Wallerstein and
note that inequality rises when w rises but wL stays constant. Thus we will examine
















τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt
 > 0 (3.40)
Throughout, we note that the continuous nature of the Γ[·, ·] function follows from
the assumed continuity of the τ(·) function. The same will hold for the Φ[·, ·] func-
tion with respect to the ξ(·) function. The fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt
yields the fact that the denominator is signed positive. The fact that the numerator is
negative follows from the fact that τt > 0. The result follows.
The intuition behind this proposition is that income taxes are the instrument of re-
distribution, and that as inequality rises, raising income taxes will result from greater
benefits for the employed insider at steadily less cost, as it will be financed by the
very wealthy. The same rise does not take place with respect to social security as, in
this model, social security contributions are not redistributive.
Proposition 3.C.1.3 As employed insiders come to value the future more, their preferred




























τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt
 < 0 (3.42)
The fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt yields the result.
With respect to s we define a function Φ[s, r] and use the theorem again. With
respect to social security contributions, we have:
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τss − eI+σH1−eI ξss
 < 0 (3.44)
The fact that τss is assumed negative as is ξss yields the result.
Here, increasing tax rates improves the state utility of those currently unemployed
and reduces the utility of those currently employed. Valuing the future makes insid-
ers care more about future states where they too will be unemployed, and so they
increase the weight they place on the state utility of the unemployed. As higher tax
rates improve this utility, the preferred rate thus rises for the employed person.
Proposition 3.C.1.4 Controlling for average wages, increasing insider employment results




























τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt
 (3.46)
As with Propositions 3.C.1.2 and 3.C.1.3, the fact that τtt is assumed negative means
that the denominator is positive. For the result to hold, we require the numerator
to be positive inside the brackets. We note that we have one positive term and one
negative term, featuring a deadweight loss parameter (τt). Where this term is suffi-
ciently small, we will have the numerator being positive, which yields the result. The
intuition behind this is that the change in the probability of being rehired, β has three
effects. Firstly, it causes employed insiders to want less taxation due to the fact that
they are less likely to need social protection, as represented by the first term 1αI . This
can be called a preference for social protection effect.
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However, by increasing the size of the employed labor force relative to the unem-
ployed labor force e1−e , it also increases the size of the tax base, both with respect to
income taxation (the second term in the numerator) and social security contributions
(the third term in the numerator). As the size of the tax base rises, a lower level of
taxation is needed to purchase a given level of social protection. This lower level of
taxation causes deadweight losses to fall, which paradoxically, has the effect of caus-
ing employed insiders to want more taxation. This tax-base effect will be dominated
by the preference for social protection effect where the extent to which deadweight
losses impact on tax returns is small. Intuitively, I expect this to be the case most of
the time; it requires us to be ‘on the other side of the Laffer curve’ so to speak for the
opposite effect to hold.



























τss − eI+σH1−eI ξss
 (3.48)
The fact that τss is assumed negative as is ξss yields the same result as above.
Proposition 3.C.1.5 Decreasing inter-tax deadweight losses result in employed insiders want-
ing more taxation.
Proof Decreasing deadweight losses implies that for each dollar taxed, the govern-
ment receives more money. This implies that τt will rise if deadweight losses resulting
from income taxes fall, and ξs will rise if deadweight losses resulting from income











ξt = 0 (3.49)
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τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt

(3.50)
The numerator is obviously positive, and the denominator is positive by virtue of
the fact that τtt and ξtt are assumed negative. It is straightforward to show a similar
result with respect to social security contributions.
































Again, we have several key intuitive implications. The first thing to note is that the
β+r
αI
term does not feature in this equation. Thus the overall desire to transfer income
from the employed to the unemployed is not related to preferences over the tax mix.
The left-hand side of the equation provides us with intuition on the demographics
behind the tax mix; the first term deals with contributors, the second with beneficia-
ries. In the numerator of the first term is the fraction of the population contributing
to the income tax, the denominator is the fraction of the population paying social
security contributions. In the numerator of the second term is the fraction of the
population contributing receiving social-security based benefits, the denominator is
the fraction of the population receiving income-tax-based benefits. It is important to
note as this point that e = eI + σH + eO, thus the difference between the numerator
and denominator of the first term is the fraction of the population that is working
labor market outsiders. We can thus reexpress equation 3.51 as
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On the right-hand side, we can see that the numerator is the amount that can be
raised through social security contributions, while the denominator is the amount
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that can be raised through the income tax system. Again we note that the income tax
is levied on all income w while the social security contribution system is levied on
only wL.
Thus we can see that as eO increases, (the population of labor market outsiders
who work) the more income taxes labor market insiders should want and the less
social security contributions. This intuition is discussed more in Section 3.4.2.
3.C.2 Unemployed Insiders’ Preferences
As before I state the full utility function of unemployed insiders here:
rV IN =
β
αI + β + r
[(1− t− s)wL] +
αI + r








We note that they receive the same utility when employed and unemployed than
their employed insider counterparts, but place a different weighting on these two
states (β and αI + r instead of β + r and αI in the employed case). Thus they place
more weight on the ‘unemployed’ state because they are currently unemployed. The
extent to which they place greater utility over their current state is determined by r.
The preferred level of income and social security contributions are given by the two





αI + β + r
[−wL] +
αI + r













αI + β + r
[−wL] +
αI + r









These equations can be reexpressed as
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We note that these equations are very similar to those equations 3.38 above; the
exception is that the r is located in the denominator here, as opposed to the numerator
above. Thus; as r grows large, the income and social security contribution rates
preferred by unemployed insiders rises. Thus the r parameter; measuring the extent
to which people value the present, governs the extent to which the employed and
unemployed disagree. We note some comparative statics:
Proposition 3.C.2.1 The unemployed insiders ideal income tax rates and social security con-
tribution rates are given by Equation 3.54.
Proposition 3.C.2.2 As inequality rises, unemployed insiders’ preferred income tax rate
rises











ξt = 0 (3.58)
















τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt
 > 0 (3.59)
The fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt yields the fact that the denominator is
signed positive. The fact that the numerator is negative follows from the fact that
τt > 0. The result follows.
Proposition 3.C.2.3 As unemployed insiders come to value the future more, their preferred
social security and income tax rates falls.
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τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt
 < 0 (3.61)
The fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt yields the result. With respect to s we




























τss − eI+σH1−eI ξss
 > 0 (3.63)
The fact that τss is assumed negative as is ξss yields the result.
The intuition is the converse of that in Proposition 3.C.1.3. Increasing tax rates im-
proves the state utility of those currently unemployed and reduces the utility of those
currently employed. Valuing the future makes the unemployed care more about fu-
ture states where they too will be employed, and so they increase the weight they
place on the state utility of the employed. As lower tax rates improve this utility, the
preferred rate thus falls for the unemployed person.
Proposition 3.C.2.4 Controlling for average wages, increasing insider employment results
in unemployed insiders wanting lower taxation, where deadweight losses are sufficiently low.



























τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt
 (3.65)
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Again, the fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt means that the denominator is
positive. For the result to hold, we require the numerator to be positive inside the
brackets. We note that we have one positive term and two negative terms, each of
which feature a deadweight loss parameter (τt and ξt. Again the first term represents
direct desire for social protection, the second two terms represent changes in dead-
weight losses resulting from changes in the size of the tax base. Where these changes
are sufficiently small, (where τt and ξt are low enough), increases in the employment
rate (brought about through changes in the rehiring rate) will result in preferences
for lower taxation. Again this is intuitive: both unemployed and employed insiders
want less social protection when they are less likely to need it. However, again, the
presence of r in the numerator for the employed and the denominator for the unem-
ployed means that the former will always prefer slightly less social protection than
the later.



























τss − eI+σH1−eI ξss
 (3.67)
The fact that τss is assumed negative as is ξss yields the same result as above.
Proposition 3.C.2.5 Decreasing inter-tax deadweight losses resulting from a given tax re-
sults in unemployed insiders wanting more taxation through that tax.
Proof τt will rise if deadweight losses resulting from income taxes fall, and ξs will











ξt = 0 (3.68)
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τtt − eI+σH1−eI ξtt

(3.69)
The numerator is obviously positive, and the denominator is positive by virtue of
the fact that τtt and ξtt are assumed negative. It is straightforward to show a similar
result with respect to social security contributions.
3.C.3 Employed Outsiders’ Preferences
We state the full utility function of Employed Outsiders here, as in the previous cases.
rVOE =
β + r
αO + β + r
[(1− t)wL] +
αO






We note that αO > αI , so employed outsiders, being less likely to be employed in
general, are likely to be more concerned with the benefits available when unemployed
than insiders will be, even if they are employed today. The other difference between
them and their employed insider counterparts is that they do not benefit from or pay
into the social security fund, and so s only enters into their utility functions once;
in terms of its effect on the amount of taxation raised. Other than this, their utility
functions are essentially the same as those of employed insiders. Their preferred level






αO + β + r
[−wL] +
αO
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We note that our assumptions on ξ(s, t)s imply that the second first-order condition
holds when s = 0. Thus, outsiders prefer social security contributions to be set
to zero, due to the deadweight loss they impose and the fact that they make regular
income tax collection more costly. We note the following comparative statics, omitting
intuitions as they are so similar to those in previous sections.
Proposition 3.C.3.1 The employed outsiders ideal income tax rate is given by Equation 3.73.




























 > 0 (3.75)
The fact that τtt is assumed negative yields the fact that the denominator is signed
positive. The fact that the numerator is negative follows from the fact that τt > 0.
The result follows.
Proposition 3.C.3.3 As employed outsiders come to value the future more, their preferred


























 < 0 (3.77)
The fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt yields the result. With respect to s we
define and use the theorem again.
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Proposition 3.C.3.4 Controlling for average wages, increasing outsider employment results
in employed outsiders wanting lower taxation, where deadweight losses are sufficiently low.


























Again, the fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt means that the denominator is
positive. For the result to hold, we require the numerator to be positive inside the
brackets. We note that we have one positive term and two negative terms, each of
which feature a deadweight loss parameter (τt and ξt. Again the first term represents
direct desire for social protection, the second two terms represent changes in dead-
weight losses resulting from changes in the size of the tax base. Where these changes
are sufficiently small, (where τt and ξt are low enough), increases in the employment
rate (brought about through changes in the rehiring rate) will result in preferences
for lower taxation. Again this is intuitive, both unemployed and employed insiders
want less social protection when they are less likely to need use for it.
Proposition 3.C.3.5 Decreasing inter-tax deadweight losses resulting from income taxes re-
sults in employed outsiders wanting more taxation through that tax.
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The numerator is obviously positive, and the denominator is positive by virtue of the
fact that τtt and ξtt are assumed negative.
Proposition 3.C.3.6 Employed outsiders want social security contributions set to zero.




αO + β + r
[(1− t)wL] +
αO






We note that social security contributions enter nowhere positively, and enter once
negatively, as part of τ(t, s). Now, by assumption, ∂τt∂s < 0, and so any rise in social
security contributions results in an unambiguous decrease in utility for employed
outsiders.
3.C.4 Unemployed Outsiders’ Preferences
We state the full utility function of Employed Outsiders here, as before. As with
the difference between employed and unemployed insiders, the difference between
employed and unemployed outsiders is given in terms of the parameter r, which
measures short-sightedness. Employed outsiders value weight employment by β + r
and unemployment by αO. Unemployed outsiders weight employment by β and
unemployment by α + r. Thus where r = 0, the utility functions of the employed and
unemployed will be the same; as both will be concerned about their lifetime utility,
and unconcerned about their present state. Where parties are totally unconcerned
about the future r → ∞, and parties will be only concerned about their present state;
and not about the prospected of being employed or unemployed in the future. Thus,
the intuition is that for low r, we are more likely to see conflict between insiders and
outsiders, while for high r, we are more likely to see conflict between the employed
and unemployed (insiders and outsiders both).
rVON =
β
αO + β + r
[(1− t)wL] +
αO + r
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Thus the preferred level of income and social security contributions are given by the





αO + β + r
[−wL] +
αO










αO + β + r
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Again, we note that our assumptions on ξ(s, t)s imply that the second first-order
condition holds when s = 0. Thus, all outsiders prefer social security contributions to
be set to zero. As with insiders, then, employed and unemployed outsiders disagree
on the level of taxation; but not on the composition of the tax mix. All outsiders prefer
social security contributions to be set to zero and for unemployment protection to be
financed with income taxation. We note the following comparative statics, again
omitting intuitions as they are so similar to those in previous sections.
Proposition 3.C.4.1 The unemployed outsiders ideal income tax rates are given by Equation
3.86.





























 > 0 (3.88)
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The fact that τtt is assumed negative yields the fact that the denominator is signed
positive. The fact that the numerator is negative follows from the fact that τt > 0.
The result follows.
Proposition 3.C.4.3 As employed outsiders come to value the future more, their preferred


























 > 0 (3.90)
The fact that τtt is assumed negative as is ξtt yields the result. With respect to s we
define and use the theorem again.
Proposition 3.C.4.4 Controlling for average wages, increasing the probability of outsiders
retaining employment results in unemployed outsiders wanting lower taxation, where dead-
weight losses are sufficiently low.


























Again, the fact that τtt is assumed negative means that the denominator is positive.
For the result to hold, we require the numerator to be positive inside the brackets.
We note that we have one positive term and one negative term, the latter featuring a
deadweight loss parameter (τt. Again the first term represents direct desire for social
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protection, the second term represent change in deadweight losses resulting from
change in the size of the tax base. Where this change is sufficiently small, (where
τt and is low enough), increases in the employment rate (brought about through
changes in the rehiring rate) will result in preferences for lower taxation. Again
this is intuitive, both unemployed and employed insiders want less social protection
when they are less likely to need use for it. However, again, the presence of r in the
numerator for the employed and the denominator for the unemployed means that
the former will always prefer slightly less social protection than the later.
Proposition 3.C.4.5 Decreasing inter-tax deadweight losses resulting from income taxes re-
sults in unemployed outsiders wanting more taxation through that tax.
Proof This implies that τt will rise if deadweight losses resulting from income taxes



































The numerator is obviously positive, and the denominator is positive by virtue of the
fact that τtt and ξtt are assumed negative.
Proposition 3.C.4.6 Unemployed outsiders prefer social security contributions to be set to
zero.
Proof The proof here follows that of Proposition 3.C.3.6.
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(1− t− s)wL +
(1− t)(wH − wL)









(1− t− s)wL +
(1− t)(wH − wL)
β+r
αI+β+r















Table 3.1: Summary of Utilities in the Theory
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Increased Inequality Raises Lowers Raises Lowers
Increased Numbers
of Outsiders
Lowers Raises Raises Lowers
Increased Insider
Job Security
Lowers Lowers Raises No Effect
Increased Outsider
Job Security
Raises Lowers Lowers No Effect
Table 3.2: How Economic Factors Change Preferences for Taxation
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Centralised More Income Taxes More Income Taxes
Trade Union
Structure
Decentralised More Social Security
Contributions
More Income Taxes
Table 3.3: Policy Outcomes as a function of Labour Market and Union Structure
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FRANCE AND IRELAND IN THE 70S AND 80S
4.1 Introduction
In the following two chapters, I present qualitative evidence for the theory that so-
cial security contributions are the method of financing social protection preferred by
insiders. As I have outlined in Chapter 3, by insiders I will mean those who have
secure, full-time jobs who are covered by social insurance, however financed. These
insiders prefer social security contributions because they allow for the ring-fencing of
revenue inside social security funds which finance benefits for insiders. Contribution-
financed benefits are less likely to be spent on social welfare for outsiders. When
unemployment and other social risks are particularly high amongst these outsiders,
the incentives for insiders to ring-fence is also high. Thus dualization increases incen-
tives for insiders to ring-fence. By outsiders, I will mean those who are in insecure,
temporary, part-time, or otherwise ‘atypical’ employment, or those who are seldom
employed at all. These actors prefer social insurance to be tax-financed, so that more
of their benefits are financed by insiders who are in regular employment, and by the
wealthy through progressive taxation.
These chapters focus on France and Ireland, two modern European economies
where unions are quite involved in policymaking. As we can see seen from Fig-
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ures 4.1 and 4.2, France has much higher levels of social security contributions as a
share of government revenue than Ireland, as well as lower levels of income taxation.
This difference makes these two countries ideal for the purpose of examining the
workings of the theory. The research strategy is to examine the differences in labor
market dualization and trade union centralization between France and Ireland, as
well as across time within each country. I then try to link these differences to changes
in social insurance financing during this period. I examine the policy positions of
unions with respect to social security contributions and income taxes, and argue that
these differences stem from unions’ preferences for ring-fencing funds for insiders,
especially where outsider unemployment was high.
Where possible, interviews are used to gauge the opinions and strategies of policy-
makers involved. Where the reforms in question are so long ago such that interviews
would be impracticable, I rely on as much primary-source documentation as possi-
ble, supplemented, where necessary, with primary source quotations from secondary
materials, and with secondary materials themselves. The aim is to develop a pic-
ture of which groups advocated which reforms, and then to analyze the factors that
resulted in the success of some reforms, and the failure of others.
This first chapter focuses first on the 1970s, and both countries’ responses to the
oil crisis in the middle of that decade, as well as each countries’ response to the pro-
longed economic slowdown in the 1980s. The chapter proceeds as follows. The re-
mainder of the introduction discusses the sources I have used for Ireland and France
throughout the two chapters, while Section 4.2 outlines key structural differences
between Irish and French trade unionism. In the remainder of the chapter, I give
episodic evidence from both countries of unions’ defense of, and efforts to expand,
contribution-financed social insurance. Section 4.3 outlines how the fractionalized
nature of French trade unionism meant that, even in the absence of labor market
dualization, French union confederations jealously guarded social insurance funds.
Section 4.4 argues that with the onset of financial difficulty for the social security sys-
tem after the oil crisis the French labor market began to dualize. As this happened,
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French unions began to separate out protection for insiders from protection for out-
siders in social insurance financing. Section 4.5 outlines the increasing duality in the
French social insurance system, as structural unemployment became endemic in the
economy.
Section 4.6 demonstrates the Irish unions’ persistent attempts over the course of
the 1970s to increase the relationship of social insurance benefits to previous salary, a
concession that French unions had won shortly after the Second World War. I note the
willingness of many Irish trade unionists to pay higher contributions in exchange for
services, and their opposition to ‘budgetization’, the merging of the social insurance
fund with the general exchequer. I also document Irish unions’ attempts to lower
income taxes on their members, and their perceptions of income taxes to be an unfair
burden on workers by farmers and the self-employed.
4.1.1 Irish Sources
My Irish research is principally informed by the Annual Reports of the Irish Congress
of Trade Unions, which is the principal umbrella organization of Irish trade unionism
that conducts most negotiations with the government and employers on public policy
on behalf of smaller unions. The reports of the organisation were published annually
from before 1930 up to 1988 and biannually thereafter.12 They contain a transcript of
the organization’s annual conference, where delegates from the ICTU’s constituent
unions came to debate policy, as well as an annual report from the National Exec-
utive of the Congress to the constituent unions, detailing the Executive’s efforts to
achieve the goals of the membership in negotiations with the employers and with the
government of the day. Where the ICTU made policy submissions to the government
1The first report I have been able to obtain is from 1926. Though the then ITUC (Irish Trade Union
Congress) seems to have met many times previously, it is not clear when the annual reports began to
be published.
2The umbrella organization of Irish trade unionism was originally named the Irish Trade Union
Congress ITUC, but after a two-year long split in the organization, it was re-formed as the Irish Congress
of Trade Unions (ICTU). For the simplicity, I refer throughout to the ICTU.
111
Chapter 4. France and Ireland in the 70s and 80s
concerning budgets or to social and tax policy commissions, these submissions are
also contained therein. The annual reports are thus the most comprehensive picture
available of the policy agenda of Irish trade unionism.
In addition, the minutes of the conference give a picture of the internal debates
within the unions, and thus of intra-union cleavages over policy. Motions at the con-
ference were proposed by various unions, then debated, and then passed or failed
by vote. Motions passed became ICTU policy, obliging the ICTU Executive Commit-
tee (which was annually elected at the conference) to pursue certain goals in their
negotiations with the government. Often motions would be very controversial, and
significant intra-union cleavages can be observed, as well as frustration on the part
of constituent unions with the National Executive.3
I also consult policy documents and annual reports published by various other
unions and interest groups, including:
• IMPACT, Ireland’s largest public sector union, which principally represents
many rank-and-file public sector workers.
• SIPTU, the Services, Industrial, Professional, and Technical Union, which is the
largest, and arguably broadest-based Irish trade union. It represents workers
from both inside and outside the public sector.
• PSEU, The Public Service Executive Union, which represents public sector middle-
management and as well as some upper-grade public servants.
• IBEC, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation, which is the principal
business and employers’ organization in Ireland, representing the semi-state
sector, the multinational sector, the banks, the financial services industry, and
many small and medium enterprises.
3As I will show, in this chapter and Chapter 5, there is evidence that the National Executive took
a significantly more pragmatic stance with respect to many public policy issues than some constituent
unions would have preferred.
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• ISME, the Irish Medium and Small Employers Association, which represents
firms with usually fewer than 50 employees, and was formed from a breakaway
group from IBEC in the early 1990s. It did not participate in the Social Partner-
ship process of the 1990s and early 2000s, which will be discussed in Chapter
5.
• INOU, the Irish National Organization of the Unemployed, which is a lobby
group set up in the 1980s during Ireland’s employment crisis to advocate on
behalf of the poor and unemployed.
• NESC, the National Economic and Social Council, which was a government-
sponsored think-tank, containing representatives from unions, employers, and
community groups and published policy memos, some of which were very
influential on future government policy.
I also rely on a wide variety of official publications, both from the Irish National
Archives, as well as Trinity College Dublin’s Official Publications Archive. These
documents primarily consist of White Papers (pre-legislative government consulta-
tion papers) from the Department of Finance, the Department of Social Welfare, and
the Department of the Taoiseach (the Prime Minister’s Office), though reports of var-
ious special commissions on taxation and social welfare are also important sources.
I consult parliamentary debates, available online at www.oireachtas.ie, and also the
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael party archives, both held at the University College Dublin
Archives. These latter party archives contain policy documents, canvassing leaflets,
and transcripts of speeches made during election campaigns, which give an idea of
the policy positions of the various parties, and the issues on which they chose to
fight elections. In addition to these primary written sources, I present evidence from
interviews with a wide variety of senior officials in Irish trade unionism as well as in
Irish employer organizations, to get a sense of the policy motivations of both trade
unionist officials and employers, as well as their perceptions of the motivations of
their constituents. These officials included:
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• David Begg, the General Secretary of the ICTU.
• Paul Sweeney, the chief economist of the ICTU.
• Jack O’Connor, the General Secretary of SIPTU.
• Marie Sherlock, an economist with SIPTU’s policy department.
• Paddy Keating, the chief economist at IMPACT.
• Tom Geraghty, the General Secretary of the PSEU.
• Fergal O’Brien, the chief economist at IBEC.
• Mark Fielding, the Chief Executive of ISME.4
4.1.2 French Sources
For economic background in France, I have relied primarily on the OECD’s Eco-
nomic Surveys which were published annually or biannually from 1943 to the present.
These surveys provide an overview of the French economy that year, as well as de-
tails of the principal changes made by the French authorities on fiscal, monetary,
social and labor market policy. They contain forecasts for coming years, and allow
us to assess the information and expectations on which French policymakers were
making their decisions. For the background of the French social insurance system I
have relied on Laroque (1966); Pedersen (1993) and Smith (2003). For background on
the politics of French social policy I have relied on Baldwin (1990); Mares (2003) and
Culpepper, Hall, and Palier (2006).
My primary sources come from two specific places. The first is the France’s
Archives of the World of Work, in Roubaix, France. These archives contain exten-
sive trade union leaflets, meeting minutes, policy papers, and books published on
social security and many other topics.5 I specifically rely on dossiers concerning the
4All of my interviewees consented to being interviewed and quoted on the record.
5Their website is http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/camt/
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CGT, France’s largest and most radical union, as well as the smaller unions, such as
the CFDT, a more moderate union that sometimes engaged more constructively with
the government and employers, and CFTC a comparatively small Christian Demo-
cratic union. I also examine the annual reports of the Secrétariat Général du Comite
Interministériel pour l’Information (General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Com-
mittee for Information) which published annual reports on the social security funds,
as well as assorted government documents and reports published by the Ministry of
Labor, Employment and Population, as well as the Ministry of Health.
In addition to this I rely on the Dossiers de Presse at Sciences Po in Paris, Frace.
These archives contain press clippings from most major French newspapers. Unlike
the Irish press, many French newspapers retain a specific left-right standpoint. The
Dossiers de Presse contain sources from right-wing newspapers such as Le Figaro,
Les Echos, L’Express and Le Point, as well as Roman Catholic newspapers such as La
Croix, centrist newspaper such as Le Journal du Dimanche centre-left newspapers such
as Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur and Libération and further left newspapers such
as L’Humanité. Newspapers such as La Rouge, L’Humanité, La Croix and La Figaro are
especially useful in gaining an insight into the positions taken by the CFDT, the CGT
and the CFTC and CNPF (the French employers’ organization) respectively.
4.2 The Structure of Labour Representation: Fractionalized Unions
versus a Functioning Umbrella Organization
4.2.1 Union Tensions in France
French unions are powerful and weak in different ways. French trade union density
- the share of the workforce that are union members - is quite low by European stan-
dards (see Figure 4.3, which gives a time series of trade union densities of France and
Ireland), which means that French unions are often perceived to lack the legitimacy
to represent all workers in the policy process. But in spite of this, French unions are
politically quite powerful for three reasons.
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• First, they command enormous capability to bring workers on strike, often in
numbers far out of proportion to their membership.
• Second, French law gives unions specific powers that provides them with an
influence beyond that which might come from membership numbers alone. In
wage bargaining, wage agreements struck with unions bind on all workers in
a sector, even if the worker was is not a member of the union that struck the
bargain with employers.
• Third, in social security policy, unions jointly administer, with employers, social
insurance funds that provide healthcare, pensions, and disability benefits.
Thus French unions are powerful and influential even though their density is low.
We can see that they might represent the views of insiders only (as union density is
low), and thus might have a significant level of influence in the policy process, (as
they institutionally and legally have a comparatively large amount of power).
However, the French union movement’s not inconsiderable political power is re-
duced somewhat by the fact that the movement is quite fractured. Five principal
union confederations dominate the landscape, though each of these confederations
represents many smaller constituent unions. Unlike the Irish case, as we will see, the
profiles of the five union confederations are very different, such that we can expect
very different positions and social and labour market policy.
The CGT, (Confédération Générale du Travail - General Confederation of Labour),
is the oldest and largest union confederation with approximately 720,000 members
in France (Boulin, 1996). It is also commonly regarded as the most ideologically
radical union confederation. It is historically a communist confederation and has
maintained ties with the French Communist Party. As such it is rarely inclined to
compromise, even with left-wing governments.6 For example, the CGT’s links to
6(Boulin, 1996) notes that the CGT has only signed one major national cross-sectoral agreement since
the beginning of the 1980s.
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the communist party meant that, in the 1980s, it would only negotiate - even with
the Socialist-led Mitterand Presidency - because the Communist Party were coalition
partners. It ceased to negotiate with the Socialist Government after these Communist
ministers left the coalition. In further evidence of their comparative radicalization,
in the 1990s, the CGT were the origin of one-third of all the calls for strike action in
France (Besancenot and Vranceanu, 1999).
The FO, (Force Ouvrière - Workers Force), is a confederation that split from the
CGT in the aftermath of the Second World War. It is a reasonably ‘broad church’ con-
federation, accommodating political perspectives from Socialists to Christian Democrats,
but has maintained a rigid anti-communist line, which is part based on its history of
splitting from the CGT over the latter unions’ ties to the French Communist party.
Another smaller confederation is the CFTC (Confédération Française des Travailleurs
Chretiens - French Confederation of Christian Workers), which is a Christian Demo-
crat trade union confederation, that seeks to combine traditional trade unionism with
social solidarity. As a Christian Democratic union confederation, it has traditionally
had strong support for family-oriented policies such as children’s allowances.
The CFDT (Confédération Française Democratique du Travail - French Democratic
Confederation of Labour) is a more moderate, socialist union confederation. It origi-
nally supported the Socialist government in the 1980s, but gradually distanced itself
from this government over the course of its term in office (Boulin, 1996). Despite this,
over the 1980s it focused a great deal more on small and medium-sized businesses,
and saw its numbers rise somewhat more than other French union confederations.
Unlike the CGT, CFTC and FO, it negotiated and signed a reform of unemployment
insurance in 2000 with MEDEF (Vail, 2004).
The last of the main French union confederations is the CFE-CGC, the Confédéra-
tion française de l’encadrement - Confédération générale des cadres (French Confed-
eration of Management - General Confederation of Executives), which is a confeder-
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ation that organizes solely at the professional and middle-management levels. It has
no constituent unions that feature semi-skilled or unskilled workers, and thus stands
somewhat apart from the other union confederations. It is a regular cooperator with
the government and employers on policy issues.
These differing confederations thus have differing ideologies, and somewhat differ-
ent demographic bases. Despite this, they still compete for workers, and for influence.
This competition is a key factor in preventing a unified voice of French trade union-
ism. For example, when the CGT (the largest union confederation) and the CFDT
(the second largest) held talks in advance of their respective national conferences
in 1998, with a view to developing common policies, the French Christian Workers’
Confederation (Confédération Frana̧ise des Travailleurs Chretiens, CFTC) stated that
it was ‘waiting to see what was behind the meeting’ and whether it implied ‘some
real changes’, before asking itself ‘what strategy was behind it all’. Even more con-
tentiously, the FO’s response to the meeting was that it refused to enter ‘at all into
the political maelstrom of which the CGT and the CFDT are part’ (Bilous, 1998b) and
argued that for the FO, ’on [our] own against everyone else, thats the best position
to be in.’7 After the meeting, the FO organized a demonstration in Paris, against the
other two unions, under the slogan ‘a trade union that is still a trade union’.
This fractionalization has often hampered the unions’ attempts to influence public
policies. For example, on the 13 of May 1980, a widespread strike was organized
in response to proposals to raise co-payments for health insurance, and decrease
the extent to which hospital care was covered by social insurance (La Rouge, 1980;
L’Humanité, 1980a; Quotidien de Paris, 1980b).8 This strike was one of the most
successful that had been seen in France that decade, with high participation levels.
The CGT was the main proponent of the strike, though the CFDT and the FEN also
participated. However, the CFDT’s participation was lukewarm, it argued that it did
7The general secretary of the FO, also claimed that the ’[the] closer relationship [between the CGT
and CFDT] will last no longer than the time it takes to dance a tango’.
8These reforms are further discussed in Section 4.4.2.
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not want to the strike action to be expanded. The FO, by contrast, supported the
reforms to the healthcare system, working with the employers - the CNPF - to reform
the system. Not to be outdone, the FO had a demonstration the same day, but with
a significantly more conciliatory tone (Quotidien de Paris, 1980a). For this they were
excoriated by the CGT leadership (La Croix, 1980), whom they accused in turn of
‘lying with every breath’ in their accusations (Quotidien de Paris, 1980a).
Given the French unions fragmentation and comparative lack of members and
their often visible animosity towards each other, their influence over wage and social
policy is perhaps surprising. As mentioned, it can in part be attributed to the fact
that French law enshrines the ‘assumption of representativeness’ (Besancenot and
Vranceanu, 1999), whereby the five principal unions are assumed to represent the
interests of workers in their sectors, regardless of whether those workers are members
of the union or not. In 1982 this institution was reinforced; the Socialist Government
that held a legislative majority and the Presidency sought to increase union power. A
law was passed which made sectoral bargaining over wages compulsory and granted
five major confederations exclusive bargaining rights in the workplace. Moreover, the
law resulted in only one union being required to sign an agreement with employers
for that agreement to be binding on all workers in a firm. Thus, though union density
is very low in France (very few workers are members of unions) union coverage is very
high - 90% of workers in 1997 were covered by a union-employer wage agreement.
This, again, gives unions power far beyond their membership numbers.
The French unions are also deeply involved in the administration of social security.
Since the inception of the modern system of French social insurance, the principle of
paritarisme has obtained. Under this system, individual funds receive contributions
of varying levels from different classes of employees and employers. These contri-
butions can vary by industry, by job tenure, and by region. In most of these funds,
the administration of the fund is carried out jointly by boards containing elected
representatives from unions and from employers organizations. Contribution rates
and benefit rates are usually set by the government in conjunction with unions and
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employers. For those funds which benefit public-sector workers, the state acts as the
employer as well. Thus, in spite of the comparatively low levels of French workers
who are members of trade unions, unions have a deep impact on the lives of French
workers through their administration of social insurance (Palier, 2006). However, the
fractionalized nature of the system meant that this system is very difficult to reform.
In sum, France’s union system is unusual in several respects. First, low union
density, but high union coverage, as well as deep union involvement in the adminis-
tration of social insurance, means that unions have a lot of bargaining power. Their
preferences make a significant impact on wage and social insurance policy in spite of
their comparatively low levels of membership. Second, the French union system is
unusual in that, while it does have ‘umbrella’ union confederations that unite various
sector-specific unions, it has five of them. Thirdly, the individual unions have deep
and often ideological and political differences. The CGT and CFDT differ on ideo-
logical lines between socialism and communism, and the CGT and CDT-FO differ
similarly while at the same time sharing a relatively divisive history. The CFTC by
contrast is ideologically Christian Democratic, and thus shares are perspective with
neither the CGT, CFDT, or the FO.
The unions also differ in that they have different worker constituencies. The CGT
recruits most of its employees from the public sector, and also in industries: utilities,
railways and other large industries. The CFDT, by contrast, recruits mainly from the
service-oriented part of the public sector, specifically public health and education.
Moreover, since the 1980s, the CFDT has made a concerted effort to recruit out-
siders, specifically the young, and those on short-term contracts. (Häusermann and
Schwander, 2012; Boulin, 1996). The CFE-CGC seldom recruits from the low-skilled
categories that the CGT and CFDT, being a union exclusively for middle-managers
and the professions. Thus, the degree of differentiation in terms of both income and
job security across unions is high.
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The fractionalization of these unions, and the partisan rancor with which they deal
with each other, makes agreements and compromises between them more difficult.
This might not be a problem from the perspective of sustaining collective agreements
if each of these unions had similar interests, but as we have seen, the different con-
stituencies (workers in the public sector, workers in industry, workers in small busi-
ness, managers and professionals), means that each union represents workers with a
different profile of social risks. This means that their interests concerning protection
from social risks are likely to be different. This is compounded by the different ide-
ologies (communist, socialist, christian democratic) of the unions. This increases the
likelihood that the unions will be more parochial in the face of outsiders, who I have
argued want access to their system. Finally, the fact that trade union officials often sit
on the boards of the many different social insurance funds means that they are likely
to be more concerned in respect of the solvency of the funds, and thus more wary
of demands on those funds made by extra claimants, evidence of which we will see
below.
Thus we can see that the structure of French trade unionism - its fragmentation,
its differentiation of unions demographically and ideologically, and their legal and
administrative institutionalization can result in each union having a comparatively
conservative attitude to the spending of those funds over which it had control. I
will argue in the next subsection that the Irish trade union umbrella organization’s
breadth, encompassing nature, and lack of administrative and legal powers over the
social insurance fund made it much more ‘outsider-regarding’ than its French coun-
terparts, and thus more likely to favor income-tax-financed social insurance in addi-
tion to social-contribution-financing, which French unions favored.
4.2.2 The ICTU and Social Bargaining in Ireland
In contrast to the French system, institutional features of Irish trade unionism en-
abled significant amounts of cross-union unity. The principal such feature was the
high degree of centralization of the Irish trade unionism. While union density in
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Ireland has neither particularly high or low by OECD standards, trade unionism is
quite centralized: most Irish unions have been affiliated to the Irish Congress of Trade
Unions, (and its predecessor, the Irish Trade Union Congress).9 This centralization
allowed Irish trade unions to speak with one voice, even where unions disagreed
(Roche, 2007). Indeed, trade union officials from both the ICTU and its constituent
unions have commented that the ICTU institutions allow constituent trade unions to
resolve internal difficulties (Geraghty, 2012; Keating, 2012; Sweeney, 2012), and keep
constituent unions from abandoning collective agreements with employers.
There also exists some variation across time in the leverage unions had over gov-
ernments through Ireland’s system of corporatist social partnership institutions. This
social bargaining system developed incrementally alongside the social insurance sys-
tem. As theorized by Mares (2006), who does not discuss the Irish case, the combina-
tion of an open economy with high levels of inflation allowed unions to be influential
through the corporatist system. The next several paragraphs detail how union influ-
ence waxed and waned depending on whether formal social bargaining existed or
not.
During the early years of independence, Ireland was governed by Cumann na
nGaedheal, a conservative party supported by large farmers and professional classes,
who had little appetite for redistribution and who subscribed strongly to fiscally con-
servative economic policies (Powell, 1992). The subsequent Fianna Fáil government,
while somewhat more left-wing than Cumann na nGaedheal, followed a policy of
import substitution and domestically-oriented production. Fianna Fáil were concor-
dant with some aspects of the ICTU agenda, but rebuffed many other union demands
(such as for contributory-based pensions). Throughout the period, Labour were ab-
sent from government, and though some worker-friendly policies were instituted,
the government’s levels of consultation with union (or other corporatist actors) on
9Figure 4.3, a time series of Irish Trade Union Density compared to some of its peers, shows that
Irish Trade Union Density is quite high by comparison with France.
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public policy issues was minimal. This meant that though Irish trade unions were
well-organized and somewhat influential in wage-bargaining at a firm level, its influ-
ence on national policy was minimal until the 1950s. Moreover, in contrast to France,
unions had no influence or participation in the administration of social insurance at
a national level.
Unions acquired some more clout in the public policy process in the 1950s, as Sean
Lemass rose to power, both as Minister for Industry and Commerce and later as
Taoiseach (Prime Minister). His new policy of economic openness and capital invest-
ment required both union cooperation and, as the Irish economy began to grow in
the 1950s, wage restraint. In accordance with Lemass’ corporatist beliefs, the trade
unions began to have more influence on public policy.10 While no explicit social bar-
gaining took place, the seeds of later Irish corporatist institutions were sown. Explicit
wage agreements were made between employers and unions in the 1960s, though
they were seldom successful in holding down real wages, due to various unions’ and
employers’ habits of exempting themselves from the need for wage restraint through
various loopholes.
As the 1970s progressed, price inflation became an increasing problem in Ireland.11
Ireland was a small open economy, a price taker with respect to almost every global
commodity. It also maintained a currency peg with its largest trading partner, Britain.
Keeping inflation low, and thus keeping Irish goods competitive in foreign markets
was thus extremely important for maintaining a healthy balance of payments and
thus for maintaining the peg to the pound sterling. Secondly, low inflation was
important for bringing scarce capital in the form of Foreign Direct Investment to the
10For example, the access of the ICTU executive to the Minister for Industry and Commerce steadily
increased over the 1950s, moving from mere correspondence to regular meeting to discuss issues, and
several consultative committees with senior civil servants (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1952).
11See Figure 4.10 for a time series of Ireland’s inflation rates compared to some other developed
countries, which shows how high Ireland’s inflation rates were in the 1970s, both compared to its own
history and compared to some of its peers
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country.
Securing wage restraint from unions, however, was increasingly difficult in the
context of very high inflation expectations, and thus wage agreements became in-
creasingly dependent on economic and social policy content (Hardiman, 1988). While
no explicit agreements took place between the government and unions in the early
and mid 1970s, the latter’s preparedness to agree with employers was often seen as
conditional on policy concessions from the government. As the Irish government re-
quired low inflation with more urgency than most governments, the union movement
acquired more influence than they might otherwise have had.
Thus, the size of the Irish economy compared to its trading partners, its increasing
openness and resulting status as a price-taker, and the seemingly endemic inflation
in the country, gave unions extra leverage with which they pursued policy goals.
These goals were numerous, as we will see. A key goal was the expansion of the
social-contribution-financed part of the welfare system, as well as reform to make it
more progressive. Specifically, unions wanted contribution-financed benefits to be
a function of previous salary, a policy known as pay-relationship. They also wanted
the abolition of the cap on eligibility into the social security system, with a view to
keeping the system progressive, and keeping as many of their members entitled to
benefits as possible, especially in the context of sharp nominal wage hikes. Over the
course of the 1970s, union involvement in state policymaking became steadily deeper,
culminating in the ‘National Understandings’ of the late 1970s, whereby bargaining
between unions, employers and the government was institutionalized.
This social bargaining process came to an end in the 1980s recession. The new
Taoiseach elected in 1981, Garret Fitzgerald, saw the corporatist process as undemo-
cratic, and despite the fact that he was in a coalition government with Labour, a
party with deep ties to unions, levels of engagement with unions were low. There
were other reasons for the absence of social bargaining agreements between 1981 and
1987. Unions found themselves without their major bargaining chip with regard to
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the government: the recession caused inflation to plummet. Figure 4.10 shows that
Ireland’s inflation levels fell from an enormous 24% in the early 1970s to about 3%
in 1990. The recession also caused unemployment to skyrocket. Figure 5.3 shows
that Ireland’s unemployment level reached 16% in 1983, and remained above 10%
for most of the 1980s. In such a loose labor market, unions were not needed to keep
wage inflation in check, the high numbers of jobseekers was performing that function
instead.
The loss of union bargaining power in loose-labor-market recessionary contexts is
seen by senior Irish trade unionists as the major cause of the breakdown in social
partnership in the 1980s. In interviews, trade union officials concede that many
government actors saw the social partnership process as a necessary evil, to be used
to keep down wages. When high levels of unemployment and few job vacancies
during recessions neutralized the inflation threat, governments saw no need for the
partnership process to continue on the same scale (Begg, 2012). The same logic holds,
in the eyes of these union officials, with regard to the breakdown of the Towards
2016 Partnership Agreement in 2011 (Government of Ireland, 2006); unemployment
in Ireland has been above 10% since 2009, and thus no concessions to unions have
been needed to keep wages down.
Thus we can see the extension of social insurance in Ireland through the prism
of unions’ leverage over the government party of the day. This logic follows that
of Mares (2006), who highlights ‘the critical importance of a political exchange be-
tween unions and governments, premised on wage moderation in exchange for the
expansion of social services and transfers’. While this is certainly true where the Irish
government was desperately seeking wage moderation in the 1970s (see for instance,
Ryan (1973)), during the pre-1950 years in which the economy was comparatively
closed, and in the years of severe recession in the 1980s and since 2009, the impor-
tance of this exchange declined. Such years thus saw comparatively less social policy
expansion than others, as we will see.
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4.3 Social Security Fractionalization in 1970s France
French social insurance has historically been dissociated from the state. While the
government regulates it, and mandates coverage, contribution levels and benefits,
the day-to-day administration of social insurance funds is carried out by unions and
employers together. This is in contrast to Irish social insurance; in Ireland there is
only one government-run fund into which all national-level social benefits are paid
from, and into which contributions are paid. In France, there is not one fund for social
insurance, nor is most social insurance paid out of the general exchequer. Rather,
there are many hundreds of different funds for different social groups and different
risks - old age, injury, unemployment and health. Laroque (1966) documents the
hundreds of different funds and mutual societies that were together responsible for
the administration of social insurance. In 1994 the OECD counted 538 different funds
in the system (OECD, 1995a).
The principal scheme (or regime in the French parlance) is the régime général, which
covered, in the early 1970s, some 60% of the total insured population - mainly salaried
workers. This main scheme was complemented by many others of various sizes, for
various occupation groups, for civil servants, for military veterans, for farmers and
agricultural laborers, and other categories.
The administration of these funds was often fractious. As discussed, French unions
and employers administered the social insurance funds together, unlike in Ireland,
where the social insurance fund was administered by the civil servants on behalf of
the government. The very difficult ideological and political perspectives these unions
had from one another, as well as their different membership demographics, made
this administration contenious. Thus the administration of the social insurance funds
was sometimes antagonistic between unions, in addition to the natural difficulties
that came with cooperation between unions and employers. The CGT, historically
the most radical of the unions, refused to vote in favor of many annual budgets for
various funds on whose boards their representatives sat. Other unions, specifically
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the CGC, the CFTC and FO, were more moderate and ran the funds in conjunction
with employers (Le Matin, 1982). Disagreements over the administration between
unions continued to fester throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Godoy, 1984).
Despite these difficulties in administering these funds, service on the boards of
the funds was a significant source of revenue for many unions. Their officials often
received a salary in their position on the administrative boards. This gave these
officials a stake in maintaining the fund-based nature of social security. Thus, even
apart from the ring-fencing rationale discussed in Chapter 3, union leaders had other
incentives to increase the size of funds managed by the caisses, as the social insurance
funds were known.
The decentralized nature of the funds meant that it was also extremely difficult
for the government to get a clear picture as to their financial position. Remarkably,
it was not until 1970 that the Minister for Social Security began to produce a ’So-
cial Budget’, gathering the accounts of the various funds and regimes and actually
documenting how much was being spent on social insurance in France. These diffi-
culties persisted: during the previously-mentioned abortive 1980 healthcare reforms,
the government complained that it did not know the exact amount of the deficits in
the social insurance funds.12
In order to improve the efficiency of France’s fragmented welfare system, the gov-
ernment tried, at various intervals, to amalgamate different funds together, to im-
prove cross-subsidization, and the reduce overheads (La Croix, 1970c; L’Humanité,
1977). La Croix (1971) documents many of the problems existing in the manage-
12The author of the reform proposal, Henri Berger, a member of the French National Assembly,
commented: ‘First of all I would like to know the exact amount that the health insurance funds lack.
Hence my proposition to get a better understanding of finances results of these organizations.’ (Je
voudrais d’abord savoir quelle est la somme exacte qui manque aux caisses d’assurance-maladie. D’ou
ma propositoon pour obtenir une meilleure connaissance des résultats financiers de ces organismes)
(Quotidien de Paris, 1980b).
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ment of social security during this period. Each regime - health insurance, family
allowances, pensions, and unemployment insurance, were governed separately, and
often had differing and overlapping branches and administrative structures at local
or regional level.13 As we will see however, concerns about the relative financial
health of various funds meant that almost invariably, such attempts at reform would
result in protests from affected workers.14
Problems with the fractionalized nature of the of the social insurance system also
resulted from the occasional necessity of transferring revenue from one fund to an-
other. Depending on which fund had a surplus or a deficit in a given year, revenue
would be transferred from surplus funds to deficit funds to make up the slack. Trans-
fers were most common within the régime général - which, though covering many
workers, had different funds for different risks. Spiraling health spending, worsen-
ing unemployment, and the aging French population negatively affected healthcare,
unemployment and pensions respectively. Thus these funds were usually the most
funds depleted. It was thus the family allocations fund, which benefited from the
modest French birthrate, that was used to fill these gaps.15 Funds were thus often
transferred from the family allocations fund to the other funds at year-end (La Croix,
1971).
While the above transfers occurred within a given regime, though within different
funds within that regime, transfers were also effected from the régime général to other
regimes entirely. For example, 6.5 billion francs were transferred from the régime
général to other ‘special’ schemes in 1974. Le Figaro (1977) documents divisions be-
13The newspaper noted that ‘the absence of clear division of labor between the different organizations
(public, semi-public, private) leads to redundancies and inefficiencies, and thus complicates the funding
process.’
14La Croix (1970b) makes reference to unions being angered by attempts to unify various funds,
noting that unions refer to ‘repeatedly reaffirmed commitments to the autonomy of each risk’: family
risk, old age, health.
15On the spiraling healthcare costs, see La Vie Française (1979).
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tween those governed under the main regime - the régime général - and those under
various other regimes.
One of the causes of the overall deficit of the general system of Social
Security - whether, as we have previously shown, health insurance, fam-
ily benefits and old-age insurance - is its financial participation in other
schemes for employed and self-employed to compensate for the demo-
graphic imbalance present in most of these regimes. . .
Before the institution of the general regime, some sectors had already
created their specific social protection regimes - such as mining, civil and
military administration. Others did not want to join the single general
regime in 1946, such as farmers, craftsmen and traders. . .
The benefits provided by the special schemes should be at least equiv-
alent to those of the general scheme. In reality, they are more favorable
than those provided by it. Thus, hospital workers, notary clerks and SNCF
workers have 90% [of medical expenses] reimbursed, those in the general
regime have 80%, and non-salaried members of the CANAM 70%. Old
age insurance benefits are highly variable: usually substantial enough for
electricians, railway officials and . . . much less for artisans, traders and
farmers.16
16 L’une des causes du déficit global du régime général de la Sécurité Sociale - qu’il s’agisse, comme
nous l’avons précédemment montré, de l’assurance maladie, des prestations familiales et de l’assurance
viellesse - est sa participation financière aux charges des autres régimes de travailleurs salariés et tra-
vailleurs indépendants, pour compenser le déséquilibre démographique que connaissent la plupart de
ces régime. . . .
Avant l’institution du régime général, certains secteurs d’activité avaient déjà créé leur régime spéci-
fique de protection sociale - telles les mines, les administration civiles et militaires. D’autres n’ont pas
voulu adhérer au régime général unique prévu en 1946, comme les exploitants agricoles, les artisans et
commercants. . . .
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The dissatisfaction outlined in the above article is interesting as it obtains within
the ranks of those who were covered by a social security scheme. It is not, as we will
consider in other sections, divisions between those covered by contributory social
insurance and those not covered. In this case, the presence of several different funds
and schemes for different categories of workers made each group insured persons
more suspicious of the potential drains on their scheme by others. In this instance,
those under the general regime are frustrated as they are cross-subsidizing losses on
schemes that are more generous than the general regime itself.
Another example of the chagrin of those running the régime général with respect to
other funds can be seen with reference to the burden placed on the régime by annexed
regimes such as that for agricultural workers. These subventions were described as
‘inappropriate’ by the head of the CGT.17 More broadly, we can see evidence that
the CGT and CFDT were suspicious of workers financing benefits for other sectors
of society. A 1973 joint platform for social security forwarded by these two unions
called for separate social insurance systems for workers and non-workers. The La
Croix newspaper noted:
It is on this point that the propositions of the CGT and CFDT are the
most striking. Their perspective is firmly positive: we don’t deny the
solidarity effort of all social categories, but we want a unique regime for
all workers, a unique regime for all non-workers, with the possibility of
Les prestations servies par les régimes spéciaux doivent être au moins équivalentes a celles du régime
général. En réalité, celles-ci sont plus favorables que celles-la. Ainsi, en prestations hospitalières, les
clercs de notaire et la SNCF, remboursent à 90%, le régime général à 80% et les travailleurs non salariés
adhérents de la CANAM à 70%. Pour l’assurance viellesse, les prestations sont très variables: en
général assez substantielles pour les électriciens, fonctionnaires et cheminots . . . beaucoup moins pour
les artisans, commercants et exploitants agricoles.
17‘La loi sur la compensation démographique est inapplicable à l’heure actuelle, a noté Mme Lambert.
La charge financière du régime général des salariés provenant des régime annexes en déséquilibre
(agriculture, commerce) est evaluée en 1979 a 16 milliards de francs.’ (La Croix, 1979b).
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both, ultimately, being combined (La Croix, 1973).18
These examples are illustrative of the theory in the following way: they demon-
strate that unions jealously guarded the revenues under their control from other
kinds of workers, be it agricultural workers, or workers on other schemes, or those
who were not salary-earners at all. The examples illustrate the idea that unions
wanted these funds to be used for ring-fencing. Of course, none of these above ex-
amples involve instances of labor market dualization; in none of these instances are
unions advocating less separation between funds because they fear heavy drains of
these funds because of widespread outsider unemployment, as outlined in Chapter
3. Nonetheless, they illustrate that the nature of French social insurance meant that
the environment favored ring-fencing. Thus, as employment outcomes between var-
ious demographics started to become more dualized, those administering the social
insurance system became more inclined to ring-fence in turn. The next section will
document the beginnings of this process of dualization and the bifurcation of social
insurance, and its financing, that accompanied it.
4.4 Retrenching Social Protection After the Oil Crisis
This section will document how the oil crisis brought with it sharp increases in un-
employment, and resulted in large deficits in the French social insurance system, as
well as increases in the level of labor market dualization. In accordance with the
theory, we will document how this change in the nature of the French economy was
followed by a significant change in the nature of French social insurance financing:
one of the first instances of unions’ consenting to the separation of tax-financed in-
surance for the long-term unemployed from the contribution-financed insurance for
insiders. This separation will be an example of the a key part of the ring-fencing
18C’est sir ce terrain que les propositions de la CGT et de la CFDT sont les plus marquantes. L’optique
set résolutment positive : on ne hie pas l’effort de solidarité de routes les catégories sociales, mais on
souhaite un régime unique de tous salariés, un régime unique des non-salariés, les deux pouvant, à
term, éventuellement se rejoindre.
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dynamic illustrated in Chapter 3.
4.4.1 Increasing Dualization
Since their widespread introduction after the Second World War, the French caisses
- social insurance funds - had mostly run large surpluses, due primarily to the ex-
traordinary growth performance of the French economy in the 1950s and 1960s. By
the early 1970s however, deficits had begun to occur in some of the funds. One rea-
son for this was the comparatively high level of structural unemployment in France,
despite the then strong growth of the economy. While structural unemployment is
a common phenomenon in many European countries today, during the high-growth
‘golden years’ of the European welfare state, it was a rarity. However, in early 1970s
France, the relatively rigid labor market, combined with comparatively high levels of
skill mismatch meant that though there were labor shortages in some areas, unem-
ployment remained quite high (OECD, 1971, 1974)[resp. pp. 18-20, pg. 26-32]. The
French education system was somewhat slow in training workers for the skilled labor
that its economy required as its agricultural production fell. Thus, over the course of
the 1970s, employment in agriculture fell, but there was less take-up of the resulting
labor market slack by increased industrial production, even though many industries
reported labor shortages.
These troubles with the eduction system and labor-market-mismatch, coupled with
fragmented active labor market policies would mean that France had higher levels
of structural employment than was the norm in the OECD at the time (OECD, 1972,
1973)[resp. pp. 21-24, pg. 55-64]. In early 1970s, the social security system began
to show deficits (OECD, 1972, 1976)[resp. pg. 53 and pg. 29], something relatively
worrying in an economy that was growing fast.19
To fill these deficits, social security contributions were raised repeatedly over the
early 1970s. L’Aurore (1970) and La Croix (1970a) document an increase in spend-
19La Croix (1970a) documents a 600 million franc deficit in 1970.
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ing by the three main French ‘funds’ to 83 billion francs in 1971 from 75 billion in
1970 and 66 billion in 1969.20 The comparatively perilous nature of social security
financing, however, meant that the funds were in poor shape to withstand the fund-
ing shock that came with onset of the oil crisis and the resulting recession in 1975
(Hall, 1986)[Ch. 7]. As the effects of the oil crisis spread throughout the French econ-
omy, the trade balance deteriorated significantly, and prices rose quickly also (OECD,
1975)[pg. 5].
The severe global recession resulting from the crisis also caused in a sharp loss of
employment in France (OECD, 1976)[pg. 11-14]. Approximately 200,000 jobs were
lost; the employment rate fell by 2.8% per annum (OECD, 1976)[pg 13]. Partial em-
ployment also increased from 88,500 in 1974 to 350,000 in 1973, this cyclical unem-
ployment thus adding to the structural unemployment discussed previously.21 Labor
force participation fell also, among young people especially. These latter factors her-
alded the beginning of the dualization in the French labor market that grew worse in
the 1980s.
Other factors contributed to increased dualization as well. During the 1970s, fe-
male unemployment increased dramatically. As the French economy recovered from
the recession, it added jobs, but the number of created were not enough to absorb
the increasing numbers of women entering the labor force. Thus, much of the rise
in unemployment during the 1970s was due to increases in female unemployment,
with male unemployment over the period remaining essentially unchanged (OECD,
1980)[pp 58-69].22
20See also OECD (1974)[pg. 39-44].
21Losses remained high throughout the 1970s (OECD, 1979)[pg. 11].
22An exception to this was during the recession in 1974-1975, which did see sharp increases in male
as well as female unemployment. Male unemployment remained largely constant over the decade as a
whole however, while female unemployment rose.
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The policy responses to the sudden increase in unemployment also partly engen-
dered the dualization that would be increasingly apparent in the 1980s. In aftermath
of the oil crisis, the government, unions and employers responded initially by increas-
ing the restrictions on hiring and firing.23 In a further example of insider-friendly
policies, the government also instituted higher benefits to those who lost their jobs
in the recession. These benefits were conferred at up to 90% of a workers’ previous
salary, however they were only available for those who had been laid off since the
onset of the crisis.24
The post-recession policy response also saw beginning of government short-term
contracts for outsiders. These contracts are an enormous feature of the French labor
market in the 1990s, and a key form of dualization that grew significantly during
the 1980s.25 1977 saw the introduction of the first of these, an ‘Employment Pact’
which saw the state take over firms’ social security contributions in exchange for
the hiring of young people for short-term traineeships. These traineeships rarely
led to full-time employment for the young people concerned however, and a year
after the introduction of the policy, job applications by young people had declined
modestly, but labor force participation had continued to fall (OECD, 1979)[pp. 15-
18].26 Unemployment began to rise again in 1979 (OECD, 1979)[pg 52], though these
pacts continued and contribution exemptions were maintained.(OECD, 1980)[pg 47].
4.4.2 Funding Social Insurance
The recession also resulted in significantly larger deficits in social insurance. To pay
for the expansion of social welfare to artisans, merchants and small business own-
23 (OECD, 1975)[Pg. 15]. See also Section 5.3.
24Workers had to have contributed to the regime - i.e., had to have been in work - for six of the
previous 12 months (OECD, 1975)[pp. 15-16].
25These contracts are discussed at length in Section 5.3.
26For more on the expansion of these kinds of contracts, see Section 5.3.
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ers, the government had already increased social contributions in the mid-1970s.27
Nonetheless, deficits mounted during the recession in the mid-1970s. As noted by
the unions, the French social insurance system was in many ways predicated on the
economy being at or near full employment (Le Monde, 1978). The loss in employ-
ment as the 1970s progressed meant - crucially - a loss in contributors to the régime
général, reducing its revenue stream (La Vie Française, 1979). These problems were
exacerbated by employers who often, in straitened circumstances, did not pay their
employers’ contributions at all. These unpaid employers’ debts amounted to 6 billion
francs in 1976 (Bertrand, 1976). Though the French economy returned to growth in
1976, the social security funds still retained significant deficits.
Initial responses to these deficits took the form of Chasse au gaspi or ‘searching for
waste’, a set of efforts to reduce inefficiency that were largely supported by employ-
ers (L’Humanité, 1977; La Croix, 1979a). However, attempted cutbacks by the govern-
ment met with strong resistance from the unions (La Croix, 1979a,b; La Rouge, 1980).
Resistance to health cutbacks, for example, was championed by the CGT, with sup-
port from the FEN, an independent union confederation, and, less enthusiastically,
from the CFDT.28 Eventually after repeated demonstrations, the cutbacks, such as
increases in co-payments, in hospital fees and other healthcare costs were abandoned
by the d’Estaing government (L’Humanité, 1980b,c). Instead, health contributions
were increased by 1% for all salary earners. Increases in social contributions were
thus a result of the unions’ unwillingness to countenance reductions in benefits for
those insured by the régime général and other schemes.
Initially, union members were angered by contribution increases. This was partic-
ularly the case where these benefits were accompanied by cuts in benefits. In 1976,
the CGT stated:
27See Figure 4.2, as well as France Soir (1973)).
28Some division can be observed amongst the unions in this instance, between the CGT who protested
strongly against these reductions in the scale and scope of benefits, and unions like the CGC who were
prepared to accept the cutbacks.
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[Problems with social security] are the result of the policy of low
wages, unemployment, employers debts, etc. . . . Employers and govern-
ment are to blame for this situation that they have created for the in-
sured. Through further increases in contributions or lower benefits (and
perhaps both) they actually want to reduce what is an indirect part of
salary. . . Under the false pretence of national solidarity, generalization and
harmonization of Social Security, the government is preparing to reduce
to nothing the basic principles of social protection regime resulting since
1945 from the resistance and struggles of workers (L’Humanité, 1971).29
Despite this anger, the CGT’s resistance to ‘harmonization’ and ‘generalization’ of
social security meant that revenues had to be found. Falling employment levels, as
well as increasing health spending, meant that contribution increases resulted in 1977
(OECD, 1977)[pp. 33-36]; 17 billions Francs in 1978 (OECD, 1979)[pg. 45], three times
in 1979, and again in 1980 (OECD, 1980)[pg 45-48].30
By the end of the 1970s, given the high levels of contributions, the CGT wanted
the government to make up the loss in the social insurance funds caused by unem-
ployment using tax revenue.31 At this time state financing of social protection was
29‘Ils sont le resultat de la politique des bas salaires, du chomage, des dettes patronales, etc. Ainsi, au
cours de l’années, la Sécuritié sociale sera en cessation de paiement, au moins quatre fois . . . Patronat
et gouvernement se servant de cette situation qu’ils ont créée pour culpabiliser les assurés sociaux.
Par le bias de nouvelles augmentations des cotisations ou de diminution des prestations (et peut-être
les deux) ils veulent en fait procéder a une diminution du salaire indirect . . . Sous de faux prétextes
da solidartité nationale, de généralisation et d’harmonisation de la Sécurité socialé, le gouvernement
s’apprete a reduire a néant les principes essentiels du régime de protection sociale issu, en 1945 de la
Résistance et des luttes des travailleurs.’
30‘In January, the sickness insurance ceiling was raised by 4 points and 1.75% contributions were
introduced for old- age insurance. In April, unemployment contributions were raised by one point,
while in August there was a temporary increase (up until 31st December, 1980) of one point in sickness
insurance contributions’ (OECD, 1980)[pg. 45].
31These feelings were not universal however, other unions were concerned about the extent to which
this outside funding would increase government control of the funds.
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not very high - compared to Ireland - and was mainly confined to the rétime général
(L’Humanité, 1971).32 This share was rising fast, however.
This position taken by the CGT is interesting, in that they were attempting to
maintain the financial health of social insurance funds while maintaining their control
over them. Increased, temporary, subvention by the general exchequer was a way to
do this, to maintain the sanctity of the social insurance funds, run by unions for
those in regular employment. By having the general exchequer make up revenue
shortfalls in the social insurance funds, they would be able to keep contributions on
their members sustainable, while also maintaining the ring-fencing properties of the
social insurance funds (La Croix, 1979b). Thus it wanted the government to make up
what it saw as temporary losses in the funds, a phenomenon known as participation
budgétiare. In this, the actions of the CGT mirror those of Irish unions in the 1970s who
also opposed a reduction in the state’s share of contributions to the social insurance
fund. Both countries’ unions wanted the government to maintain a fairly high level
of contributions to the social insurance fund(s), but without those contribution levels
being sufficiently high that the unions would lose influence over the funds, or indeed
implicit ownership of them,
Employers were also dissatisfied with the high levels of social security contribu-
tions. They regularly complained about the high labor costs that the increased in
social security contributions were imposing on them (Bertrand, 1976; Rivarol, 1981).
Indeed, throughout the 1970s, employers bore a significantly higher share of social
security financing than workers did - funding 57.8% compared to workers’ 16.17%
in 1971 (L’Humanité, 1971).33 Thus employers also wanted more involvement of the
general exchequer in financing social security. However, their conception of how to
increase state participation in social insurance financing was different to the unions.
Rather than increasing state subventions into the caisses, which were controlled by
32La Croix (1970b) documents that the state provided a little more than a quarter of total expenditures.
33The state funded the balance, 26%.
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the unions and employers, the CNPF wanted the state to take over the insurance of
certain social risks altogether. Specifically, they wanted the state to take over the dis-
tribution of the family allowances, essentially one-fourth of the risks covered by the
social security system.34 Needless to say, this idea was anathema to the unions. In
1979, the employers’ argued:
‘The massive increase in charges that weigh on businesses deeply dam-
ages the French economic fabric. If one wants to leave French companies
a chance to regain their position in the internal market and enable them
to face foreign markets and international competition, we must stop con-
fiscating their profit margins to bail out Social Security finances.
However, in recent years, the burdens on business have continued to in-
crease. From 1970 to 1978, prices have roughly doubled, while payroll and
tax more than tripled . . . [A] surcharge was levied on the very essence of
business. It caused a financial loss which impacted on their ability to in-
novate, invest and export, and especially their ability to hire . . . Employers
bring to light a blatant contradiction of government policy: “on the one
hand, it increases the costs to cover the deficit of Social Security, on the
other, we are given the social and tax exemptions to encourage the hiring
of young people.” . . . “So the government is aware that the real brake in
hiring lies in the excessive growth of our expenses.” (La Vie Française,
1979).35
In this they were opposed by the unions, who argued that the transfer of the family
allowances would result in the need to raise income taxes dramatically. This fits
34The other major risks were unemployment, old age, and health (which included maternity and
occupational injury).
35 L’augmentation massive des charges qui present sur les entreprises dètruit en profondeur le tissue
économique français. Si l’on veut laisser aux entreprises français une chance de reconquèrir le marche
intérieur et leur permettre de faire face, sur les marches etrangers, a la concurrence internationale, il faut
cesser de leur confisquer leurs marges bénéficiaires pour renflouer les financées de la Sécurité sociale.
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with the theory, in that unions want to increase the share of the welfare state being
financed through social security contributions, which they would administrate and
ring-fence for workers. Unions would want to maintain and increase the pool of
funds in the social insurance system, controlled by unions, for their members. They
would naturally be particularly against the idea of transferring family allowances,
given that these allowances, as we have mentioned, were among the most financially
sustainable parts of the social insurance system at the time. Employers, for their
part, argued that the unions’ projections of the tax increases that would be required
to fund family allowances outside the social security system (that is, by the general
government) were scare-mongering.
Responding to Mr. Barre [a trade unionist] who had estimated that the
CNPF’s proposition of ‘budgetization’ of family allowances would lead to
an increase of 50% of income tax, Mr. Chotard [a member of the CNPF]
indicated, in substance, ‘We say budgetization. They say taxation. But
we can also ask the state to identify efficiencies and find receipts. Such a
transfer of family expenses [to the state] would only be progressive.’ (La
Croix, 1979b)36
Or, au cours des dernieres annèes, les charges sur les entreprises n’ont cessé de s’alourdir. De 1970 a
1978, les prix ont, en gros, doublé, alors que les charges sociales et fiscales ont plus que triplé . . . Cette
surcharge a été prélevée sur la substance meme des entreprises. Elle a provoqué un affaiblissement
financier qui s’est rèpercuté sur leur capacité d’innover, d’investir d’exporter, et surtout sur leur ca-
pacité a embaucher . . . Et le patronat de mettre en lumiere une contradiction flagrante de la politique
gouvernementale: “D’un cote, on alourdit les charges pour combler le déficit de la Sécurité sociale,
de l’autre, on nous accorde des exonérations sociale et fiscales pour susciter l’embauche des jeunes.”
. . . “Le gouvernement a donc conscience que le véritable frein a l’embauche réside dans la trop forte
progression de nos charges.”
36Répondant a M. Barre qui avait estimé que la propositon du CNPF de "budgétiser" les allocations
familiales conduirait a une hausse de 50% de l’impot sur le revenu, M. Chotard devait indiquer en
substance ‘Nous disons budgétisation. On nous répond fiscalisation. Nous pouvons nous aussi deman-
der a l’etat de dégager de la productivité et de trouver des recettes. Mais un tel transfert des charges
familiales ne serait que progressif’
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The employers did not succeed in transferring family allowances to the state. How-
ever, as we will see presently, in 1979 another set of social insurance responsibilities
were transferred; unemployment insurance for the long-term unemployed.
In the late-1970s expenditures on unemployment from the social security accounts
were very small (4% in 1978). However, they had grown rapidly since 1972 (quadru-
pling from 1%), and would continue to rise over the course of the next decade. We
recall that in response to the recession in 1975, the unions, employers and govern-
ment together instituted a set of benefits with a 90% replacement rate for those with
contribution histories. However these benefits became increasingly unaffordable as
the numbers unemployed increased, and the duration of unemployment lengthened
(OECD, 1979)[pg. 44].
In 1979, thus, the unions did consent to the budgetization in response to increased
unemployment. A two-tier system was developed, the benefit paid from UNEDIC,
the contribution-financed unemployment supplement to the régime général (which
we remember had been at a 90% replacement rate) was replaced by a sliding scale,
reducing the amount of compensation after one year spent unemployed. This boosted
the finances of the general regime, as it reduced the drain posed the regime by the
long-term unemployed, whose share of spending had been rising. To make up for
this loss of benefits for the long-term unemployed, they were given a tax-financed
unemployment benefit. Unlike the contribution-financed benefit, which was linked
to previous wages (being at 90% of previous wages), the tax-financed benefit was not
a function of the previous wage, and was thus more meager.37 It did not, however,
fall with increased length of unemployment.
Thus short-term unemployed workers with longer contribution histories would re-
ceive the tax-financed benefit as well as the - wage-linked - contribution-financed
benefit. Long-term unemployed workers would receive only the lower, flat-rate bene-
37The tax-financed benefit was index-linked to the minimum wage.
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fit. Thus, as unemployment increasingly threatened the financial health of the various
social security funds, unions became more and more content to allow unemployment
benefits to be financed by outsiders. The import of this is significant. As the share of
social benefits being spent on unemployment rose, and increasingly the duration of
employment rose (OECD, 1979), the unions allowed some fraction of unemployment
benefit to be spent on outsiders. This is in stark contrast to the above-noticed refusal
to allow family-allowances to be financed from taxation.
This is strong confirmation of the theory in the following way: we have docu-
mented that dualization in the French labor market was rising over this period. Fe-
male unemployment was rising, as was youth unemployment. Moreover, the unem-
ployment was causing a drain on the social insurance system; the share of spend-
ing accounted for by unemployment benefits was steadily rising, and much of this
revenue was naturally being spent on labor market outsiders, who were steadily be-
coming a well-defined demographic. It is in accordance with the theory, then, that
insiders would try to ring-fence funds in the social security system from the drain
presented by long-term unemployment. In fact, this is exactly what happened. The
effect of the reform meant that short-term unemployed workers would not lose out
on their high replacement rates, but the social security system would not have to
maintain high replacement rates for the long-term unemployed, who would transi-
tion onto the significantly less generous, government-run, and tax-financed scheme.
The separation of unemployment insurance into two components, its partial bud-
getization is significant also in contrast with the unions’ refusal to budgetize the family
allowances. It is arguably significant that the facet of social insurance where spend-
ing was rising fast, and was largely accounted for by labor market outsiders, is the
part that was taken over by the state. The more fiscally sustainable family allowances
were not. Moreover, these family allowances went, obviously, in significant part to
those in regular employment. This policy outcomes thus demonstrates the unions’
concern with the fiscal health of caisses, as well as their desire to maintain control
over the benefits that were most important to their members, while dissociating from
141
Chapter 4. France and Ireland in the 70s and 80s
the funds the payment of benefits claimed by those whose performance in the labor
market was increasingly poor.
4.5 The Socialist Experiment in France and its Aftermath
The election of a coalition Socialist-Communist government in 1981 saw an abrupt
shift in French social and economic policy. The new government instituted widespread
nationalizations, reductions in working time, and dramatic increases in social welfare
payments. The minimum wage was increased by 6.7%, while the minimum pension
was increased by 20% (L’Humanité, 1981b). In addition, co-payments for healthcare,
introduced in 1967 and much despised by trade unions, were repealed (Les Echos,
1981).
The economic rationale for these increases was straightforwardly Keynesian: in-
creased payments to the least well-off would increase consumer spending, as these
demographics were most likely to spend extra money received. This in turn would
provide a boost to the economy that would increase revenues sufficiently to pay for
the spending (OECD, 1980; La Rouge, 1981; Culpepper, Hall, and Palier, 2006). The
French authorities also hoped that stimulating the economy would raise economic
activity in the short-term, and that the tax revenue to pay for the spending hikes
would come from an upturn in global economic activity the following year.
The socialists had inherited social security accounts in surplus from the repeated
increased in contributions in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Section 4.4). Nonethe-
less, the large increases in spending needed extra financing. Some of this financing
came from a special surtax on the wealthy, as well as a higher corporation tax. How-
ever, given that the general exchequer’s subvention into the social security system
was limited, the spending increases also required a 1% increase in social security
contributions (L’Humanité, 1981a), and an increase in the ceiling of these social con-
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tributions by 3.5%, which angered employers especially (Rivarol, 1981).38
Unfortunately, the hoped-for upturn in international economic activity did not ma-
terialize. Thus the required increases in tax revenue required to pay for the Keyne-
sian stimulus did not materialize either (OECD, 1983)[pg. 61]. In addition, while
the French authorities had hoped that their increases in social spending, and in the
minimum wage, would result in increases in demand that would raise tax revenue,
much of the increase in consumer spending was spent on imported goods, limiting
the impact of the stimulus on the French economy (OECD, 1983)[pg. 61]. With their
high levels of spending having failed to successfully sustainably stimulate growth
and reduce unemployment, the government was left with no choice but to balance
the budget and engage in some comparatively deflationary budgetary policy.
To moderate the unemployment crisis, the employers and indeed some of the more
moderate unions (such as CFTC and CGC), favored increasing labor market flexibil-
ity. This, they argued would reduce the extent to which unemployment was reducing
social security contributions. But such flexibility was anathema to the CGT and CFDT
(Le Monde, 1984a).
By the 1983, moreover, the deficit had risen, not least in the social insurance
funds, but also in the general government accounts, and thus on all fronts, the
Socialist-Communist government’s gamble had failed (Culpepper, Hall, and Palier,
2006)[Chapter 1]. Thus a major process of social security reform was launched in
1982, with one half of the process focusing on the structure and management of so-
cial security, and the other focusing on its financing (Le Matin, 1982). This financing
reform led to another 1% ‘exceptional levy’ increase in social contributions (Le Matin,
1984).
38Payrolls were subject to social contributions only up to a point, above which extra earned income
was not subject to social security contributions. Ireland had a similar system until 2011.
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Moreover, in spite of the reforms in unemployment benefits undertaken in 1979,
the nature of social spending in France continued to change, with spending on unem-
ployment allocations moving from 2% to 9.7% while spending on family allowances
stagnating (L’Humanité, 1984). Thus less and less social insurance was being spent on
insiders, or those with labor market security. As the division between those in secure
employment and those in insecure employment became more apparent, the unions
became more open to the idea of the government paying benefits for the chronically
unemployed. Many unions, favored increased economies with a view to reducing the
1% levy, even going to so far as to contemplate the mutualization of some social se-
curity obligations over and above those undertaken in 1979 (Le Monde, 1984b). Such
a separation of the two systems would have been unthinkable only a decade before
(Le Figaro, 1984). This increasing duality became more pronounced as the 1980s pro-
gressed, after lower growth required steadily increasing retrenchment (OECD, 1983,
1984)[resp. pp. 39 and 16]. Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders, and Naczyk (2012) write that:
In 1982, [pension] benefit levels were tied to the duration of prior contri-
butions, whilst in the past they had depended only on age. In 1984, unem-
ployment insurance and unemployment assistance were separated from each other
and the possibility to accumulate both types of benefits was eliminated. In
1992, the generosity of benefits was even more significantly tied to prior
contributions. . . Retrenchment has also occurred in unemployment assis-
tance, since young workers and lone mothers were largely excluded from
it in 1992. [Italics added.]
Thus again, as in the late 1970s, to policy reaction to the worsening French eco-
nomic situation broadly protected insiders at the expense of outsiders. Labor mar-
ket restrictions protected those within employment. At the same time, short-term
contracts - with the government paying social security contributions - relieved the
pressure that unemployment was placing on the caisses, while not really improving
the long-term job prospects of outsiders. Finally, separating out of benefits between
the social security regime run by the unions and employers and an entirely separate
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scheme run by the exchequer generated a two-tier system. The lack of ability receive
benefits from both schemes cemented the separation between social insurance for in-
siders and social assistance for outsiders. A contribution-financed system had high
replacement rates for those with long contribution histories, who were temporarily
unemployed. A flat-rate, tax-financed system provide comparatively lower benefits
for the wider population.
As we will see in the next chapter, this system became entrenched in France over
the course of the next 10 years. The conflicts in the 1990s were largely over the unions’
desire to increase state financing of the regime, while maintaining their control over
it, and defending the social security system from attacks by the unemployed, who
steadily felt less and less represented by it.
The attempt to increasingly separate the provision of employment insurance with
a view to further ring-fencing funds for insiders was not, however, endorsed by all
unions. The CGT, in particular, as well as the French Communist Party to which
it was allied, was opposed to the reduction in the 1% contribution, arguing that
the reduction would result in the ‘social budget be[ing] immolated on the altar of
discipline’ (Le Nouveau Journal, 1984). It was also opposed to the separation of
flat-rate benefits from UNEDIC (Godoy, 1984). Finally, it also, with its allies in the
communist party, opposed the increasing subventions of social security by income
taxation.
While hostile to all reduction in benefits, the communists are also hos-
tile to social financed by the state. "Social protection should be linked to
the revenues of business, to the "production of wealth". The importance
of contributions, the originality of the French system of social protection
should thus be preserved.
Thus the [Parti Communiste] is worried . . . this transformation seems
to the [Parti Communiste] to be a step towards a ‘state-ified’ system - for
145
Chapter 4. France and Ireland in the 70s and 80s
escaping from the representatives of the socially insured, ‘when instead
[these representatives] ought to have their responsibilities enlarged’.
To finance Social Security the [Parti Communiste] wants an overhaul
of the base of current employers contributions, taking into account the
"value added" by a contribution based thereon, alongside the contribution
on salaries. (Godoy, 1984).39
This example demonstrates some differences in opinion across unions about how
to best sustain the future of the social insurance system. Some unions - often those
whose members were better off, such as the CFTC - allied with the government in
separating from UNEDIC a large fraction of the financing of unemployment insur-
ance for the long-term unemployed. However other unions did not support these
measures. Often, these were unions like the CGT, whose membership demographic
had more ‘outsiders’, that is, more workers whose labor market prospects were less
secure. We will see in Chapter 5 some more examples of the CGT advocating more
outsider-friendly policies than some other French unions.
Thus some unions opposed decreases in contributions that would be made possible
by transfers of insurance responsibility to the state. Even these unions, however,
39Hostiles à toute réduction des prestations, les communistes sont aussi hostiles à un financement de
Sécurité sociale par l’Etat : la protection sociale doit être liée aux revenue de l’entreprise, à la ‘production
des richesses’. L’importance des cotisations, originalité du système français du protection sociale, doit
donc être préservée.
Aussi le PC s’inquitète-t-il d’une substitution éventuelle d’un crédit d’impôt aux allocations familiales
: cette transformation lui paraît être un pas vers un système ‘étatisé’ échassant aux représentants des
assurés sociaux, ‘alors qu’il faudrait élargir leurs responsabilités’. D’autre part, ils sont hostiles au ‘1%
social’ parce qu’il pèse encore sur les salariés même s’il touche d’autres revenus que les salaires.
Pour financer la Sécurité sociale, le PC souhaite une refonte de l’assiette des cotisations patronales
actuelles, prenant en compte la ‘valeur ajoutée’ par une cotisation pesant sur celle-ci, à côté de celle qui
s’appuie sur les salaires.
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noted that the size of contributions that were becoming necessary to fund the welfare
state were indeed a barrier to unemployment. We recall from Section 4.4, that the
preferred solution of the CGT to social security deficits in the 1970s was an increase
in government transfers to the social security funds. However, we note from the above
quote the concern on the part of some of these actors of the increasing ‘state-ification’
of the social insurance system.
Their new preferred solution to this problem was different from that in the mid-
1970s, when the rise in unemployment was more transient. Now, rather than increas-
ing government financing, unions wanted to change the base of social contributions.
Rather than employers’ contributions being a function of the number of workers em-
ployed - which was acknowledged to be a drag on hiring - they wanted employers to
contribute in proportion to the value-added that their firms generated. This would
have several positive effects from a union perspective, ensuring the sustainability of
the social security funds, while keeping unions in control of these funds, and finally,
reducing the burden on wages and hiring.
These examples show that as the twin unemployment and fiscal crises developed
in 1980s France, the policy responses were severalfold. Of paramount importance
for unions was to maintain the financial sustainability of the social welfare funds
they managed, and to maintain their control of these funds. Whether through in-
creasing tax subventions, changing the base of contributions, or removing drags on
these funds in terms of the transfer of risk, unions sought to protect the interests of
their members, and the interests of the union officials, by keeping the contribution-
financed system healthy.
4.6 Union Preferences for Social Insurance in Ireland
Social insurance in Ireland was quite different to that in France. Due in part to
the underdevelopment of the country, and its late industrialization, few Irish trade
unions had their own social security funds in the early part of the twentieth century.
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Thus as social insurance expanded, in Ireland, it did not have to take into account
the multiplicity of funds that had to be accounted for in the French case. The diverse
caisses that were such a feature of the French system did not have to be integrated
with one another. Contribution-financed benefits were introduced in Ireland incre-
mentally, risk by risk, demographic by demographic. Manual laborers were first to be
covered, as was workplace injury. Gradually more and more risks began to be cov-
ered, such as maternity, unemployment, old age, and so on. Simultaneously, coverage
was extended to more and more demographics.
Despite this, in the 1970s, the Irish contribution-financed social security system was
considerably less developed than the French system, in a series of ways. Benefits were
flat, in no way linked to previous wage levels, though entitlement to them did depend
on the length of contribution history. In addition, the coverage of the population was
more restricted; most self-employed workers and small artisanal workers were not
covered, whereas in France, coverage was extended to these workers in the early
1970s. Third, the system was not fragmented; there was one Social Insurance Fund
into which all contributions were paid and from which all benefits were received.
Finally, this fund was managed by the government, with the account held at the
Central Bank of Ireland, with little input from unions or employers.
Despite these differences, in this section, I will demonstrate that Irish unions, like
their French counterparts, favored, and sought to expand contribution-based social
insurance. Due its lack of development, their main agenda was the development
of increased benefits, and specifically the linking of benefits to wages in Ireland.
However their agenda was more complicated than that of French unions. I will
discuses four facets of this agenda.
• First, Irish unions sought to develop Ireland’s contribution-financed system into
a ‘pay-related’ system, where benefits would be a fraction of wages prior to
unemployment or retirement. As such a system would have been significantly
more expensive, and would thus require increased social security contributions,
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it is significant for the theory. Union officials in 1970s Ireland told their mem-
bers that higher contributions would be required for higher benefits.
• Second, Irish unions sought to ring-fence benefits from outsiders. While the
dualization in Irish labor law never became as rigid as in France, we can still
discern a discomfort with the increase of part-time work, and irregular work,
and a concern with its implications for the health of the social insurance fund.
• Third, Irish unions sought most of all to reduce the burden of income taxes
on their members. This action, which would have increased the relative de-
pendence of the social welfare system on social security contributions, was in
part due to a desire to have the self-employed, as well as agricultural farmers,
finance more of the state.
• Finally, this agenda - to have other aspects of Irish society finance more social
insurance - is in evidence in Irish unions attempts to maintain and increase the
state subventions into the social insurance fund. In this, their actions mirror
those of the CGT in the late 1970s in France.
More broadly speaking, however, a large part of the reason why so many trade
unionists favored contribution-based financing was that they saw payment into a
ring-fenced fund as being more politically secure than making claims on revenue
from income or other taxes. Unions saw, and continue to see, the social insurance
fund as ‘their money’ (Sweeney, 2012); the fact that they had paid specifically into the
fund confers on workers a specific entitlement to money from the fund (O’Connor,
2012). The unions leaders thought that while cutting income-tax-financed benefits
may be politically costly for the government, cutting social-contribution-financed
benefits, benefits that workers have ‘earned’ through their contributions, would be
costlier still. Thus contribution-financing was more secure from future retrenchment.
Thus, though Irish unions did not explicitly control the administration of social in-
surance the way French unions did, Irish unions nonetheless saw social-contribution-
financed protection programs as ‘more secure’ than income-tax-financed protection
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programs. Despite the fact that the government had total agency over benefits and
contributions paid to and from the funds, union leaders preferred social contribu-
tions because cutting these benefits was perceived to be politically costly. Moreover
they saw the payment of social insurance contributions by the state and by employ-
ers, in addition to those paid by employees, as a ‘costly signal’ of these latter two
actors’ commitment to the system (O’Connor, 2012).
4.6.1 The Pay-relationship Agenda in 1970s Ireland
As mentioned, a key reason why Irish unions preferred social contribution financ-
ing to income tax financing, is that social security contributions, are seen, at least in
part, less as taxes and more as insurance premia.40 As such they are more likely to
maintain their real value, especially where they are attached to pay-related benefits
instead of tax-financed flat benefits. The Irish system had not been pay-related prior
to the 1970s. The trade union movement thus viewed the shift towards social secu-
rity contributions, particularly in the 1970s and 1960s, a means of moving the Irish
system of social protection away from a flat-rate system and towards a pay-related
system, where benefits would be a fraction of prior income. In contrast to Bismar-
ckian systems, the Irish, poor-law-based system had not had a relationship between
pre-unemployment earnings and retirement benefits. Neither had any other benefit
been related to prior earnings; all benefits had been at a flat rate. This was in stark
contrast to the social welfare system in France.
Even as Ireland moved away from a poor-law-based system towards contribution
financing for the first time in the 1950s, benefits from the contribution-financed fund
were still not related to wages. The introduction of contributions-based ‘social insur-
ance’ in Ireland the 1950s, benefits remained flat, the only change was that benefits
were simply no longer means-tested (The Commission on Social Welfare, 1986). This
40A significant debate on whether social security contributions are in fact taxes or insurance con-
tributions has taken place in Ireland, with particular liveliness during the 1970s and 1980s. See The
Commission on Taxation (1982), Irish Congress of Trades Unions (1973) and McDowell (1990).
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absence of a means-test for social-contribution-financed benefits allowed for workers
to accumulate retirement benefits, for instance, through private, personal ‘superan-
nuation funds’ without jeopardizing their state-financed pension. Thus it is the case
the the absence of means test meant that some measure of wealth-preservation was
possible for retiring workers. However this only came about to the extent that the
state pension was accompanied by a private pension. Despite this, the state-financed
pension itself was in no way income-related. This meant that all workers who had
contributed to the social insurance fund, and who were not covered by an occupa-
tional or private pension or disability insurance program were on the same benefit.
Almost immediately after securing this piece of social welfare expansion, unions
began to state that they favored a shift towards a fully ‘pay-related’ system (Irish
Congress of Trades Unions, 1962). Essentially, workers would pay a fraction of their
lifetime income (or their income upon retirement or unemployment) to the state (as
opposed to a flat contribution), and in return would received a fraction of their in-
come (as opposed to a flat benefit) upon retirement. Such a government-sponsored,
pay-related program already existed for many local government employees, and so
from the unions’ perspective, the administrative burdens of expanding the program
were comparatively minor. In proposing the program, unions were proposing to
significantly shift the financing of the Irish system from income taxes to social con-
tributions, as income-linked social security contributions would raise significantly
more than the flat-rate social security contributions that had been introduced in 1960.
Their calls were repeated throughout the years following 1962 (Irish Congress of
Trades Unions, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1973, 1976).
In 1963, a research officer stated to the ICTU Congress that
‘It is not generally realized that the structure of our social services today
are as they were over fifty years ago in 1911.....Up to now the basic prin-
ciple of the social insurance scheme has been the provision of flat rate
benefits in return for flat rate contributions.....This is a principle which
151
Chapter 4. France and Ireland in the 70s and 80s
is hardly ever questioned in the Republic is virtually unique in Europe.
We are one of the few countries in Europe that continues to adhere to
this principle. It is clear that as long as contributions are geared to what
the lowest paid worker can afford, that as long as the social security sys-
tem is inflexible, its provisions inadequate, there will in fact be a poll-tax
that will bear most heavily on those least able to bear the burden’ (Irish
Congress of Trades Unions, 1963, pp. 353 - 354).
In 1971, the Irish Shoe and Leather Workers Union explicitly endorsed higher social
security contributions, stating that
‘There is also the need to recognise that if we are going to get these pen-
sions, two-thirds of our retiral wage or salary scales, we must be prepared
to provide the finances. [We] must recognise that the social welfare con-
tributors of this country are ready, willing and able to provide the cost by
way of increased contribution’ (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1971, pp.
457-458).
The unions’ preference for pay-relationship increased as inflation became a signif-
icant feature of Irish economic life in the mid 1960s (See Figure 4.10, which shows
the spike in inflation). The Cumann na nGaedheal government’s fiscally conservative
policies had held inflation low in the 1920s and early 1930s, and the de Valera-led the
Fianna Fáil government’s import substitution policies and rationing had kept prices
down in the late 1930s and 1940s. But in the 1950s, successive Lemass governments
began a policy of economic liberalization (Cousins, 2003). By the 1960s, exports were
rising and the economy was booming, and the erosion of real incomes of those pen-
sioners and unemployed persons on flat-rate contributions became a problem. Suc-
cessive social bargaining agreements comprehensively failed to hold down real wages
(Hardiman, 1988, 2000). Inflationary trends were exacerbated by the 1972 Coalition
Government and the 1977 Fianna Fáil Government’s pursuit of Keynesian stimulus
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policies even in the context of high inflation.41
In this context, the flat-rate benefits were resulting in pensioners, disabled persons,
and the unemployed being left increasingly impoverished. The ICTU took issue with
this on many occasions (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1964, 1972), eventually,
pay-related unemployment benefit was introduced in 1972 by the newly-appointed
Fine Gael and Labour government. Again, these new benefits were financed through
social security contributions, causing the significant spike in the share of social secu-
rity contributions in government revenue in the early 1970s (this increase is shown in
a time series of Ireland social security contribution levels, see Figure 4.2). A Green
Paper in 1976 promised the introduction of pay-relationship for pensions too, but
events were overtaken by the recession in the 1980s, during which the introduction of
the program was deemed too expensive. Nonetheless, demands for the introduction
of pay-relationship in pensions continued into the 1980s (Irish Congress of Trades
Unions, 1981, 1982).
This evidence shows a preference on the part of those in receipt of state benefits for
the real value of those benefits to be maintained. In contrast to the evidence presented
in the previous section however, the preference for social contributions is here made
with a view to protecting benefits not from future cutbacks, or from outsiders, but
rather from inflation. Again, however, the evidence is that it was those unionized
workers who were already in receipt of social security contributions from the state
who were most concerned with protecting these benefits and pushed hard for the
introduction of pay-relationship, and the rise in social security contributions that
came with it. This shows that while Irish unions sought the development of the social
welfare system and the concomitant increases in contributions, the key reason was
to increase the retirement incomes of unionized workers who were becoming better
and better paid, and to maintain the real values of these incomes against inflation.
41See, for example, the 1973 Budget speech for Richard Ryan, the Minister for Finance in the Fine
Gael Government at the time (Ryan, 1973).
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4.6.2 Dualization in Ireland
Chapter 5 will outline the fact that dualization levels were low in Ireland in the 1990s.
But despite the lack of duality in Ireland during that period, duality of over insurance
policy is discernible earlier in the century. In the early stages of the development of
the Irish social welfare system, insider-outsider divisions between the secure and in-
secure were perhaps more present than in the middle decades of the century. They
did not, however, necessarily result in increasing dependence on social security con-
tributions.
In fact the contrary was sometimes the case: in the 1930s ‘insider’ unions in some
instances strongly opposed many attempts to grow the size and scope of state-
sponsored health insurance. This was because, as mentioned, many of the best-
organized and most powerful unions had secured private, firm-based insurance for
their workers. In the case of health, unions had negotiated rates for health insurance
with ‘friendly societies’, (private health insurance providers) and feared that integra-
tion into a national-level system, even if financed using social security contributions,
would endanger their benefits. While private health insurance was unified into a na-
tional program in 1933, some workers felt that they were subsidizing the benefits of
those in less viable programs.42 Thus, when proposals were forwarded to fund state
contributory pensions by similarly unifying occupational pension programs were for-
warded in the early 1950s, these proposals were opposed by many trade unionists.
For instance, the Irish Transport and Salaried Staffs Association said that:
42The difference in the viability of various health insurance programs was stark: a letter from the
Minister for Industry and Commerce to the ICTU National Executive stated that ‘Prior to unification [of
the friendly societies into a National Level Social Insurance Fund] those societies whose membership
consisted of good and sometimes selected lives, engaged in sheltered occupations, disclosed surpluses
on valuation because they had less expenditure on sickness and disablement benefit and because they
had a more regular and assured income from contributions. On the other hand, the societies whose
membership either included all classes of the population or was confined to workers whose employment
was irregular, and whose liability to illness greater owing to more hazardous conditions of employment,
were found on valuation to have no disposable surplus’ (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1938).
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‘[We] oppose that portion of the motion calling for the coordination of
pensions. We will continue to support State pensions schemes for those
who have not been properly catered for, as the members of my organi-
sation have been. We want our superannuation funds left untouched be-
cause coordination would mean a reduction of pension.’ (Irish Congress
of Trades Unions, 1953, pg. 138).
Divisions in the trade union movement persisted, and hampered the efforts of
the ICTU Executive Committee to centralize and nationalize pension provision. For
instance, a 1973 motion at the ICTU Annual Meeting, proposed by the National Exec-
utive which ‘call[ed] on the Government to take immediate steps with a view to the
introduction of one comprehensive national occupation pensions scheme to super-
sede all existing pension schemes for employees’ (Irish Congress of Trades Unions,
1973) was vociferously opposed by constituent unions. In addition to calling the pro-
posal ‘dangerous’ and ‘faulty’, the Irish Union of Distributive Workers and Clerks
responded:
‘Is it suggested that the Government be asked to take over existing [pen-
sion] schemes? If so, is it realized by the Executive Council that many
millions of pounds have been paid into schemes by many thousands of
trade unionists? Knowing that, is it seriously suggested to Congress that
we invite the Government to accept a present of our money? Any attempt
to push this motion in its present form, if my assumption is correct, will
be opposed by many thousands of workers in these types of schemes’
(Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1973, pp. 558-559).
As above, thus the Irish case provides evidence as to insider-outsider divisions
working both for and sometimes against the expansion of contribution-financed so-
cial insurance. While this seems to discord with the theory, we note that where oc-
cupational programs existed, the well-protected workers often resisted the amalgama-
tion of these programs into a national program. However, they usually welcomed the
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construction of contribution-financed programs alongside these occupational schemes.
This is what eventually happened, in the case of unemployment and disability insur-
ance, though not in the case of healthcare provision. In this we can see striking
similarities to the preferences of French unions in the 1980s. They strongly opposed
the amalgamation or ‘budgetization’ of the provision of social insurance in France,
as in Ireland, refusing to let the government ‘accept a present’ of their money. But,
like the Irish unions, they supported the construction of more meager, tax-financed
benefit systems alongside the contribution-financed systems.
Resistance to national-level social insurance was also brought by some public ser-
vice unions whose members faced very little prospect of unemployment, and who
thus resented paying social insurance which would pay out in cases of unemploy-
ment. When a union based in the semi-state sector (the Transport Salaried Staffs
Association - TSSA) sought to extend the full benefits of the social welfare system (un-
employment, disability, retirement pension, optical and dental benefits) to all public
sector workers (it had previously been confined to workers in the semi-state sec-
tor and other private sector workers) their proposals were strongly resisted by civil
servants. This latter group of workers faced little or no prospect of job loss or oc-
cupational injury. Thus they opposed paying full social security contributions into
programs such as disability or unemployment insurance, benefits from which they
were unlikely to ever receive. Thus there was a division between insiders (the civil
servants) and outsiders (those in the TSSA), but it was rather the insiders who op-
posed the expansion of benefits and the concordant increase in contributions. They
argued:
‘We cannot pay for unemployment for our members. They are either
dismissed or they are employed. We do not have redundancy. They are
not made redundant, they are absorbed elsewhere. If, therefore, the TSSA
wants to adopt a principle of taxation without representation in the form
that we will pay for benefits we can never hope to get or have any right
to, then that is an inequitable principle and we could not accept it’ (Irish
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Congress of Trades Unions, 1974, pg. 564).
As workers in the trade union movement became increasingly reliant on contribution-
financed insurance, as opposed to occupational provision, trade unionists became
more resistant to financing benefits for those with irregular work backgrounds. The
1975 conference heard, for instance, complaints against ‘ “hangers on”..... people in
every community who can go to a doctor and get a doctor’s certificate and £1 per
week and stay out sick and draw up to £34 per week social welfare.’ Trade unionists
were thus becoming at least somewhat more concerned with those unemployment
who ‘[did] not want work’ (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1974).
This concern was compounded by the growing prevalence of part-time workers in
the Irish economy, and concern amongst union members who thought they would
undermine the sustainability of the social welfare system. Concern over the impact
of these workers began with Ireland’s accession to the EEC in 1973 (Irish Congress
of Trades Unions, 1974) where unions thought that the EU would impose increasing
levels of part-time work on Irish companies. The concern of the union movement
about this can be seen in the rise in the number of motions tabled at the ICTU An-
nual Congress concerning part-time work. Figure 4.7 shows the number of motions
tabled concerning atypical or part-time work at the ICTU Annual Congress. Usually
no motions were tabled before 1980, but an increase is observed thereafter, which
saw two, three or four motions per congress being levied in the 1980s and 1990s,
evidencing unions increasing concern with the issue.
These insider-outsider cleavages thus existed to some extent over the 1960s and
early 1970s, as unions sought to protect their benefits from amalgamation into the
new system. But in contrast the French case, they became less pronounced in the
1980s and 1990s. The position of the preponderance of trade unionists towards social
insurance changed over the course of the 1970s and 1980s for a series of reasons.
First, the fiscal position of many Pay-As-You-Go occupational pension funds became
steadily less secure over the course of the 1980s recession. Though Ireland’s de-
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mographics remained more favorable than many Continental countries, small, firm-
based pension programs were often in deficit by the 1990s (Irish Business and Em-
ployers Confederation, 2007; Fielding, 2012). Thus, and in contrast to France, in real
terms the significance of the national social-contribution-financed pension became
increasingly important to many workers (Keating, 2012).
Second, employment in Ireland was increasingly generated by FDI, particularly
through large multinationals who seldom recognised unions, let alone provided oc-
cupational pensions (Allen, 2010; D’Art and Turner, 2011). As mentioned, generous
occupational pensions had previously been the preserve of large Irish companies, of-
ten in sectors sheltered by tariffs, producing solely for domestic consumption. Many
of these companies had wound down, or were winding down, in the face of stiff
international competition throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Walsh and Whelan, 1999).
Thus by the 1990s, the bulk of workers in the multinational sector were solely reliant
on the state pension programs (Geraghty, 2012).
Thus at the initial stages of the development of contribution-financed social in-
surance in Ireland, union preferences for social insurance were driven by a desire
to obtain aid from the state that would not be subject to means testing, would be
secure from future political interference, and would be subject to some measure
of union control. Insofar as some unions opposed the rise in social-contribution-
financed social protection, it was out of a desire to protect occupationally-financed,
firm-level programs which were often quite generous. In the 1960s and 1970s, social-
contribution-financed social protection became preferable to unions as it had to po-
tential to become ‘pay-related’ in a way that was not possible for income-tax-financed
programs. As such, social-contribution-financed social protection would retain its
real value for workers. Later, as part-time work and irregular employment histories
became somewhat more prevalent in Ireland, unions became more concerned with
making sure that access to social-contribution-financed benefits for those with irreg-
ular contribution histories was strictly on a pro-rata basis (Irish Congress of Trades
Unions, 1982). This concern was exacerbated by the growing numbers of immigrants
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in Ireland (Keating, 2012).
4.6.3 Redistribution, Income Taxes and Inflation
The Irish case highlights the complexities of the role of tax progressivity in the theory.
Chapter 3 has argued that a reason why unions should prefer income taxes over social
security contributions is that income taxes tend to be more progressive than social
security contributions. Wage earners, particularly those on lower incomes should
prefer income taxes to social security contributions as a means of redistributing from
the rich to the poor. The implication is thus that unions representing insiders should
prefer social security contributions as a means of financing benefits, provided that
income inequality is not too high. Where income inequality is higher, they should
prefer to shift the financing of the system towards income taxation.
The theory outlined in this dissertation thus argues that a mitigating factor in
union preferences for social security contributions is the fact that social security con-
tributions are usually less progressive than income taxes. Thus, unions should prefer
income taxes as a means of redistributing from rich to poor, as social security con-
tributions are ill-suited for this objective. In the Irish case, unions indeed pushed for
higher income taxes relative to certain regressive indirect taxes, but in a nuanced way.
Specifically, they pushed simultaneously for decreases in income taxes (particularly
marginal rates) on workers and but increases in income taxes on other sections of
society (those earning income from land or capital).
As mentioned, Ireland in the early years of independence suffered from a problem
common to many developing countries: low tax capacity. The state overwhelmingly
relied on excise duties on imports, as well as indirect taxes on tobacco, fuel and
alcohol to fund the state (Ryan, 1962). As the welfare state began to expand over the
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the government had to search for new forms of revenue. The
need for new forms of revenue was made particularly acute because the policy of
economic liberalization and trade openness of the Lemass government necessitated a
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reduction in revenue from customs duties. A comprehensive assessment of Ireland’s
tax capacity was carried out by the mammoth First Commission on Taxation in the
1950s, which recommended a shift away from narrower tax towards taxes on income
and expenditure.43
This period saw receipts from income taxes rise. During the 1930s and 1940s, in-
come tax was subject to exemptions. These sufficiently high that most unionized
workers (and indeed most wage and salary earners in general) were outside income
tax net entirely. As Ireland began to rise out the deflationary 1940s, increasing num-
bers workers began to fall into the tax net and so, the burden of income tax falling
on salary-earning workers began to rise. This process continued steadily through
‘bracket creep’, a process by which nominal inflation pushes earners into higher and
higher tax brackets, increasing their tax liability even if tax rates do not rise.
The trade union movement’s early attempts to deal with the transition of many
of its members into the income tax net was to push hard for the introduction of
measures such as PAYE which, it thought, would ease the burden on its members.
Under the historical income tax system in the 1940s, income tax was paid twice a
year, there was little or no facility to pay throughout the year. Thus, in 1949, the
ICTU wrote the Minister for Finance, arguing that
. . . payment of the income tax has frequently resulted in hardship in these
cases, as it is not easy to make provision for saving the amount due, and
payment is often deferred until finally the amount due is deducted from
wages in a lump sum frequently amounting to as much as a week’s wages
- a procedure that is highly undesirable..... [The ICTU] Executive requests
you to consider the introduction of a ‘Pay As You Earn’ system, similar to
the system which has been successfully applied in Great Britain.
43The Commission instigated by the Lemass Government, was given broad scope to ‘enquire gener-
ally into the present system of taxation of profits and income, its scope and structure, including the
provisions for collection and for the prevention of evasion, its effects on the national economy, and the
equity of its incidence’ (Maltby and McKenna, 1980).
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The early response of the Minister for Finance was mixed. Any increase in the
administrative burden was frowned upon, but, in response to steady union pressure,
a PAYE system of collecting tax revenue from workers was introduced in 1959.44 This
system proved to be an extremely false friend to wage and salary earners, however,
from whom it became extremely easy for the government to raise taxes. By contrast,
the self-employed sector, who submitted annualized returns, often had significant
capital income, and thus had greater opportunities for evasion and avoidance.
Thus, over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the share of income tax being paid
by (usually unionized) wage and salary earners rose steadily. Unions’ opposition to
this was significant - motions calling for raising of tax bands or reduction of tax rates
were common.45 Figure 4.8, shows the number of motions concerning income tax
tabled at the ICTU Annual Congress, and shows how income taxation moved from
being an issue that scarcely concerned the ICTU to being one that dominated their
agenda. Fewer than 2 motions per year on tax policy were levied before 1955, but
from the 1965 onwards between 6 and 12 was the norm. This increasing concern
over income tax culminated in the famed ‘Tax Marches’ of the late 1970s in which
hundreds of thousands of workers poured onto the streets of Dublin to protest the
tax burden being placed on workers (Hardiman, 1988; Powell, 1992; Cousins, 2003).
Some 500,000 workers turned out on the streets of Dublin in a series of marches in
1979, to protest against high tax rates, a level of public protest scarcely seen on any
other issue in modern Ireland.
Thus, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, unions repeatedly called for income
taxes to be both raised and lowered: lowered on the PAYE sector, but raised on the
self-employed (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1978, 1979). There were repeated
calls for increasing income taxes by closing loopholes on farmers and other self-
employed persons, raising of capital gains taxes, while at the same time calls for
44The ICTU issued specific calls for the introduction of a PAYE system in 1951, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957
and in 1959 (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1951, 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, 1959).
45See for example, Irish Congress of Trades Unions (1964, 1965)
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reducing taxes by raising tax-free allowances and increasing the size of tax brackets.
Thus while the conventional story of Irish workers’ attitudes towards income taxation
is characterized by the tax marches of the 1970s, these marches were not against
income tax per se, but rather against the share of income tax levels on the PAYE
sector versus the self-employed and other sectors. This shows a potential limitation
of the theory as outlined in Chapter 3, which presumes a fixed rate of income tax
progressivity, and thus does not explain preferences over the progressivity over the
income tax code. Here we can see that where the income tax code was progressive (in
1950s, the years before extensive bracket creep) unions seemed to favor the income
tax’s extension through the introduction of PAYE, but as the tax code became less
progressive (in the 1970s after bracket creep had undone most of the progressivity
inherent in the tax code) unions came to oppose income taxes. Thus the Irish case
sheds light on how the theory can explain preferences and action over income taxes,
but in a nuanced way.
4.6.4 Funding the Social Insurance Fund
A further reason for the comparative preference of Irish unions for the expansion of
contribution-based financing - even in the absence of significant labor-market duality
- is that the social security fund was partly financed from income taxes. As such, so-
cial security in Ireland provided a hybrid of the redistributive capacity of income-tax
financing with the ring-fencing capacity of social-contribution financing. Though not
accounted for in the formal exposition of the theory, an important factor in financing
social insurance from a specific social insurance fund is the share of non-contribution
tax revenue (in addition to social security contributions) that are paid into it. In our
discussion thus far, we have assumed that the social security fund is solely financed
using social security contributions, whereas in fact governments pay into the social
security fund from tax revenue too. In the Irish system, this division was often about
one-third tax revenue, one-third employees’ contributions, and one-third employers’
contributions.
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In spite of the unions’ appetite for social protection to be broadly financed by
social security contributions as opposed through the income tax code, this did not
mean that they wanted the burden to fall on entirely on employees and employers.
As discussed, Irish unions preferred to keep social insurance paid for from a ring-
fenced social insurance fund. This was the case for two reasons. First, they believed
that the benefits from the fund were politically harder to reduce than income-tax-
financed benefits. Second, they believed that benefits from the fund were less likely
to be means-tested than income-tax-financed benefits, preserving the real value of
their occupational pensions. However unions, throughout the latter half of the 20th
century, sought for the social insurance fund to be financed in part from the general
exchequer, with a view to reducing the burden on workers.
Thus unions preferred the Social Insurance Fund to be sufficiently financed from
social security contributions so as to legitimate the claims that workers have on the
fund, but also part-financed from the exchequer to reduce the financial burden on
workers. Unions repeatedly stressed their support for the broad principle of ‘one-
third, one-third, one-third’ financing on the part of the state, the employees and the
employers. This attitude is in evidence in the unions’ stiff opposition when the Irish
government tried to reduce the government’s share of contributions to the social
insurance fund (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1972). Unions also argued at times
that increased social security benefits should be paid for using increased exchequer
contributions to the social insurance fund, instead of through increases employee or
employers social security contributions (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1962), and
elsewhere expressed a preference for increased employer contributions to the fund
(Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1973). In this, their positions mirrored those of
French unions.
Thus while, as the theory predicts, protected insiders prefer a mix of income and
social security taxation, their motivation for some amount of income taxation is not
just redistributive (stemming from the fact that income tax is more progressive), but
it is also motivated by the fact that income taxes can be used to subsidize the social
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security fund. When asked by me why it was not thus better to fund the social
security system entirely from income taxes, trade union officials replied to me that
some amount of social security contribution by the workers themselves directly into
the fund was needed to maintain their tacit ‘ownership’ of the fund (Sweeney, 2012).
4.7 Policy Outcomes
The effect of Irish unions attempts to develop the social welfare system, as well
as their campaign against income taxes steeply increased the share of contributions
in the Irish tax mix. Figure 4.2 shows the share of government revenue raised from
security contributions rose from 5% in 1960 to 15% in 1980. Ireland in this sense was
different from France, where the 1970s was the beginning of a period of retrenchment
and difficulty with regard to the sustainability of the welfare state after a golden
period in the 1960s. Ireland, by contrast, saw significant social welfare expansion in
the 1970s. Though the world oil crisis did result in high inflation in the country, the
combination of EU accession, catch-up growth, and high levels of Keynesian stimulus
from the 1977 Lynch government (FitzGerald, 1991; Fianna Fáil, 1977) caused the Irish
economy to grow faster than that of France. Figure 4.9 shows a spike in Ireland’s
growth rate to 7% from 1975-1977, in contrast to some other European countries that
experienced growth rates of around 3%. Thus Ireland was affected less severely by
the retrenchment that began to be seen elsewhere (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000).
The 1970s saw several major developments impacting social protection financing
in Ireland. Rising inflation over the period from 1960 onward (see Figure 4.10, which
shows the spike in Ireland’s inflation levels in the mid 1960s and, shows an annual
inflation rate of almost 25% in the mid 1970s), coupled with Ireland’s increasing
export orientation, presented challenges for the government. While inflation in Ire-
land had historically been low, the successive Programmes for Economic Expansion
(Ireland’s Five-Year-Plans) greatly opened up and expanded the economy (Govern-
ment of Ireland, 1958, 1963). The resulting inflation, coupled with the introduction
of PAYE and the increasingly steep marginal tax rates introduced in the mid-1970s
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meant that increasing numbers workers were paying higher tax rates.4647 This led to
a self-perpetuating cycle whereby workers would demand wages increases to cope
in the first instance with the fact that prices were rising, but these extra wages would
push them into a higher tax bracket, requiring even further wage hikes.
This process had two effects. First, it dramatically increased the share of the tax
burden on the PAYE sector, and increased the share of revenue raised from income
tax (See Figure 4.1, which shows the share of government revenue from income tax
rise from 21% in 1960 to 35% in 1980). It also jeopardized the Irish economy’s compet-
itiveness, and made the government plead with unions and employers many times
for price and wage restraint (Ryan, 1973, 1974). The period saw the government to
take a steadily more involved role in the social partnership process (Hardiman, 1988).
While in the 1960s national wage agreements had been negotiated between employ-
ees and employers, with unions and employers making separate representations to
the government on budget and other policy matters, by the mid-1970s these wage-
bargaining and budgeting processes had become tacitly, if not yet explicitly related.48
Increasingly, the government traded policy concessions for industrial peace and for
(extremely limited) wage restraint.49 This process culminated in the ‘National Un-
46‘Taxation paid directly out of income has grown steadily heavier over the years mainly because of
inadequately adjusted personal income tax allowances. The Government have publicly acknowledged
the inequity caused by this defect in the present system and they are committed to a policy of reviewing
the personal allowances at frequent intervals.’ - Minister for Finance, Richard Ryan, in his 1974 Budget
Speech (Ryan, 1974).
47This bracket creep meant that a Minister for Finance of the day could announce ‘tax relief’ in a given
budget by raising tax brackets (the income level at which a worker would become liable to pay a higher
tax rate on a extra pound earned) but could still, due to inflation, allow a real hike in the effective tax
rate on income. In a country in which Budget Day is often the most politically-highlighted day in the
calendar, the ability to raise taxes while seeming to reduce them, was, especially in the high-inflation
1960s and 1970s, a boon to various governments.
48This logic is described, in a broader, non-Irish context in some detail by Mares (2006).
49This was however, very difficult to achieve in the context of the global environment of stagflation
(The Commission on Social Welfare, 1986).
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derstandings’ of 1979 and 1980, the first explicit agreements between unions, govern-
ments and employers. By the election of 1981, the outgoing Fianna Fáil government
could boast of having ‘cultivated an entirely new approach to economic manage-
ment’, and of ‘consult[ing] constantly with the trade unions, employers and farmers
to secure cooperation. . . ’ (Haughey, 1981).
In 1975 the ‘income ceiling’ social welfare was lifted, making better-paid workers
eligible for benefits. This insulated workers, particularly those who had received
wage hikes due to steep inflation, from falling out of a social welfare system that had
been targeted largely at those on medium and lower incomes. This concession was
extremely important to unions: the original social security law of 1960 had included
an income cap, above which workers were considered not to need even contributory
social welfare (let alone the means-tested residual benefits) and thus above which
they neither contributed to nor benefited from the social insurance fund. The in-
flation over the course of the 1960s and 1970s had placed many workers above the
limit: they neither contributed to nor received money from to social insurance fund.
The limit was raised in 1972 and then abolished altogether in 1975. Perhaps even
more significantly, in 1973 pay-related unemployment benefits were introduced (The
Commission on Social Welfare, 1986). This was the first time the principle of pay-
relationship was introduced in Irish public policy.
The expansion of social insurance came to an abrupt end with the onset of a dra-
matic recession in the early 1980s. The outgoing Fianna Fáil of 1977-1981 government,
like the Mitterand government in 1980s France, had spent heavily in an effort to re-
vive the economy, but rampant inflation meant that the economy was uncompetitive
in international markets, and thus suffered heavily from a global economy slowdown
in the early 1980s (Fianna Fáil, 1977). Keynesian stimulus was no longer an option
for the small open economy, government borrowing was out of control, and public
debt reached significant highs. The Fine Gael-Labour government made the restora-
tion of fiscal discipline a priority, and implemented a series of harsh budgets. Garret
Fitzgerald, the then Taoiseach, personally disapproved of the corporatist approach to
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government that had been pursued in previous years, arguing it lacked democratic le-
gitimacy, and thus ended the social partnership process, and seldom met with union
leaders (Roche, 2009, p. 59).
The 1980s recession, coupled with the absence of social partnership, saw the end
of significant social insurance expansions in Ireland. The rise in social security con-
tributions as a share of GDP largely halted, and no significant expansions such as
those that took place in the 1970s and 1960s were seen. This can be seen in Figure 4.2,
which shows that social contributions as a share of total revenue remained relatively
stagnant over the course of the 1980s, compared to significant rises over the course
of the 1960s and 1970s. Pay-related unemployment insurance was scrapped by the
Fitzgerald government in an effort to save money, while pay-related pensions, which
had been a union demand since the introduction of pay-related unemployment in-
surance (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1979, 1980), was quietly shelved. Thus
the recession and the halting of the development of social policy that it engendered,
brought with it perhaps the end of the unions’ ability to move Ireland away from
a residual welfare state model towards a system of comprehensive social insurance
(O’Connor, 2012).
Thus we see that the evidence from 1970s Ireland gives somewhat mixed support
for the argument presented in the dissertation. While social-contribution-financed
social protection is indeed preferred by unions and well-organized insiders, it is not
only with a view to securing benefits from outsiders; nor is it necessarily solely a
function of labor market duality. Social-contribution-financed social protection can
preferred by unions as a means of insulating their entitlements from future politi-
cal interference - claims on the social insurance fund being seen as more secure and
politically sustainable than claims on the general exchequer, and as a means of se-
curing real benefits, particularly in the context of superannuation schemes, real wage
increases and high inflation.
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There are also reasons why in the Irish case we might expect lower levels of at-
tachment to social security financing for several reasons. Firstly, the Irish unions did
not control the administration of social insurance as was the case in France. Thus
their attachment to it, from the perspectives of salaries for unions officials, or from
the point of view of being a key instrument with which to affect the lives of their
members, might reasonably be expected to be lower. Secondly, there was one fund,
not several, and so the opportunities for discord across demographics, occupations
and risks were lessened.
Indeed, to some extent, this lower level of contribution-favoring is what we see.
Irish unions seldom went on strike in to ‘save’ social security the way French unions
did, and, certainly their rhetoric on the subject is more modest than that of the French
unions. However, the above evidence, largely gathered from interviews, points to an-
other logic at work; besides ring-fencing, Irish unions perceived social security bene-
fits as simply being more secure, by virtue of the fact that, even though no actuarial
relationship existed between contributions paid and benefits received, workers per-
ceived that they had earned the benefits. Thus, for union leaders, social contribution-
financed benefits were perceived to be more secure from future cutbacks, and were
thus favored. The evidence here thus provides qualified support for the theory.
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Figure 4.1: Income Taxes as a Share of Government Revenue in Comparative Perspec-
tive
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Figure 4.2: Social Security Contributions as a Share of Government Revenue in Com-
parative Perspective
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Figure 4.3: Trade Union Members as a share of the Labor Force for Ireland in Com-
parative Perspective
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Figure 4.4: Unemployment as a Share of the Labor Force in Comparative Perspective
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Figure 4.5: Long-Term Unemployment as a Share of Total Unemployment in Com-
parative Perspective
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Figure 4.6: Labour Force Participation in Comparative Perspective
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Figure 4.7: Motions at ICTU Annual Congress on Part-time Work
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Figure 4.8: Motions at ICTU Annual Congress on Income Taxation
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Figure 4.9: GDP per Capita (Constant 2000 USD) in Comparative Perspective,
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FRANCE AND IRELAND IN THE 90’S
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter illustrated several instances in which French and Irish unions
favored social contribution financing. In France, I have particularly illustrated that
some French unions favored the protection of their contribution-based systems with
a view to ring-fencing benefits from the long-term unemployed. The Irish case is
slightly more nuanced; there I have argued that the ICTU favored social contributions
because they believed them to be more secure from cutbacks, as well as offering
greater protection from inflation.
This chapter will outline in sharper relief the differences between Ireland and
France, as the French labor market became more and more rigid and dualized, and
as the Irish economy grew strongly in the 1990s. I will show how in France more and
more revenue was moved from the general exchequer to the social insurance funds.
I will contrast this with Ireland where the relative share of the social insurance funds
as a share of government revenue stagnated, and did not expand even in the context
of strong economic growth in the 1990s.
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How did this difference come about? I will argue, in accordance with the theory,
that higher levels of dualization in France, and higher levels of union centralization
and density in Ireland are key drivers behind this dependency on social insurance
financing in the latter country. I will outline how France’s legacy of union admin-
istration of the social insurance system, its legacy of union fractionalization, and its
increasing problems with youth unemployment, created incentives for insiders to
ring-fence. In Ireland, by contrast, unemployment was spread throughout unionized
and non-unionized sectors of the population, and employment growth was strong
across the population. These factors, as well as a strong union confederation resulted
in a lack of pressure for increased social security contributions. In addition, Irish
trade unions sought to reform the income-tax-financed facet of the system so that
the self-employed and farmers paid more, and so the Government, not employers
and employees, financed a larger fraction of the social insurance fund. In this, their
actions mirrored those of the French unions.
This chapter examines the two countries during a period where the levels of du-
alization, the key variable in the dissertation, are sharply in contrast. While there is
evidence of intermediate levels of dualization in both countries in the 1970s, levels
sharply contrasted in the 1990s. In France, dualization had grown steadily worse over
the course of the 1980s, with an expansion of short-term contracts, and increased job
security for insiders. In Ireland, by contrast, many would-be outsiders had emigrated
in the 1980s, and in the 1990s, high levels of economic growth and a flexible labor
market provided widespread growth in employment. I will demonstrate how these
differences led to different priorities for unions and employers thereafter.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 outlines similarities and differences
between France and Ireland at the start of the 1990s. It also provides some back-
ground on the two cases. Section 5.3 compares levels of labor market dualization in
both countries, while Section 5.4 builds on Section 4.2 and discusses the mechanics of
the ICTU’s role in the social partnership process of the 1990s. The next two sections
examine outcomes in both countries, Section 5.5 in Ireland, and Section 5.6 in France.
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Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Comparing Ireland and France
Why does this period in France and Ireland serve to explicate these questions? There
are several reasons why these countries are useful illustrative cases for the theory.
Specifically, these two cases are appropriate given that the mechanisms of the theory
work primarily through 1) labour market dualization, and 2) trade union centraliza-
tion; these two countries are very different in this respect.
Regarding trade union centralization, as we have seen in Section 4.2, France has
historically had trade union confederations that were split along ideological and in-
dustrial lines. Four or five union confederations were constantly rivals for political
power and membership. These separate confederations seldom held similar positions
to one another on social and economic policy. In Ireland, by contrast, the umbrella
organization, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, played an important role in herding
individual Irish trade unions into common positions. Indeed this umbrella organiza-
tion played a deeply institutionalized role that grew more important over the course
of the 1990s, as we will see. Thus union centralization was much higher in Ireland
than in France.
The theory argues that where trade union centralization is high, unions, and union
leaders, internalize the preferences of outsiders, and so advocate lower levels of social
security contributions than they might otherwise. Remember, in the theory outsiders
usually prefer higher levels of income taxes compared to those preferred by insiders.
Formally, we can say that encompassing, centralized unions maximize a utility func-
tion that is a weighted average of the utilities of insiders and outsiders. By contrast,
where unions are smaller and less centralized, each union will only be concerned
with the effects of policy on its members - who are often insiders. In such an in-
stance, we will see insider-dominated unions advocating more for social insurance
contributions.
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Regarding dualization, we will see in Section 5.3 that the increasing use of CDDs
- short-term contracts for young people in France - coupled with a high minimum
wage and heavy restrictions on hiring and firing, led to very high levels of youth
unemployment. Labor force participation also declined dramatically over the 1980s,
particularly among the young and over-55s. Habitually, young workers were unable
to find permanent work, and moved from fixed-term contracts to unemployment
benefits to fixed-term contracts. Long-term unemployment, especially among the
young, steadily rose, in spite of regular government training programs that attempted
to deal with the problem. In addition, the jobs of permanent French workers were
particularly secure - as we have seen in Chapter 4.
While Ireland had high rates of long-term unemployment going into the 1990s - a
consequence of its decade-long period of anemic growth in the 1980s - these levels
reduced rapidly over the course of the 1990s. Low restrictions on hiring and firing,
the absence of a minimum wage, and strong skill-biased technological growth led to
young people being strongly favored in employment growth that accompanied the
economic boom in the mid-1990s. Moreover, a demographic revolution was occurring
in Ireland, as more and more women entered the labor force. Ireland is considered
to have one of the most liberal labor markets in Europe, as will be discussed. This
chapter will explore how this dualization interacted with social insurance policy over
the period.
Again, the theory argues that where dualization is high, those ‘outside’ secure
employment will rely more on the social welfare system. Insiders, who have compar-
atively low needs for social insurance, will prefer to ring-fence funds from outsiders
who will be chronically unemployed in a dualized environment. This is because the
chronically unemployed will place too high a burden on insiders, who would rather
keep these funds for their own use.
Ireland and France in the 1990s differ on the two key parameters discussed in this
dissertation: dualization and trade union organization. But despite these differences,
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both countries faced similar economic challenges over this period. Both countries
had come out of periods of low-to-negative growth in the early 1980s, saw halting
improvements in the late 1980s, and then were severely negatively affected by the
global recession in the early 1990s. Both countries thus began the 1990s with gov-
ernment debts and deficits that were higher than they would have liked (see Figure
5.11). Thus both countries faced pressure for economic retrenchment.
In both countries there were significant problems with the structure of the econ-
omy: from the entry into the EEC, from increasing economic openness, and from
cheaper foreign competitors. The European Single Market was nearing completion,
increasing both countries’ exposure to foreign competition from within the EU.1 Both
countries had undertaken extensive liberalizing reforms in the 1970s and 1980s as
part of its entry into the single market: France has undertaken massive privatizations
of its nationalized industries, and had seen the loss of many agricultural jobs. Ireland
had put off a process of structural adjustment that came with EEC entry by overstim-
ulating its economy. The mid-to-late 1980s had seen a resulting period of massive
cutbacks and reform in Ireland; these cutbacks are in evidence in the sharply falling
government debt over the period.
Finally, both countries saw their economic prospects improve over the 1990s, partly
due to the upturn in the world economy, but also as the economic conditions re-
quired for entry into the new Single European Currency forced structural changes
on otherwise unwilling governments. However, as will be discussed, in France, this
growth was more moderate. Moreover, greater economic growth did not translate
into greater numbers of available jobs in France, whereas in Ireland it did. We can
see this growth in Figure 5.7, which documents the minor upturn in the the French
economy in the late 1990s with comparatively healthy growth rates of 3-4% in ad-
vance of the introduction of the euro. In Ireland, the picture was even better with
1Indeed France and Ireland have historically been allies in opposing reductions in EU subsidies to
the agricultural sector. See http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2011/09/minister-coveney-forges-
strong-alliance-with-france-on-cap-and-common-fisheries-policy/ (Accessed 05/05/12).
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growth rates at or near 10% for the latter half of the decade, the period known as the
‘Celtic Tiger’ economic boom.
In addition to the economic challenges both countries faced, both countries are
useful cases for examining the influence of unions on social policy making because
in both countries unions were involved in the reforms that took place over the 1990s.
In France, union involvement in the administration of social security has been central
to the administration of the system since its foundation (Pedersen, 1993; Dutton,
2002). Moreover, the Juppé reforms, that we will examine, took place in the context
of extensive consultation with unions (Concialdi, 1998).
In Ireland, the unions did not have any explicit role in the administration of the
social insurance system as they did in France (Boulin, 1996). However, the Fianna Fáil
government elected to power in 1989 re-started a process of corporatist ‘social part-
nership’ agreements that involved intense consultation with the unions over wages,
employment conditions, tax and social policy.2 These unions, as we will see, freely
admitted that they were trading industrial peace and wage moderation - both enor-
mously desired by the governments of the day - in exchange for greater influence
over social policy. Thus in both countries union involvement in the reform of the
social insurance system, and in its financing, was extensive. I will demonstrate how
this meant the union preferences mattered, and how the structure of unions mattered
too.
Finally, in both countries the influence of political partisan politics on social policy
was ambiguous.3 As can be seen in Figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10, both countries had
a wide variety of partisan configurations over the 1990s. Ireland, over the period,
saw almost every political party involved in government at some point. But these
2The previous process of social partnership had collapsed during the recession of the early 1980s.
3We will see in Chapter 6 that the impact of left-wing government on tax policy in a sample of OECD
countries is not large.
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governments were, for the first time in Ireland’s history, uniformly coalition gov-
ernments. Moreover, they rarely had an obviously discernible economic perspective;
often they were coalitions of various more left-wing and right-wing parties, which
led to broadly centrist economic policies being enacted.4 France saw some notable
periods of ‘cohabitation’ with a President from one party and a Prime Minister (with
a legislative majority) from the other. Thus the party politics in both countries were
characterized by a large measure of cross-party compromise.
In sum, we compare Ireland and France as a means of exploring the theory for
both their similarities and differences.
• Both countries, at the start of the 1990s, faced growth challenges brought about
by the worldwide recession in the early 1990s.
• Both had had significant economic restructuring take place over the previous
two decades forced on them by EEC entry.
• Both countries’ saw the left and right share power - though intermittently - over
the period.
• Both French and Irish unions and employers were involved in social insurance
policy making.
In contrast to these similarities,
• France’s labor market was significantly harder on young and fixed-term work-
ers, and gave significant employment protections to those on permanent con-
tracts.
• Ireland by contrast had had a liberalized labor market since the 1970s.
4For example, the Christian Democratic Fine Gael with the centre-left Labour Party, the centrist
Fianna Fáil with the center-left Labour Party, or the centrist Fianna Fáil with the right-wing, near
libertarian Progressive Democrats.
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• France’s had several trade union confederations, that had a very adversarial
relationship with one another.
• Ireland’s had one peak union organization, that represented almost every union
in the country, and was essentially the exclusive voice of organized labor in the
country.
5.3 Comparative Levels of Dualization and Labour Market Pol-
icy
5.3.1 Ireland
Ireland began the 1990s with a significant structural unemployment problem, and
moreover, significant levels of long-term unemployment - see Figure 5.3 - levels which
were higher than those in France at the beginning of the 1990s. These levels were a
holdover from the recession in the 1980s, which had devastated the country’s econ-
omy. These levels were particularly high among the young - see Figure 5.5 - and also
particularly high amongst young men - see Figure 5.6. However, in spite of these high
and sustained levels of youth unemployment, the Irish growth boom of the 1990s re-
duced unemployment far more than was expected at the time, and far more than
could necessarily have been accounted for by the boom itself (Walsh, 2003). What
drove these changes?
Firstly, though unemployment had been high, the Irish labor market retained com-
paratively low levels of labor market protection. The Irish labor market did not
become, and indeed never was, as rigid as the French market - see Figure 5.4. Re-
strictions on hiring and firing were low, as were severance packages. This meant that
when an upturn in the Irish economy began, firms had were less reluctant to hire
than they might otherwise have been.
A second reason why structural employment was less of a problem in Ireland
than in France, was Ireland’s historical experiences with emigration. Historically an
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important part of the Irish national identity, emigration was a natural alternative to
remaining unemployed in Ireland as unemployment began to rise in the 1980s. Thou-
sands of young men and women emigrated to the United Kingdom and the United
States, meaning that the scale of the unemployment problem the Irish government
had to deal with at the start of the 1990s was far lower than it might otherwise have
been (Bergin and Kearney, 2007). This prevented a large group of outsiders from
forming, with unemployment undermining increases in human capital in a vicious
cycle.
A third reason behind the lack of labor market duality is the absence of a minimum
wage in Ireland throughout the the 1990s. This absence was a reason why Irish
labor costs stayed extremely low relative to its international competitors, even as
the economy began to grow in the 1990s. This absence of a minimum wage was a
source of constant chagrin for the Irish Congress of Trades Unions, which regularly
complained about the low pay being earned by many of its members. (Irish Congress
of Trades Unions, 1995, 1997). However this absence of a minimum wage meant
that it was cheap for many companies to employ young people at very low wages;
keeping them in the labor market. A minimum wage was only introduced - at a
very low level by European standards - in 2000, after the economy had been at full
employment for many years (Sheehan and Geary, 1998). This stands in stark contrast
to France, where, as we will see, the SMIC (Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de
croissance, the French minimum wage) and the RMI (Revenu minimum d’insertion,
a guaranteed minimum level of income for all persons in or out of employment)
were widely held to diminish the performance of the French labor market (Bazen
and Skourias, 1997; Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
A fourth reason behind the fall in Ireland’s unemployment level is the Irish growth
model that was pursued in the 1990s. The growth model rested almost entirely on
FDI, with comparatively little emphasis placed on domestic industries. This influx of
foreign investment largely took the form of high-tech manufacturing, specifically in
pharmaceuticals, electronics, and medical instruments. This, combined with a large
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influx of financial services companies, meant that the growth in the jobs available in
the Irish economy was high-skill-biased.
This in turn meant that the jobs available in the Irish economy were also youth-
biased. The reason for this is that Ireland had introduced free secondary education
comparatively late, by European standards, in 1967. With this introduction, Irish hu-
man capital levels rose quickly, much later than they did in the rest of Europe. Many
people in this generation who had access to free secondary eduction were also the
first in their families to attend college. As this cohort came into the workforce in the
1980s, they were well-placed to take-up high-tech manufacturing jobs that the Irish
government were trying to attract. In this, they had comparatively little competition
from older generations, where human capital levels were much lower (Walsh, 2003;
Bergin and Kearney, 2007). Thus the growth in labor demand in Ireland was bi-
ased towards the young in a way not present in France, where youth unemployment
remained much higher throughout the decade.
These factors - high levels of labor market flexibility, emigration of a large part of
the unemployed during a downturn, the absence of a minimum wage, and the skill-
biased job growth, all meant that when the Irish economy finally upturned in the
mid-1990s, unemployment fell sharply. This has been referred to as a ‘transformation’
in the Irish labor market (Walsh, 2003). Moreover, the unemployment rate fell just as
fast amongst the young than amongst older workers (Walsh, 2003)[pp. 92].
This confluence of factors meant that while there was an upturn in part-time work,
and in atypical work, as well as a stubborn problem with long-term unemployment,
even as the Irish economy moved to full capacity, a two-tier labor market never de-
veloped in Ireland. Flexible labor markets and the absence of a minimum wage
gave employers plenty of incentives to employ those demographics that might tradi-
tionally be termed outsiders. Moreover, as increasing FDI brought more and more
multinationals to the country, skill-biased technological change created many jobs for
the country’s increasing numbers of well-educated young people.
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5.3.2 France
France, in contrast to Ireland, had much more rigid labor market (Laroque and
Salaniè, 2002). it was very difficult for companies - especially large ones, those with
more than 10 workers - to lay off workers. Often, government permission was re-
quired in cases of larger numbers of layoffs. Companies were required to prove that
the layoffs were required to save the company from failing. Even if the company
could prove to the courts that it was in sufficiently dire financial straits so as to re-
quire layoffs, they had to provide a plan for those workers who were laid off that
usually involved retraining or extensive compensation. Often, companies could not
re-hire workers without government authorization for a period of time after mass
layoffs. In firms with eleven employees or more, employers were required to enter
a statutorily-mandated period of deliberation between staff before the could even
ask for permission to layoff workers. These periods varied between 15 days to three
months depending on the number of redundancies involved (OECD, 1985)[pp. 42].
It was common in France for the courts to intervene in mass layoffs and demand
the reinstatement of workers where the layoff plan was deemed to be insufficient or
inadequate. These polices made French businesses comparatively reluctant to hire
permanent workers (Vincent, 1997).
Partly to ameliorate this problem with labor market rigidity, the French Giscard
government (see Figures 5.9 and 5.10) introduced of fixed-term, temporary contracts
that would not be subject to such heavy firing restrictions. The standard permanent
contract, as mentioned, is subject to stringent rules: firms can only layoff workers for
‘personal reasons’, in which case they have to demonstrate that the worker cannot
do the job assigned to the authorities, or if the company can demonstrate - under
the difficult conditions described above - that it needs to lay off workers. The tem-
porary contracts - ‘Contrats a durée determinée’ (Contracts of determined duration,
or CDDs) - were different. These contracts still required a severance payment, but
were otherwise unencumbered by the legal conditions required for full-time con-
tracts. These contracts were introduced in 1979, curtailed by the socialist government
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in 1981, and expanded again in 1986. These contracts were typically for one year, and
could not be renewed - a worker who was kept on had to be offered a permanent
contract (Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
Use of these contracts increased significantly after their introduction, from 1.4%
of total employment in 1983 to 10.8% in 2000 (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). More-
over, these contracts were focused on the young - in 1983 3% of young people were
employed under these contracts, by 2000 it was 46%. Older groups also saw an in-
crease in CDD contracts, but to a lesser extent; amongst 25-29 year-olds, numbers
on CDDs rose from 1.6% in 1983 to 10% in 2000, while amongst 30-34 year-olds, it
rose from 1.1% in 1983 to 6%. Thus, labor market insecurity in France as represented
by increased use of these temporary contracts was borne disproportionately by the
young (Blanchard and Landier, 2002)[pp. 230-232]. Moreover, the one-year (some-
times 24-month) nature of the contract meant that many young people went from a
CDD to relying on unemployment benefits to a CDD and back again.5 Essentially,
the expansion of CDDs resulted in a high-turnover, low security situation for many
young people, under the guise of keeping the unemployment rate from growing too
high. Thus the expansion of the CDD greatly contributed to the dualization of the
French labor market.
The precarious position of young people in the French labor market was not lost
on policy makers. By the mid-1980s there were regularly announced summits and
programs designed to address the unemployment crisis (OECD, 1984; Bilous, 1998a;
Lefresne, 1997). Often, these programs relieved employers of social security contri-
butions on temporary contracts. While these reductions in labor costs were effective,
they often only lasted as long as the contracts: when the reduction in social security
contributions ended when the contract did; in such cases the cost of retaining the -
usually young - employee rose sharply after the contract expired, and so employers
5Average time to a permanent contract - starting from a CDD - increased from 3.2 years in 1983 to
4.8 years in 1999.
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had little incentives to do so. Moreever, many of these programs involved ‘personal-
ized plans’ of labor market activation for young people, as well as training programs
that did nothing to solve the underlining difficulties in the labor market (Fougère,
Kramarz, and Magnac, 2000).
Other factors, in addition to the expansion of the CDD and the rigidity of the
French labor market, contributed to the increased dualization. The SMIC, the French
minimum wage, was very high by European standards. While high minimum wages
were advocated by unions, the high costs of these wages - with the comparatively
large social security contributions laid on top of them - made it costly for French
firms to hire workers at low cost. In contrast to Ireland, where wage moderation
and the absence of a minimum wage made it comparatively easy to hire workers
on low pay.6 Bazen and Skourias (1997) use a regression discontinuity approach and
finds that a 10% hike in the minimum wage in 1981 contributed significantly to youth
unemployment, as well to unemployment amongst those with low skills.
These negative effects were compounded by the relatively high payments given
to those outside employment. Two such policies in particular, a means-tested basic
income known as the RMI - Revenu minimum d’insertion - and a parent-focused
allowance known as APE - Allocation Parentale d’Education. This latter gave 60%
of the net minimum wage to mothers of at least three children, one of whom was
younger than 3, provided the mother stopped working (Laroque and Salaniè, 2002).
There is significant evidence that these two policies led to reduced labor-market par-
ticipation.78 In marked contrast to the APE, in Ireland two payments were given to
parents. The first - child benefit - was given to all parents regardless of employment
status (and thus had no effect on the incentive to work or not). The second - the Fam-
6For more on why unions might advocate high minimum wages, see Borooah and Lee (1993).
7Piketty (1998) estimates that the APE may have reduced the participation rate of newly eligible
women by about 15 points.
8Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2011) found that ‘that the RMI reduces the participation of uneducated
single men by 7-10% at age 25.’
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ily Income Supplement (FIS) - was given only to parents where both parents worked
a combined 19 hours per week, and thus had positive impacts on the incentive to
work (Walsh, 2003; Bargain and Doorley, 2009).
5.3.3 Conclusion
In sum, I have argued in this section that both Ireland and France entered the 1990s
with very high unemployment levels, a holdover from the recessionary 1980s. How-
ever, this apparent similarity conceals a great deal of different in the two labor mar-
kets. The French labor market had significant restrictions on hiring and firing, the
Irish market much more liberal. The French market had a high minimum wage
which restricted employment among the young and lower-skilled, Ireland had no
minimum wage until 2000. The French social welfare system gave comparatively
generous benefits to parents out of work; while in Ireland parents received univer-
salist or in-work transfers only. The French saw a strict bifurcation between CDDs
and permanent contracts, and saw a massive expansion in short-term, unstable work
over the course of the 1980s. In Ireland, the whole labor market was comparatively
equally insecure. Finally, in Ireland economic growth in the 1990s was biased towards
high-skilled manufacturing, which opened more job opportunities for younger, me
land ore skilled workers than it did for older less skilled workers. This also related
to the differing profiles of skills in the Irish labor force due to the comparatively late
extension of full secondary education in Ireland rapid increase in human capital over
the course of the 1980s.
These factors together meant that the Irish labor market recovered remarkably as
the economy started to grow in the early 1990s; firms found it administratively easy -
and cheap - to take on younger workers. Moreover, because it was - relatively - easy
to fire in Ireland, they had more incentive to hire, even in the context of economic
insecurity. In France, higher growth led to some employment growth, but many
young people continued to drift from short-term contract to short-term contract. Fi-
nally, in part due to the incentives provided by the social welfare code, but also
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due to demographic and economic changes, labor market participation continued to
rise in Ireland while it did not in France. Thus in Ireland, the increase in economic
growth reduced youth unemployment to the same extent as it did employment in the
larger population, in France, youth unemployment remained high, and labor mar-
ket participation low. It should follow from the theory, then, that unions’ incentives
to ring-fence contributions from outsiders, who were often moving from short-term
contracts to unemployment benefit and back again, would be high in France, and
lower in Ireland.
5.4 The Role of the ICTU in the Social Partnership Process
As discussed in the previous chapter, the role of the ICTU in bringing constituent
unions together in the social partnership process was significant. Many individual
unions flirted with rejection of various partnership agreements in the 1990s, and
complaints about the ‘out-of-touch’ role that the ICTU’s national executive played in
many of the ICTU’s dealings with the government, were, and are common in Ireland.
Constituent unions would grow frustrated with what they perceived was the um-
brella organizations’ insufficiently aggressive stance with the government. Despite
this, rarely have individual unions unilaterally defected from the processes of social
partnership when they existed in the 1970s, 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the ICTU
was able to moderate the demands of unions that might have individually become
parochial. The ICTU leadership has adopted a perspective that included a deep-
seated belief in protecting the impoverished and unemployed (Begg, 2012). The role
played by the ICTU has been particularly strong during these periods of explicit so-
cial bargaining between unions, employers and governments, - such as the 1990s. In
such instances, the role of the ICTU as the voice of trade unionism was given a very
specific institutional form by the state and by employers, who dealt with the trade
union movement almost solely through the ICTU.
The ICTU played a role in internalizing, for insiders, the effects of public policy
on outsiders. The model presented earlier in this dissertation argues that a cleav-
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age exists between insiders and outsiders, the former wanting to ring-fence benefits
from the latter. However, to the extent that these two groups are one and the same,
no such cleavage exists, and insider and outsider workers will ally against the rich,
resulting in class-based instead of cross-class cleavages. While Section 5.3 argued
that little dualization existed in the Irish economy, I argue that the ICTU, especially
its National Executive and leadership, played an important role in bringing insiders
and such outsiders as there were together, particularly in the face of employers. To
the extent to which ICTU leaders were able to internalize the effects of their policies
on the poor and disadvantaged, and to the extent to which they were able to cajole
their constituent unions (and those unions’ constituent members), the ICTU (and in-
deed other trade union leaders) were able to prevent insider-outsider cleavages from
becoming salient. These efforts were not lost on outsider representatives. The Irish
National Organization of the Unemployed in 1989 said at their national conference:
The INOU is proud to be associated with the ICTU, the and only na-
tional organization [sic] which has put forward and fought for concrete
proposals to solve the jobs crisis. The ICTU strategy is documented in
their pamphlet “Confronting the Jobs Crisis” which we wholeheartedly
endorse (Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed, 1989).
This attitude, as we will see in, Section 5.6, is in stark contrast to the fractious
relations that often existed between the major French unions and French unemployed
persons’ associations.
The positions taken by union leaders, especially at ICTU level, though also at the
constituent union leadership level, often contrasted with those of members. While
union members, and even constituent unions may have exhibited typical insider be-
havior, and thus behaved in manner consistent with a ‘dualised’ labor market, most
trade union leaders saw their role as being ‘traditionally left-wing’, and thus ex-
hibited a concern for those who would be negatively affected by policies that ex-
tensively favored those in secure employment over the long-term unemployed (Ger-
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aghty, 2012). Often, union leaders would put in considerable efforts to put in place
fully universalistic, tax-financed policies in place of those contribution-financed poli-
cies largely favored by constituent unions.
The comparatively pro-insider views held by some consistent unions, as well as
by many rank-and-file trade unionists meant that these ambitions were usually frus-
trated when union leaders were faced with governments and employers. While senior
trade unionists often described to me efforts arising from their desire to ‘move their
members’ in certain directions, most of the time these efforts yielded comparatively
little in terms of actively pro-outsider policy(Sweeney, 2012; Keating, 2012). This was
because the union leadership suffered from a lack of credibility with the government
that these issues were really favored by union members (Begg, 2012). Constituent
unions (in the case of the ICTU) or union members (in the case of some larger unions
like SIPTU) might have been persuadable that certain outsider-favoring policies such
as concessions for part-time workers was worth pursuing, but ICTU leaders would
know, as would the government and employers, that members would not strike or en-
gage in industrial action in favor of outsider-favoring policies (Begg, 2012; O’Connor,
2012). Because of this, ICTU leaders had less leverage with which to pursue these
policies, as governments and employers knew that they would suffer little sanction
in terms of industrial action if the ICTU’s wishes were not fulfilled.
I have argued that insider-outsider cleavages in Ireland were comparatively minor;
the INOU often alllied with the ICTU, and the difference between youth unemploy-
ment and the national unemployment level were low in comparison to France. Such
cleavages as did exist in Ireland, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, did not manifest
itself as insiders actively campaigning against the interests of outsiders, but rather
simply being unprepared to work for the latter’s interests in the face of employer or
government intransigence in the way that they would if their own issues were on the
line. A senior trade union official said that those issues ‘that fell off the table’ during
social partnership negotiations were those issues where the government knew that
members would not strike if concessions were not secured. As we will see, members
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of Irish unions expressed concern at the expansion of part-time and atypical work in
the Irish economy, but this was mainly from the perspective of the potential threats
this work represented for full-time, permanent employees. On issues concerning the
rights of short-term, part-time and contractual workers, even where trade union of-
ficials may have been able to get some concessions from the government, lack of
support from their members meant that they could not ‘put the government under
pressure’ (O’Connor, 2012).
Nonetheless, the concern that senior Irish union officials have shown for outsiders,
and their ability to give voice to these concerns centrally and directly through the so-
cial partnership process, even in the face of some opposition from constituent unions,
limited the manifestation entrenched insider-outsider divisions that have appeared
elsewhere in Europe (Häusermann, 2010). Indeed, a common coalition in favor of
social partnership agreements has consisted of both civil servant and public sector
unions on one hand, coupled with SIPTU, which has many lower-skilled and occa-
sional workers in its membership, one the other.9 Thus the ‘coalition’ in favor of
social partnership in Ireland crucially bridged the divide between some of the most
secure workers in the economy (public sector workers) and some of the least skilled
(low skilled-private sector workers). Indeed, a trade union official argued that the
public sector unions would go to some lengths in terms of policy concessions, during
periods of intra-ICTU bargaining to keep SIPTU ‘on-side’ (Keating, 2012). Thus a
coalition of public sectors unions (insiders) and SIPTU (a mix of some insiders and
some outsiders) remained in favor of the social partnership process with the govern-
ment and employers. The institutional framework of Irish trade unionism and its
institutional calcification inside the framework of social partnership (the tri-annual
agreements on wages, conditions and public policy) which ‘took on a life of its own’
(Fielding, 2012) made the opening up of insider-outsider cleavages more difficult, and
also allowed the trade union movement to speak with a louder voice than otherwise.
9Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union, Ireland’ largest union.
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Thus the centralization of the Irish trade union movement can be seen to have gone
some way, though not all the way, toward ameliorating concerns that might have re-
sulted from some of the limited dualization that existed in the Irish labor market.
Union leaders worked hard to advocate policies that favored outsiders, and thus the
part of the Irish social welfare system that remained tax-financed (not contribution-
financed) remained well-funded. However, a lack of appetite for strike action in favor
of outsiders amongst rank-and-file trade union members meant that ICTU leaders
found their bargaining power with the government and employers somewhat dimin-
ished on issues like part-time or occasional work. These issues would, naturally, be
of concern to those with low levels of attachment to the labor force, and those with
unusual work histories, who we have argued are the main outsiders in European
economies.
These two examples; the efforts of ICTU leaders to ‘talk around’ their constituent
unions to policies that might be more other-regarding, combined with the lack of
bargaining power these leaders had on such policies, provide examples of how the
theory plays out in practice. The institutionalization of outsider-regarding prefer-
ences amongst the umbrella organization is an important means by which the efforts
of insiders to restrict access to benefits, to social security and to job market security.
As I will demonstrate in Section 5.5, in Ireland, the ICTU followed a ‘middle path’;
neither undermining the social-contribution-financed part of the social welfare sys-
tem, but not developing it either. As we will see in Section 5.6, this is in contrast to
to France, where unions fought tooth-and-nail, often in the face of organized protests
by outsiders, to preserve the contribution-financed character of the social insurance
system, and to co-opt more funding into the social insurance system from the exche-
quer.
In sum, I have argued that several features of the status of trade unions in French
society gave them policy leverage, particularly their institutionalized role in the ad-
ministration of social welfare, as well as their legal rights in wage bargaining. Irish
trade unions neither administered national-level social insurance, nor were their
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rights in terms of coverage of employment contracts as extensive. However, the Irish
trade union movement, while made of many different unions with often very differ-
ent perspectives, has only one confederation. The French trade union movement, by
contrast, has five confederations, each with slightly different ideologies and demo-
graphics of members. Moreover, these confederations compete with each other for
members, for funding, for power in the administration of social policy and on policy
itself.
I will argue below that while the ICTU structures, and also its leadership played
an important role in bringing outsiders concerns to the attention of its members,
and advocated for them (though this advocacy was limited), French unions in some
cases actively opposed increased participation of unemployed groups in policy. I will
further argue that while the Irish trade unions certainly favored the maintenance of
social contribution-based financing as existed in Ireland in the 1990s, their primary
focus was on making the tax system more progressive, and reducing the overall level
of unemployment. In France by contrast, some unions, especially the CFTD, worked
to steer revenues from the overall tax system towards those social insurance funds
that were reserved for insiders.
5.5 Social Partnership, Trades Unions and Tax Policy in Ireland
In the late 1980s, unemployment was high in Ireland, as were tax rates. Succes-
sive governments had struggled to bring down the public debt, the result of which
was that taxes were extremely high. The Fianna Fáil government, that retained a
corporatist ideology that favored national-level bargaining pacts with unions and
198
Chapter 5. France and Ireland in the 90’s
employers, brought them both together for an agreement on wages.10 The implicit
strategy was to keep wage rates low, in an effort to attract more foreign investment
into the country. However, in order to appease the unions, who demanded take-home
wage increases for their members, the government implicitly promised to cut taxes
in exchange for wage restraint (Begg, 2012).11
Over the years to come, especially from 1990 to 1997, the unions aggressively pur-
sued tax cuts for their members. What was not pursued however, were any reduc-
tions in social security contributions. For example, a pre-budget submission (IM-
PACT Trade Union, 1997) by IMPACT (a predominantly civil service based union)
called for:
• An increase in the tax-free allowance given to workers,
• Indexing these tax allowances to inflation,
• Stricter punishments for tax evaders,
• A progressive shift to a tax credit system from the tax allowance system,
• Making educational grants from tax-free,
• An increase in property tax.
The same submission merely made mention of the need to ‘maintain’ the system
of PRSI. It did however, request that PRSI contributions be made deductible for tax
purposes (which would reduce the income tax burden of salary earners).
10This agreement foreshadowed six more in the two decades that followed: The Programme for
National Recovery (Government of Ireland, 1987), The Programme for Economic and Social Progress
(Government of Ireland, 1991), The Programme for Competitiveness and Work (Government of Ireland,
1994), Partnership 200 for Inclusion, Employment and Competitiveness (Government of Ireland, 1996),
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (Government of Ireland, 2000), Sustaining Progress (Govern-
ment of Ireland, 2003) and Towards 2016: Ten-Year Framework (Government of Ireland, 2006). This
latter agreement was essentially made redundant with the onset of the 2008 economic crisis.
11For more on this logic see Mares (2006).
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Similarly, the conference of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions that year (Irish
Congress of Trades Unions, 1997, pp. 45-50) called for
• Improved progressivity of benefits.
• PRSI to be tax-deductible,
• The Introduction of tax credits.
• Increases in tax allowances.
The call for PRSI to be tax-deductible is an example of insider-focused behavior,
as it would have relieved salary earners from some of the burden for financing so-
cial welfare for non-salary earners (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1995, pg. 110).
These measures, however, did not advocate for a fundamental shift in the way so-
cial welfare was financed in Ireland. They would have made the tax code signifi-
cantly more progressive, but would not have contributed significantly to raising the
amount of money going into the social insurance system. Some of this tax relief for
PRSI contributions was introduced in 1997, but not to the extent that unions had de-
manded (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1997, pp. 60). Overall, unions demanded
the ‘maintenance’ of the insurance principle as regards to social insurance (IMPACT
Trade Union, 1997), but little of the expansion that they had demanded towards pay-
relationship in the 1970s.
This absence of demands, and even absence of discussion, regarding social security
contributions in Irish trade union discourse is not too surprising for the following
reasons. First, as Irish unemployment levels fell sharply, the pressure on the social
insurance fund lessened; the financial threat presented by the unemployed lessened,
which did not happen in France. As discussed in Section 5.3, levels of dualization
in Ireland were lower; the numbers of unemployed outsiders fell. As the theory would
expect then - see Table 3.2 - this resulted in lower demands for social contribution
financing.
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A second reason why demands for increased contribution financing were not present
in this period in Ireland is that the Irish population is significantly younger than the
French population, also contributing to a lack of financial pressure on the social in-
surance fund. Again - the extent to which insiders felt there to be a threat to the
sustainability of the Social Insurance Fund was much lower in Ireland, thus the de-
sire for ring-fencing was lower. Finally, unions were encompassing; many of the
unemployed were from a union background, and thus their plight was of serious
concern for the union movement (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1990, pg. 52).
This again, highlights the effects of the broad coverage and centralization of Irish
trade unionism.
Disquiet about unemployment extended, as it did in the French case, to worries
about the increasing pervasiveness of occasional, seasonal and part-time workers.
Work of this nature was increasing over the period, and most of these workers were
neither represented by trade unions or covered under the social insurance system.
The challenge presented by this change was not lost on trade union officials.12 We
can see in Figure 4.7, the extent to which atypical work was discussed in the ICTU’s
annual conference rose during the 1980s and 1990s.
As mentioned, however, behavior of the larger unions was often comparatively
outsider-friendly. The largest Irish trade union, SIPTU (an umbrella union - Services,
Industrial, Professional and Technical Union) demanded in 1997 that planned gov-
ernment reductions in income taxes be implemented not through cuts in rates, but
through increases in tax credits. Their reason was that increasing credits would more
directly impact those working irregularly than would a rate cut (Geary and Dobbins,
12One noted that ‘there are two crucial issues which this trade union movement faces, the issue of
union recognition and the way we handle the new world of work or atypical workers ’(Irish Congress
of Trades Unions, 1997, pg. 78).
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1997).13 Such outsider-friendly behavior on the part of an Irish union is confirmation
of extent to which, with the economy at full employment, the unions felt that the
proceeds of the economic boom could be spread to atypical workers.
We can also see evidence that the ICTU leadership played a role in publicizing
the plight of both the unemployed and occasional workers. Repeatedly unemployed
members and retired people were brought to address ICTU gatherings. Moreover,
the National Executive of the ICTU pushed its constituent unions to advocate for
the inclusion of part-time workers into the social insurance system, and making their
work eligible for cover under the PRSI system (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1991,
pg. 114). In this effort, they were often allied with the National Union of Journalists -
whose members were often freelance or occasional workers with irregular PRSI con-
tributions histories.14 In addition to this the ICTU organized unemployment ‘centers’
for training and job placement around the country. They also developed a supple-
13The national pay agreement, Partnership 2000, committed take into account the employment situ-
ation of “atypical” workers, stating that “the social partners have agreed that the appropriate taxation
arrangements for atypical workers should be examined jointly in greater detail during the course of this
Partnership to see how the income tax system might be adapted to cope with this change in the nature
of employment and activity.”
14A 1995 Motion by the National Executive, for example, demanded that
• “all flexible and part-time working must be voluntary and negotiated by unions
• access should be ensured to good quality jobs which maintain career prospects
• part-time worker should retain the same protection rights and working conditions as full time
workers on a pro-rate basis
• part-time workers should be organized and included in collective agreements
• part-time workers should be recruited into decision-making bodies, particularly those affecting
atypical workers.
• Congress must be actively be involved at national level with Government and employers on
changes in working patterns.” (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1995, pg. 69)
(Italics added.) Similar resolutions were adopted in 1991 (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1991, pg.
57), 1993 (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1993, pg. 26), and 1997 (Irish Congress of Trades Unions,
1997, pg. 102).
202
Chapter 5. France and Ireland in the 90’s
mentary fund, separate from the government-sponsored Social Insurance Fund, with
which to finance these benefits. The ICTU’s actions in this respect mirror that of the
French CGT. (Irish Congress of Trades Unions, 1991, pg. 44). It is notable, however,
that many constituent unions refused to contribute to the small fund the ICTU set
up. In this we can see that though the ICTU executive, with some of its constituent
unions, offered policies that benefited outsiders, these sentiments were not necessar-
ily financially supported by all the constituent unions.
In sum, the ICTU advocated lower taxes in exchange for wage restraint, but did
not support lowering the level of social contributions. The effect of this was that
income tax rates came down significantly in Ireland over the 1990s, though the buoy-
ancy of the economy kept income tax revenue high. I argue that it is significant
that unions constantly advocated lower income tax rates, but wanted PRSI kept un-
touched. Irish trade unionists were simply not as exercised about the issue of social
security funds as French unions were. More generally, the ICTU leadership, in con-
trast to the positions taken by French union confederations, pressed for the inclusion
of part-time and occasional workers in the social insurance system, through inclusion
in collective agreements, and through the setting-up of their own fund to aid the un-
employed.15 The reception these latter initiatives got from the constituent unions was
decidedly mixed, however. This illustrates a logic of the theory - that while individual
unions, especially those whose members are in secure employment, might be hostile
to outsider-friendly policies, the ICTU played a role in ‘bringing them along’, at least
to some extent. Such an effort by an umbrella organization was notably absent in
France. It is to this French experience that we now turn.
15An exception to this in the French case is the CGT.
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5.6 Funding Social Welfare in France and the Contribution So-
ciale Généralisée
5.6.1 The Management of UNEDIC
This section will document that French unions fought over the period of the 1990s
to maintain control of the social insurance funds that they managed, to keep con-
tribution rates and benefit rates to and from these funds high, and, in the most
part to subvent resources from the rest of the government to these funds. Evidence
of some French unions’ attempts to restrict benefits from outsiders are in evidence
in the management of the French national employment insurance fund, UNEDIC.
This fund - Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le
commerce (National Professional Union for Employment in Industry and Trade) -
like other French insurance and pension organizations was managed jointly by the
unions (CGT, CFDT, FO, CFE-CGC and CFTC) and employers.16 While the govern-
ment set the contribution rates and benefit rates, the distribution of payments, and
the management of funds, was carried out jointly by the social partners. Crucially
however neither unemployed people nor their representatives sat on the boards of
these funds.
A 1997 agreement between the CFDT, CFTC, FO and CFE-CGC and the employers
traded - in a typically pro-insider fashion - a rise in unemployment benefits with
a tightening of eligibility requirements. In response to this new agreement, several
organizations of unemployed people staged widespread protests both against the
tightening of eligibility requirements and their lack of representation on the boards
(Damesin and Priou, 1997). Most of the unions - except the CGT - stated that they
viewed themselves, and not any unemployed persons’ organizations as the legitimate
representatives of workers, employed, retired and unemployed, and so no change in
the structure of the boards was needed (Damesin and Priou, 1997). In this we can
16Originally MEDEF, CGPME et UPA. MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France) was, before
1998 known as CNPF (Conseil national du patronat français, CNPF)
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see the behavior of the French unions as being insider-focused: an attempt to restrict
benefits from outsiders, while keeping benefits high for insiders, in addition to an
effort to keep outsiders from overly influencing the setting of social contribution
policy.
In April 1998, in response to these protests, the National Assembly took a decision
to allow unemployed associations to ‘to take part in new local liaison committees
attached to the agencies for training and placement of unemployed people.’ The
Assembly did not, however, pass a measure that provided for representation of un-
employed people within the UNEDIC boards itself (Bilous, 1998c). This measure
was thus an attempt to give outsiders - especially the unemployed - a voice in social
policy, while at the same time not angering too much those unions that jealously
guarded their positions of the boards of social insurance funds.
Despite this, the proposal met with enormous hostility from all the trade unions,
again, except the CGT. The General Secretary of the CFDT said that ‘the suspicion
that [union’s protests against the measure] perpetuates as to the legitimacy of unions
to represent the interests of unemployed people in this area is prejudicial to both
the efficient running of the UNEDIC and to the unemployed themselves’ (Bilous,
1998c).17 These events indicate the extent to which the trade unions viewed the un-
employed with not a little suspicion; and in particular feared the ease in eligibility
requirements that might come with increased involvement by the unemployed in the
management of the unemployment insurance fund. The efforts of unions to maintain
their control of these funds in the face of increasing attempts by the government to
interfere provide a mechanism through which the theory plays itself out; by con-
trolling the funds, the trade unions in France could easily ring-fence benefits from
17 Bilous (1998c) notes that unemployed sections were created at local level in the CFDT in 1974, but
the experiment was discontinued in 1982. Within the FO, the committees for unemployed and short-
term contract workers, established in 1982, were aborted by the following year. Only the CGT set up
and maintained their own structures for the unemployed, a fact which likely resulted in their different
stance on this issue.
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outsiders - most notably the young.
5.6.2 The Contribution Sociale Généralisée and the funding of unemployment
insurance
These conflicts further extended to the funding of the social insurance funds, both the
funding of UNEDIC - the main unemployment insurance fund previously mentioned
- but also other funds for pensions, disability and healthcare. The socialist govern-
ment in the 1980s tried to finance the increasing deficits in these funds by increasing
the contributions to them. However, not only did these increases in social security
contributions not solve the deficits in the fund, but they added to disincentives for
employers to hire. In the early 1990s, partly at the instigation of international organi-
zations like the OECD and IMF, the French government began to provide incentives
for employers to hire the young and the long-term unemployed. These incentives
specifically took the form in reductions in social security contributions for certain
at-risk groups. Employers hiring young workers or long-term unemployed workers
would not have to pay social security contributions for those workers for a period of
years, making them cheaper to hire.
In evidence that accords with the idea that unions prefer to raise revenue from
social security contributions than other taxes, these reductions in contributions, even
for lower-wage, marginally-employed or unemployed workers were broadly opposed
by trades unions. Concialdi (1998) writes that ‘[t]he CFDT questioned the notion
that ’cuts in contributions necessarily went hand in hand with job creation’, while
the CGT considered that the recommended lowering of contributions was based on
’the debatable and disputed theory that labour costs are responsible for the high
unemployment rate.’ The unions further criticized the proposed reductions, saying
that by introducing a measure of progressivity into the calculation of contributions,
they could ‘push down all salaries’ and ‘penalize skilled workers.’ Some of these
misgivings were shared by others; the OECD argued that many of the cuts in con-
tributions would induce workers to hire long-term unemployed people instead of
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short-term unemployed people, but would not lead to a net increase in the number
of jobs (OECD, 1995a).18 Others said that said they accentuated the dual nature of the
French labour market, as workers went from one of these short term contracts to the
next, as employers had no incentives to keep them on after the social security subsidy
expired (Palier, 2005). Nonetheless, these schemes, introduced in 1990 as a temporary
measure, were continued in 1990, 1991, 1995 and 1999 (OECD, 1992, 1995a,b, 1999).
While these reductions in contributions, opposed by unions, may have had neg-
ligible effects on unemployment, what they did do was contribute to starving the
social insurance funds of their revenue base. The more contribution reliefs reduced
the amount going into the funds, the larger the deficits that resulted. Raising con-
tributions was an unpalatable option for the unions, and the government would not
countenance the rise in unemployment that it thought would result from the dis-
establishment of the special contribution reduction schemes. Thus in 1997, they
turned to another source of revenue: a tax called the CSG (Contribution Sociale
Généralisée). This is a unique tax in the French system, and indeed anywhere, for
two reasons. Like income taxes it is levied on all income (unlike social security con-
tributions which are levied on wages only). But unlike social security contributions
it is ring-fenced for the social insurance funds (unlike income taxes which go towards
all forms of government expenditure).19
This tax was initially levied in 1991 at a very low level, to make up a shortfall in
the health insurance funds. But it provided an opportunity to widen the spectrum of
funding for social security by levying the tax on self-employed income, rental income,
property income and income from investments and savings. Revenue shortfalls in
these funds could be made up with tax revenue without having to have punitive taxes
that might discourage employment (Bilous, 1997). The tax was thus dramatically
18As discussed in Section 5.3 and as outlined by Blanchard and Landier (2002), this is indeed what
happened.
19An early discussion of the differences between social security contributions and income taxes is
contained in Section 1.4.
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increased from 1.1% of income in 1991 to 2.4% in 1993, then to 3.4% in 1995, then to
7.5% in 1998.
The introduction of the CSG effected a transformation of the funding of French
social insurance. In Figures 5.2, we can see that social security contributions fell
abruptly in the mid-1990s, while income taxes (see Figure 5.1) rose commensurately.
This seemingly massive change conceals the fact that since introduction, there has
been controversy in French law as to whether the CSG was actually a social security
contribution or an income tax. Specifically, it was a tax levied on everyone in society
(like an income tax), but for the benefit of those covered under the social security
system (specifically, secured salary earners with a history of social contributions). It
stands today as the largest single source of revenue other than VAT for the French
Government.
The nature of the CSG provided an enormous boon for those insiders covered by
the system, in that it kept their benefits secure in times of significant deficits in the
social insurance system, without further increases in contributions that would fall
solely on them. It is unusual in this sense in that it gave insiders an opportunity
to attain all the benefits of social contributions (ring-fencing) while also gaining the
benefits of income taxes (taxing bases other than labor such as capital). For the French
government, it provided a way to balance the books, without politically unacceptable
cutbacks to social insurance, or further increases in social security contributions that
would exacerbate France’s employment crisis. Distributionally however, it meant that
more and more of the Fench revenue spent on social welfare was going through the
social insurance system - targeted largely at insiders - as opposed to other aspects
of the system that were based on poverty alleviation. Moreover, the lack of money
for the social security funds was being made up by the rest of society, because of the
CSG’s broader base.
The shift to the CSG was supported by the CFDT (France’s second-largest, and
most moderate union confederation) as well as the CFTC (France’s Christian Demo-
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cratic union). This is again in accord with the theory that unions should support
financing methods that ring-fence benefits for insiders instead of outsiders. The CSG
did exactly this. While the set of revenue sources for social security funds for social
insurance was steadily being enlarged, limitations in access to most benefits to those
with contribution histories were maintained. Specifically, the self-employed, atypical
workers, and those not earning their income from a regular salary, were being taxed
to pay for benefits to which they had little access.
However the new contribution received a much more lukewarm reception from the
CGT, and was opposed outright by the FO. This is surprising from the perspective
of the theory laid out in Chapter 3 as these unions had large numbers of secure
workers, who should have favored receipt of funds from the general exchequer that
were ring-fenced for their use. Insiders like this should be in favor of taxes like the
CSG. The reason for this unusual finding can be found in these unions - especially
the FOs - position on maintaining control of the administration of the social security
system. Specifically, these unions feared that increasing financing of social insurance
from the general public would be a ‘thin end of the wedge’ and would result in the
unions having less and less say over how the funds were spent. Seeking to maintain
the jointly-run (between management and employees) nature of these funds was a
priority for these unions, over and above the crisis of financing that the CSG helped
to ameliorate (Bilous, 1997).
In sum, we have seen evidence in this section that maintaining control over the
administration of the social security funds is of enormous import for French union
confederations. This is evident in their attempts to scuttle the direct representation
of the unemployed on the boards of these funds, and also in the fears of the CGT
and FO that increasing the Contribution Sociale Généralisée would lead to a loss of
control of these funds. The French unions steadfastly opposed any reductions in ben-
efits of these funds, and indeed, secured increases in both benefits and contributions
throughout the 1990s, even in the context of chronic deficits in the funds. These in-
creases were paid for in part by reducing the eligibility for funds - a measure which
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again can be characterized as anti-outsider - and also by the introduction of the Con-
tribution Sociale Généralisée. This new tax on all income is a unusual invention in
European social policy, as, like a social security contribution, its benefits are reserved
for employees with regular contribution histories (insiders) but, like an income tax,
its costs are borne by the population at large.
The shift to this tax constituted perhaps the French government’s in the 1990s
principal reaction to the twin challenges in the 1990s of high structural employment
and high deficits in the social welfare funds. Its introduction, while easing financial
constraints in the funds, and at the same maintaining incentives for employers to hire
young and disadvantaged workers, has nonetheless shifted, ever further, the benefits
of the French social security system to insiders.
5.7 Conclusion and Implications
In the aftermath of widespread economic struggles in the 1980s, as well as growing
demographic problems, most governments in Europe struggled with the sustainabil-
ity of welfare costs. High unemployment and the recession in the early 1990s pre-
sented governments with significant challenges as to how to fund the welfare state
in such times. In both countries here, unions were deeply involved in this debate,
through the explicit social partnership process in Ireland, and through their position
in the management of social insurance funds in France. In both cases thus, the prefer-
ences of unions were of deep significance in answering the questions ’can the welfare
state be funded in a way that is not inimical to economic growth, and how?’
France and Ireland present two different answers to this question. I have tried
to argue that the pre-existing structure of the labour market and the trade union
movement, as well as this movement’s involvement in policy, is a key mediating
factor in how these challenges are met. I have argued that a key explanatory factor
was the presence of labour market dualization; the localization of unemployment risk
on the young, on women, and other ‘outsiders’. Where dualization was high, unions
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favored social security contributions as means of ring-fencing benefits in funds where
entitlement to contributions was restricted to insiders who had long, uninterrupted
contributions histories. By contrast, where unemployment risk was spread more
evenly across the population, the incentives to ring-fence funds were less strong.
In France, we have seen that tensions between the long-term unemployed resulted
in separate unemployed persons’ organizations being set up, and conflict often spilled
out onto the streets in rival protests by unions and the unemployed. By contrast,
Irish trade unions, especially the umbrella ICTU, made significant efforts to reduce
long-term unemployment, not least because many of those laid off in the 1980s were
union members who maintained their membership. Thus, the level of dualization in
the labor market was not as strong in Ireland as it was in France.
Secondly, I have argued that the presence of encompassing unions is an important
explanatory factor. I have specifically argued that the Irish ICTU was able to win over
individual unions to policies that mildly favored the economically disadvantaged,
policies that they might not have supported otherwise. Though sometimes these
efforts by the ICTU leadership met with mixed success, there seldom was seen the
actively anti-outsider policies that were at times supported by French unions. These
latter unions were significantly more divided along ideological and demographic
lines, leading to a lack of a collective platform that might have been more outsider-
focused.
Other explanatory variables, not considered here in detail, may be at work. I have
demonstrated, for example, that ‘control’ of the administration of social policy was
a key concern for some French unions. It is not impossible that this was in no small
part to the generous salaries given to union officials for the performance of their roles
in this administration. I have given no consideration here to party politics and how
it interacted with trade union structure. Moreover, the case-universe here does not
allow for a disentangling of the effects of union structure and labour market structure.
I have argued that France had both a fractured trade union movement, and high levels
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of dualisation, while Ireland had neither. It remains to be seen what the policy mix
would look like in the presence of one or other of these factors. Finally, I have given
no consideration to the roles of employees in these debates; neither IBEC, the Irish
Business and Employers Confederation, nor MEDEF, la Mouvement des Entreprises
de France, have received more than a cursory mention.20 These topics, and others, I
leave for further research.
20On the importance of this topic, see Mares (2003).
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Figure 5.1: Comparing Income Tax Revenues in Ireland and France
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Figure 5.2: Comparing Social Security Contribution Revenues in Ireland and France
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Figure 5.3: Dualisation in the Labour Market in Ireland and France: Overall Unem-
ployment
215
Chapter 5. France and Ireland in the 90’s










Figure 5.4: Dualisation in the Labour Market in Ireland and France: Employment
Protection
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Figure 5.5: Dualisation in the Labour Market in Ireland and France: Youth Unem-
ployment
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Figure 5.6: Dualisation in the Labour Market in Ireland and France: Young Male
Unemployment
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Figure 5.7: Economic Growth in France and Ireland
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Figure 5.8: Governments in Ireland: 1980-2010
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Figure 5.9: Presidents of France
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CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE FOR THE MODEL
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we test the outcomes of the theory developed in Chapter 3 at the
aggregate level. While Chapters 4 and 5 provided some evidence in support of the
mechanisms of the theory at a national level, this chapter focuses on whether the the-
ory has explanatory power on a larger scale. Thus, the dependent variables of interest
in this chapter are quantitative tax-mix outcomes. However, while the theory devel-
oped and tested in the previous chapters has focused largely on social security taxes
and income taxes, this chapter has a slightly broader focus. Here we test hypotheses
over the entire tax mix. Obviously, while the principal focus of this testing will be on
the theory I have developed, we will also include tests of competing hypotheses, as
well as testing, in an ancillary fashion, some other theories in the literature regarding
other taxes.
We are able to do this through a methodological contribution of the chapter: a
combined use of compositional data analysis with seemingly unrelated regression
with random effects. As discussed in Chapter 2, the share of revenue raised from
various taxes has been studied previously, but the existing literature has looked at
these taxes ‘a tax at a time’. By and large, scholars have yet to integrate the various
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parts of the tax mix into a coherent whole. This has been true both theoretically and
empirically; most theories account for variation in this or that tax, without consider-
ing trade-offs between taxes. In addition, most studies have included only one tax at
a time as a dependent variable in a regression.1 Given that the theory outlined in this
dissertation explicitly concerns a trade-off between income taxes and social security
contributions, two taxes we have argued are imperfect substitutes, it is particularly
important to empirically account for potential links between taxes. The approach
adopted here allows for interactions between various taxes, as well as accounting. I
borrow an approach developed by Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg (2002) for the study
of electoral systems, and combine it with that of Biørn (2004), the former to account
for the compositional nature of the tax data and the latter to deal with seemingly
unrelated regressions with unbalanced panels.
In a panel of OECD countries, the results demonstrate that richer countries are
more likely to raise revenue from income than consumption taxes, as are countries
with higher levels of growth. Inflation results in the tax mix being predominated by
goods and services taxes, but decreases the share of revenue raised from taxes on
labor. Crucially for our purposes, countries with higher levels of trade union density,
and higher levels of economic openness are more likely to tax labor through income
taxes than social security taxes. Two facts other facts are also interesting; countries
with larger states (higher levels of tax revenue as a share of GDP) raise a larger
share of revenue from social security taxation, and less from goods and services
taxation. This suggests that larger welfare states are financed using comparatively
regressive, ring-fenced taxes on labor. In addition, coefficients on a variable for ’left-
wing’ government are comparatively small and sometimes insignificant. This lends
support to institutional and economic explanations of the tax mix, as opposed to
partisan-political explanations.
1An exception is Timmons (2010).
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6.2 Main Hypotheses
Trade Union Density The central argument of this dissertation has been that varia-
tion in income and social security taxes across countries is a consequence of ‘insider-
outsider’ politics, divisions between those who are in protected sectors of the econ-
omy with low levels of job loss and high access to entitlements, and those with poor
job security and low levels of entitlements. In this, my work follows the insider-
outsider theories of Häusermann (2010), Mares (2006) and Rueda (2005). In short,
I have argued that insiders tend to prefer more social security taxes to outsiders.
Social security taxes are usually ring-fenced and flow into a social insurance fund
linked to a social insurance system where disability and unemployment benefits and
pensions are usually paid in accordance with years of work and salary upon request
of benefits. over income taxes.
Where the labor market is divided, we should see the preferences of insiders di-
verge from those of outsiders. However, the theory section of this dissertation has ar-
gued that these preferences are mediated through institutions of labor representation,
namely, trade unions. I argue that where union leadership encompasses the prefer-
ences of outsiders, the reliance on social security taxes will be less. This is because
outsiders, according to the theory, prefer income-tax-financing to social-contribution-
financing, as the resulting benefits are more likely to be accessible to them. I argue
that where trade unions encompass the preferences of outsiders, social security taxes
should be less. Thus, the greater the fraction of the population that unions represent -
the greater the trade union density - the smaller the probability that insider/outsider
divisions will be prevalent at all. Insiders will be less eager to shield their tax con-
tributions from outsiders, and nationally-based trade unions will be less concerned
with the unemployment benefits purely for insiders. In such instances, we should
see lower levels of social security contributions.
Hypothesis 1: Countries with high levels of trade union density will have larger shares
of revenue from income taxes and smaller shares of revenue from social security taxes. The
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impact of trade union density on revenues from goods and services taxes and property taxes
is indeterminate.
6.3 Other Hypotheses
Left Wing Parties A competing theory is that the cleavages around income tax and
social security contributions are not insider-outsider at all, but rather class-based;
between the wealthy and the poor. In such a conception, we would see wealthy
people wanting more social security taxes and less income taxes, and the poor want-
ing more income taxes and less social security taxes. Thus when, the traditional
party of the left should favor income taxes over social security taxes, in response to
its working-class constituency, while right-wing parties should favor social security
taxes over income taxes, in response to its richer constituency. Moreover, left-wing
parties should favor lower taxes on consumption and on property, as both these taxes
tend to be regressive. Right-wing parties should comparatively favor these taxes.
Hypothesis 2: Countries with higher shares of left-wing government will have shares of
revenues from income taxes, and smaller shares of revenue from indirect taxes and social
security taxes.
Inflation and Growth Following Messere (1993), Volkerink and de Haan (1999) ar-
gue that where inflation and growth are higher, one can expect to see income taxes
rise, due to the fact that workers are earning more in nominal terms (either due to
real income growth in the case of economic growth, or nominal income growth in
the case of inflation) pushes tax payers into high income brackets; due to the legal
brackets in the tax system not moving with inflation in most countries. We have seen
evidence of trade unions concern for this ‘bracket creep’ phenomenon in Ireland in
Chapter 4. As workers earn more in nominal terms, but nominal tax brackets remain
sticky, workers move into a higher tax bracket. Each dollar of their income becomes
taxed at a higher rate. Thus inflation should increase the share of GDP raised from in-
come taxes. By contrast, social security taxes are often capped; with no extra income
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being paid above a certain amount. Consequently, increased nominal wage growth
will push more taxpayers to brackets where they pay less, not more, reducing the
share of income raised from social security taxes. The authors argue that ‘[g]eneral
consumption tax ratios will remain broadly unaffected by inflation, since they are
based on the value of goods and services, but increased growth could have a positive
effect through higher consumption (Messere, 1993). It follows from the preceding
analysis that the a priori effects of inflation and real growth on the total tax ratio are
undetermined’. This leads to a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Countries with high levels of inflation will have larger shares of revenue from
income taxes and smaller shares of revenue from social security taxes. The impact of inflation
on goods and services taxes and property taxes is indeterminate.
State Size Again here, I base my argument on the work of Volkerink and de Haan
(1999) who in turn follow Messere (1993) and argue that there are visibility factors
at work here. Where the size of state is larger, the amount of revenue raised from
taxation is necessarily larger; but high tax rates often meet with large levels of public
opposition. Indirect taxes are used because of their lower visibility or ‘salience’, as
they are commonly integrated into prices, taxpayers do not ‘know’ they are paying
tax. Goods taxes can be a way for governments to raise taxes without incurring
political consequences. Taxes on income and social security taxes, by contrast, are
taken out of paychecks, and so appear in numerical form once a month in front of
most taxpayers.2 As such, they are likely to be more politically costly. We thus have
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Countries with high total levels of taxation will have larger shares of revenue
from goods and services taxes and smaller shares of revenues from income and social security
taxes. The impact of inflation on goods and services taxes and property taxes is indeterminate.
2A seminal paper by Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) shows that taxpayers react less to taxes that
are less salient.
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Economic Openness As discussed in Chapter 2, there is an extensive literature on
the consequences of globalization for advanced industrial countries; indeed the po-
litical science literature on taxation and the welfare state has focused extensively on
the consequences of globalization for social protection. Though I have tried to argue
that capital taxes have not fallen substantially as a share of the tax mix in the glob-
alizing period sine 1960, and that taxes on labor have actually increased, we include
the variable in this regression to examine the case at a cross-national level. Following
Ganghof (2005b), I hypothesize that it will reduce the amount of revenue raised from
taxes on mobile factors (labor and capital) and will increase revenues raised from less
mobile factors (property and consumption).
Hypothesis 5: Countries with high levels of economic openness will rely less on income and
social security taxes and more on taxes on property and goods and services.
Summary and Other Taxes I summarize the expected signs in the data derived from
the previous hypotheses in the Table 6.1. We note that there is a fifth category, labelled
‘Other Taxes’ in the data. This will be discussed further in the data section. It is a
combination of taxes that belong in other categories but have been mis-categorized
by governments as they report to the OECD, and other revenues such as fines and
penalties paid for infringement of regulations relating to taxes. Due to the residual
and varied nature of the taxes in this category, we do not make any predictions based
on it.3 I note however, in Table 6.2 of summary statistics, that the average share of
government revenue raised from these taxes is comparatively low, as is the standard
deviation when compared to the other taxes. Hence, I am comfortable with their
inclusion even though the category is somewhat theoretically ambiguous.
3The OECD’s Revenue Statistics says that ‘Taxes which are included under the heading 6000 [Other
Taxes] because they involve more than one tax base or because the tax base does not fall within any of
the previous categories but which are identifiable as levyable only on producers and not on households
are included under ’business’. The rest of the taxes which are included under the heading 6000 are
shown as ’other’ or non-identified’.
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6.4 Data
I test the hypotheses mentioned above using a panel of tax mix data from the OECD.
The data are divided into five categories: Income and Payroll Taxes, Social Security
Contributions, Property Taxes, Goods and Services Taxes and Other Taxes.4 Details
of these five categories are available in the chapter appendix. Summary statistics
are presented in Table 6.2. In each instance, the data are divided by total taxation
(taxper1000 + taxper2000 + taxper3000 + taxper4000 +taxper5000 + taxper6000) and
multiplied by 100, so that the data sum to 100. Independent variables are taken from
a variety of sources, listed in the data appendix. Summary statistics are presented in
Table 6.3. In these regressions, we control for GDP per capita though we have not
developed hypotheses for it in the theoretical section.
6.5 Methodology 1: Accounting for the Compositional Nature
of Tax Mix Data
An empirical innovation of this study is to take into account the compositional struc-
ture of data on tax mixes. Compositional data is data that is comprised of shares that
sum to 1. Each element of the tax mix is considered as Vitg where i is the country,
t is the time period concerned and g is the tax source, (income, goods and services,
social security and so on). The data is ‘share’ data; it is the share of revenue that
governments raise from each kind of tax. Two features of this data are particularly
important. The first important feature of the data is that Vitg ≥ 0, ∀i, g, t. The second
is that ∑g∈G Vitg = 1.
As pointed out by Katz and King (1999), as well as Honaker, Katz, and King (2002)
and Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg (2002), models that do not take this structure of
the data into account will generate nonsensical results and logical impossibilities. In
this instance a non-compositional analysis would result in models that could predict
4Note that capital income is included in the first category.
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that the sum of shares of tax revenues will be greater than 100 percent: a logical
impossibility. Such models could also predict that some taxes will be negative in the
amount of revenue they generate, so that there would be, for instance, a corporation
‘subsidy’ instead of a corporation tax, or that VAT would actually lower the price of
various goods.5
Thus taking the nature of the data into account is important; just as using linear
regression instead of Logit or Probit where data is discrete generates nonsensical
results by not allowing for the fact that observations can only take on two values,
so too will studies that do not account for the compositional nature of the data will
generate results that do not make sense.
In a seminal paper, Katz and King (1999) deal with this kind of data using a lo-
gistic transformation akin to that used in multinomial logit models. They transform
the data using a logistic transformation. Instead of having a vector of dependent
variables of the form {Vit,1, . . . , Vit,G} for each country-year, the data are transformed
by dividing them by one of the dependent variables. For convenience let us to divide
by Vit,G. In this chapter we have a vector of taxes as (income, social security, goods
and services, corporation, property, capital and other taxes). We construct dependent
variables according to the Katz and King methods by dividing by the ’other’ category.
After this transformation, instead of G independent variables per country-year, we
will have G − 1 variables, of the form {Vit,1/Vit,G, Vit,2/Vit,G, . . . , Vit,g−1/Vit,G}. Fol-
lowing these authors then assume that the vector of logs of the ratios ln(Vit,1/Vit,G)
are distributed as a multivariate normal with mean µ and variance covariance matrix
Σ. Hence instead of a vector {Vit1, Vit2, . . . , Vit,g−1, Vit,G}, the dependent variable be-
comes {ln(Vit,1/Vit,G), ln(V2it,2/Vit,G), . . . , ln(Vg−1,it/VGit)} = {Y1it, Y2it, . . . , Yg−1,it}.
We then run linear regressions on these transformed data.
5While features of the tax code such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and various trade subsidies
and the like have this effect in reality; they do not feature in the revenue raised from governments, and
thus are not part of our data.
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The obtained coefficients from these regressions are of little interest in themselves;
being coefficients on the log ratio of one tax to another they are hard to interpret.
To obtain some purchase on the implications of the model, I use simulated predicted
tax shares. I simulate a variety of Yit = {Yit,1, Yit,2, . . . , Y,it,G−1} for various values of
the coefficients. Then I use the multivariate logistic transformation in reverse of these
predicted Yit to obtain a Vit,g value for each Yit,g.
Vitg =
exp(Yitg)
1 + ∑G−1g=1 exp(Yitg)
(6.1)
This transformation has the effect that, because of the exponent, any value of Yitg























1 + ∑G−1g=1 exp(Yitg)
+
1
1 + ∑G−1g=2 exp(Yitg)
= 1 (6.3)
This equations means that no matter what the predicted values of Yitg, the resulting
Vitg’s will sum to 1. This ensures that none of the predictions of the model will fall
outside the unit simplex. First differences in these Ygit for various values of the in-
dependent variables are then analyzed as one normally would regression coefficients
for their empirical content.
This literature using compositional data has, in political science at least, focused
on electoral politics, on estimation of vote shares in various electoral systems. This
chapter is, to my knowledge, the first time the approach of Katz and King (1999) and
others has been applied to a political economy topic, or indeed to tax policy. Other
empirical studies of the tax mix, such as Kenny and Winer (2006); Volkerink and
de Haan (1999); Tosun and Abizadeh (2005); Tosun (2006); Oliva et al. (2007) and the
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other papers discussed in Chapter 2 have not accounted for the nature of the data,
and thus may suffer from the nonsensical results that concern Katz, King and others.
6.6 Methodology 2: Seemingly Unrelated Regression with Un-
balanced Panels and Random Effects
As mentioned, previous studies using a compositional data approach have focused
on elections. This allows the errors within each tax category to be correlated with
one another. Thus the dependent variable in most of these studies has been the share
of the vote gained by one party in a given constituency in a given year. However, the
dependent variable in this study is that share of tax revenue raised by a given tax
in a given country-year. This results in two issues that require the approach taken in
this chapter to be different from that taken in Katz and King (1999). Firstly, Katz and
King (1999) use a complicated logistic function to allow for data selection.6 I do not
need to account for the unavailability of certain taxes to certain governments, and so
I follow Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg (2002) who use a Seemingly Unrelated Regres-
sion framework, which allows the errors across taxes to be modeled and provides a
computationally easier approach than that of Katz and King (1999).
The second issue with tax mix data, aside from its compositional character, con-
cerns the fact that, in this study observations are tax categories in country-years,
while Katz and King (1999) deals with observations that are constituency-parties.
Because the data is panel data, we potentially need to be concerned with country-
specific effects. Intuitively there are unlikely to be simultaneous shocks to the share of
revenue gained from various tax sources across countries. Some preliminary evidence
of this can be seen in Figure 1.8, which contains significant country-level clustering.
Thus it seems correct to use random effects in addition to the cross-correlations re-
6In parliamentary elections, some constituencies are not contested by all parties; and so the data will
be selected. In the case of taxes; it is not sensible to assume that any tax category is not available to any
particular government. Thus we do not need to account for ‘non-contestation’ they way they do.
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sulting from the seemingly unrelated regression model. Here, I follow the stepwise
maximization procedure of Biørn (2004), who develops a procedure for including
random effects in seemingly unrelated regressions model with unbalanced panels.7
I consider a 4× 1 vector Yit = (Yit,income, Yit,socialsec., Yit,property, Yit,goods)′.8 We also
have a vector of explanatory variables Xit = diag(Xit,income, Xit,socialsec., Xit,property, Xit,goods).
I allow the number of explanatory variables to be different for each tax (although in
practice they will be the same), thus there are Hg explanatory variables for each
tax g, where H = ∑g Hg. The dimensionality of Xit is 4× H. I also define a vec-
tor of coefficients on each of the explanatory variables for each explained variable







′, where the dimensionality of β is H × 1. Thus
the regression equation is:
Yit = Xitβ + αi + uit = Xitβ + εit (6.4)
where αi = (αi,income, αi,socialsec., αi,property, αi,goods)′ is a 4× 1 vector of country random
effects, and uit =
(
uit,income, uit,socialsec., uit,property, uit,goods
)′ is a 4× 1 vector of errors
specific to the year, country, and tax. Again, following Biørn (2004), we assume that
αi and uit both have a mean of 0 9 and a covariance matrices Σα and Σu, respectively.
We also assume they are mutually uncorrelated and uncorrelated with Xit. Thus
E(εit, ε′js) = δij(Σα + δtsΣu), where δij = 1 if i = j, and 0 if i 6= j. δts = 1 if t = s,
and 0 if t 6= s. So, the variance-covariance matrix is Σα + Σu within a country-year,
Σα within a country, and 0 otherwise.
6.7 Results
As is discussed by Katz and King (1999), as well as Honaker, Katz, and King (2002)
and Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg (2002), the coefficients on the explanatory vari-
7The section that follows takes heavily from Biørn (2004).






9A 4× 1 vector of zeros.
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ables in the regressions run on the transformed data (the log-ratios) have no inde-
pendent import; in order to analyze the implications of the model for actual tax-mix
outcomes, we follow the procedure of King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) who use
post-regression simulations to examine first differences.
The procedure is as follows. Firstly, we generate a sample of 1000 values for each
of the seven β coefficients from the regression,10 using the reported β̂’s from the
regression as means and the variance-covariance matrix from the regression as the
variance of the distribution. Thus we end up with a H × 1000 vector of simulated
vector βsim, such that βsim ∼ N(β̂, V̂β), where V̂β is the variance-covariance matrix
from the regression. Thus I can gain traction on the variance and accuracy of the
estimates.
Next, I simulate changes in the explanatory variables; for each of the seven vari-
ables I calculate the value of that variable one standard deviation below and above
the mean in the sample. Holding the other variables constant, I calculate predicted
values for Y = Yincome, Ysocialsec., Yproperty, Ygoods for each βsim 7 times. We hold all
variables constant but one, calculate 1000 simulated Y’s for the higher value of the
dependent variable of interest, and 1000 simulated Y’s with the dependent variable
of interest set below. Thus we cycle through each Xk, each time setting them above
and below.
This leaves us with 2000× 7 values of Y, 2000 for all seven coefficients β with Xk set
one standard deviation below the mean, and 1000 for each simulated β with Xk set
one standard deviation above the mean. We take first differences of these higher and
lower values, leaving us with a 1000× 7× 4 matrix of first differences. Each element
m, h, g of the matrix is a measure of the change in Yg when explanatory variable Xh
goes from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above
the mean, given the simulated βm. Then using the multinominal transformation
10 Trade Union Density, Inflation, Left, Openness, Growth, GDP Per Capita and Taxation as a share
of GDP.
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described above, we change each vector Y into a vector of V’s, one for each tax.
Averaging over the thousand β simulations, we get a mean and standard error of the
impact of a change in each explanatory variable from one standard deviation below
the mean to one standard deviation above the mean on the five tax categories. These
are presented in Table 6.4.
To illustrate, this implies that a change in economic growth for instance, from
one standard deviation below the mean (2.7 percent per annum) to one standard
deviation above the mean (5.6 percent per annum), would result in an average 6.6
percent increase in income taxes, (give or take .5 percent), and a 6 percent decrease in
goods and services taxes, give or take .9 percent, and so on. For ease of comparison
with predicted results, I present signs and color-coded significance levels in Table 6.5.
Black signs are predicted signs, red signs are statistically significant at the 10 percent
level, and blue are not significant at the 10 percent level.
Further illustration of the results are shown in Figures 6.1 through 6.7, which show
changes in the tax mix as each explanatory variable goes from the minimum found
in the sample to the maximum.
Several of these results are interesting; the data support Hypothesis 1; the effects
of trade union density; indeed the coefficients are significant and large. This lends
support to the idea that insider-outsider divisions over the structure of social pro-
tection discussed earlier have an impact on the structure of taxation. Hypothesis
2 receives some support also; left-wing governments do seem more inclined to tax
using income; but they do not seem to tax social security as much. This could be
because social security taxes tend be less progressive than income taxes however;
which would make left-wing governments seeking a progressive tax more inclined
to pursue income tax than social security tax. Somewhat puzzling however is the
fact that the coefficient on Goods and Services taxes is positive; it is not clear why
left-wing governments would choose more regressive consumption taxes. The coef-
ficient is small and statistically insignificant however. Somewhat surprisingly, the
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coefficients are small; if we compare the effects of changes in left-wing government
from the min to max in the sample to the effects of changes in trade union density
(comparing Figures 6.1 to 6.3) we see that the impact of left-wing government is
comparatively less-dramatic; partisan political factors seem to matter less than these
structural factors.
The results do not give much support to the implications of globalization theories;
while social security taxes - a tax on labor - do fall in response to economic openness;
income tax receipts - a tax on labor and capital - actually rise. There seems to be no
effect on property tax receipts or goods and services tax receipts. The coefficient with
respect to income tax receipts is particularly curious; in this category is included data
on capital and corporation taxes; which, according to globalization theorists; should
fall in response to economic openness the fact that they actually rise is curious. Of
course we could argue that this data does not disaggregate corporation and capital
taxes properly; that these taxes may be falling, both other (labor) taxes may be rising.
But this is belied by the fact that social security tax receipts, which are levied entirely
on labor and not on capital, actually fall. This means that the increase in income
tax receipts in response to globalization could actually be driven by corporation and
capital tax receipts. This would be curious indeed; and would more confirm those
authors such as Garrett (1998) who argue that globalization does not lower capital or
corporation taxes significantly. Indeed these ideas are supported in Figures 1.1 and
1.2, which show that capital and corporation taxes have actually risen slightly since
the 1990s.
The results are not consistent with ‘salience’ hypotheses concerning the impact of
total taxation; while the coefficients on income taxes and property taxes are negative,
while the coefficient on goods and services taxes positive, albeit not significant. Most
surprising is the coefficient on social security taxes; which is significant and positive,
not negative. This seems to suggest support for the idea that large welfare states are
providers of extensive social insurance, and that this is financed using taxes that are
ring-fenced for this purpose (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). We note that not only is
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this coefficient quite large, it is also significant at the 1 percent level.
Interesting results are found with respect to inflation; we note from Figure 12 that
a move from the minimum inflation value found in the sample to the maximum
in the sample results in a dramatic rise in goods and services tax receipts and a
corresponding collapse in social security tax receipts. This fits with the idea that the
capping of social security taxes means that as nominal wages rise; the social security
tax base erodes. In addition, high inflation also raises the nominal price of goods, and
so dramatically increases the size of the goods and services tax base, and so raises
goods and services tax receipts.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter argues that the structure of taxation is a key part of the political econ-
omy of developed economies. Following work by Swank and Steinmo (2002); Kato
(2003); Kemmerling (2005); Ganghof (2006) and Plumper, Troeger, and Winner (2009),
I have econometrically examined the tax mix as a coherent whole, in which each
part influences others. In doing so, I have sought to use methodological innovations
pioneered by Katz and King (1999); Tomz, Tucker, and Wittenberg (2002) and Biørn
(2004) in other areas of political science hitherto unexploited in the area of tax policy.
The results lend support to, and pose challenges for, various theories in the litera-
ture. Insider-outsider theories are given some support by the fact that trade union
density is positively associated with income tax and negatively with social security
tax. Some support is also given to partisan effects, which are present though small.
Less support is given to salience effects; it seems that larger welfare states rely more
on transparent taxes not less. In addition, questions are posed for proponents of
globalization based theories of tax competition; though these results are only partial
due to the the fact that the data is not disaggregated.
Finally, it is important to note that while this chapter has sought to test various the-
ories of tax structure in an integrated whole, no integrated theory of tax structure yet
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exists. Existing political economy formal models have discussed trade-offs between
a few taxes at a time, but a theoretical picture of the entire tax mix has not yet been
painted. It is hoped that the results in this chapter provide some signposts for this
work in the future.
239
Chapter 6. Cross-National Evidence for the Model
6.A Descriptions of OECD Data
These descriptions of the various categories of taxation are quoted directly from the
OECD’s 2009 Revenue Statistics, Annex A.
1000: Taxes on Income, profits and capital gains This heading covers taxes levied
on the net income or profits (i.e. gross income minus allowable tax reliefs) of individ-
uals and enterprises. Also covered are taxes levied on the capital gains of individuals
and enterprises, and gains from gambling.
2000: Social Security Contributions Classified here are all compulsory payments
that confer an entitlement to receive a (contingent) future social benefit. Such pay-
ments are usually earmarked to finance social benefits and are often paid to institu-
tions of general government that provide such benefits. However, such earmarking
is not part of the definition of social security contributions and is not required for
a tax to be classified here. However, conferment of an entitlement is required for
a tax to be classified under this heading. So, levies on income or payroll that are
earmarked for social security funds but do not confer an entitlement to benefit are
excluded from this heading and shown under personal income taxes (1100) or taxes
on payroll and workforce (3000). Taxes on other bases, such as goods and services,
which are earmarked for social security benefits are not shown here but are classified
according to their respective bases because they generally confer no entitlement to
social security benefits.
3000: Taxes on Payroll and Workforce This heading covers taxes paid by employers,
employees or the self-employed either as a proportion of payroll or as a fixed amount
per person, and which do not confer entitlement to social benefits. Examples of taxes
classified here are the United Kingdom national insurance surcharge (introduced
in 1977), the Swedish payroll tax (1969-1979), and the Austrian contribution to the
Family Burden Equalization Fund and community tax.
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4000: Taxes on Property This heading covers recurrent and non-recurrent taxes on
the use, ownership or transfer of property. These include taxes on immovable prop-
erty or net wealth, taxes on the change of ownership of property through inheritance
or gift and taxes on financial and capital transactions.
5000: Taxes on Goods and Services All taxes and duties levied on the production,
extraction, sale, transfer, leasing or delivery of goods, and the rendering of services,
or in respect of the use of goods or permission to use goods or to perform activities
are included here.
6000: Other Taxes Taxes levied on a base, or bases, other than those described under
headings 1000, 3000, 4000 and 5000, or on bases of which none could be regarded as
being predominantly the same as that of any one of these headings, are covered here.
As regards taxes levied on a multiple base, if it is possible to estimate receipts related
to each base (e.g. the Austrian and German ’Gewerbesteuer’) this is done and the
separate amounts included under the appropriate headings. If the separate amounts
cannot be estimated, but it is known that most of the receipts are derived from one
base, the whole of the receipts are classified according to that base. If neither of these
procedures can be followed, they are classified here.
6.B Other Data Sources
Trade Union Density These data are from the OECD’s Employment and Labour
Market Statistics (OECD, 2010b)
Inflation These data are the category ‘GDP DEFLATOR’ from the IMF’s Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.
Left These data are from the Comparative Political Dataset I. (Armingeon et al.,
2010); the variable used is ’gov_left’. The data are available at http://www.ipw.
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unibe.ch/content/team/klaus/armingeon/comparative/political/data/sets/index/
ger.html.
Openness These data are from the Menzie-Chinn Measure of Financial Openness
(Chinn and Ito, 2008).
Growth These data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
GDP Per Capita These data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors.
TaxofGDP These data are formed by summing ‘taxgdp1000 + taxgdp2000 + taxgdp3000
+ taxgdp4000 + taxgdp5000 + taxgdp6000’ from the OECD’s Revenue Statistics.
All data and STATA do-files are available from the author upon request.
6.C Figures and Tables
Income Social Security Property Goods and Services Other
Trade Union Density + - ? ? ?
Inflation + - ? ? ?
Left + + ? - ?
Openness - - + + ?
Growth + - ? ? ?
Taxation of GDP - - - + ?
Table 6.1: Predicted Coefficients for Explanatory Variables
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OECD Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Income and Payroll Taxes taxper1000 + taxper3000 36.83 11.701 9.90 69.77
Social Security Contributions taxper2000 23.91 12.46 0 48.55
Property Taxes taxper4000 5.83 3.60 0 21.41
Goods & Services Taxes taxper5000 32.53 9.00 0 64.79
Other Taxes taxper6000 .88 2.16 0 18.98
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics of Tax Mix Data
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade Union Density 37.31415 20.55663 5.8 94.3
Inflation 6.647135 12.08155 -13.6514 135.834
Left 35.50201 37.02294 0 100
Openness 1.68262 1.23477 -1.831187 2.500014
Growth 2.931223 2.686954 -11.89204 12.61271
GDP Per Capita 18881.75 10656.2 1578.509 56624.73
Taxation of GDP 33.82931 8.585596 9.278674 52.22791
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables
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Income Social Security Property Goods and Services Other
Trade_Density 7.77*** -20.837*** -0.821*** 13.993*** -0.106***
1.283 0.747 0.232 1.281 0.027
Inflation -3.376 -21.068*** 1.77** 22.692*** 0.15***
3.925 2.378 0.755 3.73 0.036
Left 2.68** -3.866*** 0.348* 0.838 -0.091***
1.108 0.652 0.201 1.086 0.017
Openness 6.983*** -9.873*** 0.512 2.566 -0.221***
2.389 1.51 0.457 2.374 0.05
Growth 6.671*** 0.524 -0.922*** -6.027*** -0.156***
1.035 0.658 0.217 0.993 0.025
GDPpercap 10.424*** -1.706* 2.681*** -11.917*** 0.497***
1.456 0.994 0.438 1.422 0.081
TaxofGDP -4.639*** 7.492*** -1.753*** -1.596 0.581***
1.259 0.855 0.336 1.249 0.092
Table 6.4: Main Results: Simulations from First Differences
Income Social Security Property Goods and Services Other
Trade Union Density + + - - +/- - +/- + +/- -
Inflation + - - - +/- + +/-+ +/- +
Left + + + - +/- + - + +/- -
Openness - + - - + + + + +/- -
Growth + + - + +/-- +/- - +/- -
GDP Per Capita + + + - - + - - +/- +
Taxation of GDP - - - + - - + - +/- +
Table 6.5: Predicted Coefficients for Explanatory Variables
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Figure 6.1: Changes in the tax mix in response to changes in trade union density
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Figure 6.2: Changes in the tax mix in response to changes in inflation
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Figure 6.3: Changes in the tax mix in response to changes in left wing government
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Figure 6.4: Changes in the tax mix in response to changes in economic openness
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Figure 6.5: Changes in the tax mix in response to changes in economic growth
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Figure 6.6: Changes in the tax mix in response to changes in GDP per capita
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This dissertation has sought to develop a theory of how countries tax labor. I began
by arguing that the literature on globalization and tax policy has somewhat mis-
directed scholarly attention to taxes that did not make up a large fraction of the
revenue base of modern economies - capital and corporation taxes. I proceeded to
show that the taxes that raise most revenue in developed welfare states are increas-
ingly income taxes, social security contributions and indirect taxes like VAT. I argued
that social security contributions are the most under-explored of these three taxes.
I asked - what makes a country tax using social security contributions instead of
income taxes? I presented graphical evidence that income tax and social security
contributions were substitutes, and presented evidence that social security contribu-
tions are less progressive, and more detrimental to employment than income taxes.
This again presented the puzzle as to why countries use social security contributions
to fund welfare states, and why these contributions are favored by organized labor.
In Chapter 3, I argued that labor market dualization and trade union centralization
were key dependent variables explaining why countries differed in their propensity
to use social security contributions instead of income taxes. Building on theories
252
Chapter 7. Conclusion
of labor market dualization by authors such as Saint-Paul (1996) and Rueda (2005),
I argued that in many continental economies, labor markets are bifurcated, with a
heavy concentration of risk amongst outsiders. I presented a formal model that out-
lined conditions under which insiders would prefer to use social contributions to
ring-fence funds from outsiders. Specifically, where outsiders were numerous, where
unemployment amongst outsiders was high relative to unemployment amongst in-
siders, and where inequality was low, insiders would prefer social contributions.
I argued that a key determinant of whether these preferences of insiders for more
social security contributions were translated into policy was the structure of orga-
nized labor. Specifically, where outsiders were excluded from the decision-making
of organized labor, it would press for increased social security contributions - a key
demand of insiders. By contrast, if the interests of outsiders were internalized by
organized labor and its leaders, then we would see a moderation in these demands
for increased social security contributions.
In Chapter 4, I argued that Irish trade unions demonstrably tried to increase social
security contributions with a view to making social insurance ‘pay-related’, and that
they sought to vigorously defend efforts to integrate the social insurance fund into
the general exchequer. In part, this was due not just to labor-market dualization,
but also due to concerns about inflation, control and progressivity. In France, I pre-
sented evidence that again, in the absence of severe dualization, French unions still
displayed resistance to the merging of various social insurance funds, and demanded
the separation of risks. This demonstrates no small about of concern for the costs and
benefits obtained by contributors to social insurance funds that were represented by
unions. In addition, I demonstrated that as structural unemployment became an in-
creasing problem in France, unions consented to the separation of the insurance of
long-term unemployment from the social insurance system, in an effort to increase
the sustainability of these funds.
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In Chapter 5, I presented evidence that while the French labor market became
increasingly dualized, the Irish labor market saw strong growth in the employment
of young people and women - groups typically considered outsiders (Häusermann
and Schwander, 2011). Furthermore, I argued that the Irish trade unionism in the
1990s was centralized, and French trade unionism was fractionalized. I argued that
this led to the ICTU not advocating for a large expansion in the funding of the Irish
social insurance fund. In contrast, French unions sought to increase revenues to, and
maintain their control over, equivalent French funds.
Finally, Chapter 6 sought to extend the argument to countries across the OECD,
not just France and Ireland. I demonstrated that trade union density was associated
with a statistically significant reduction in the social security contributions, providing
supporting evidence for the idea that the amelioration of insider-outsider divisions is
a factor in reducing reliance on social security contributions. I made an argument that
scholars of tax policy should focus empirically on the trade-offs between taxes; and
thus that an SUR procedure; which accounts for potential correlations in errors across
taxes in a country year is the correct empirical procedure for estimating standard
errors. Moreover, following Katz and King (1999), I argued that a compositional data
transformation was a necessary additional to such empirical studies, as it accounts
for the nature of tax-mix data, which necessarily sums to 1 and cannot fall below 0.
7.2 Contributions
This dissertation has made several contributions to comparative political economy.
Firstly, as mentioned in the previous section, it has forwarded new empirical ap-
proaches to tax policy. It is hoped that the compositional data and SUR approaches
will prove fruitful for authors studying other aspects of the tax mix, and that the
use of SUR will become more widespread in the study of public policy more gen-
erally. This is particularly the case in parliamentary democracies, and in corporatist
countries, where policy issues are often dealt with simultaneously with social part-
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nerships, or where annual budgets are announced in their entirety on budget day.1
Certainly, the results in Table 6.4 display several interesting tax policy results beyond
the focus of this dissertation.2
This dissertation has also forwarded a new theory on the tradeoffs that can exist
between two of the major taxes in modern developed economies. It has focused on
how those in secure employment may favor social security contributions with a view
to ring-fencing funds for their own use. The extent to which this happens depends
positively on the number of outsiders, the extent of their unemployment. It depends
negatively on the degree of inequality (which causes insiders to favor income taxa-
tion due to its progressivity) and on the degree of trade union centralization (more
centralized trade unions may internalize the interests of outsiders). This theory is
novel in focusing on a trade-off between two different tax categories, in arguing that
tax policy preferences depend specifically on the distribution of social risk - similarly
to (Mares, 2003) - and in postulating a reciprocal relationship between the political
economy of tax policy and that of the labor market.
The dissertation has substantively contributed to the literature on the ‘crisis of
the welfare state’, and on dualization in Continental Europe, by demonstrating how
dualization can reinforce tax systems that exacerbate labor market problems. High
social security contributions can raise labor costs specifically on those who are most
likely to leave the labor force or remain unemployed; the young, women, and the
low-skilled. This dissertation has demonstrated how social protection institutions
can result in increased dualization problems that can in turn, increase reliance on
these taxes in a vicious cycle. It has thus extended the literature on dualization to the
study of tax policy, as well as showing how dualization can affect, and be affected
1In countries like the United States, tax reform can be significantly more intermittent, and policy-
making can be confined to one tax at a time. In such situations the SUR may not yield the same
efficiency gains as elsewhere, but it will still be no less efficient.
2For instance, the negative effects of trade union density on property tax, as well as the stylized fact
that GDP per capita is associated with a rise in income tax.
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by, policy parameters outside of the labor market (Rueda, 2005) and social protection
(Häusermann, 2010).
From a policy perspective, the distribution has contributed to a reassessment of
the problems that face modern welfare states, especially in Continental Europe. A
common refrain in the welfare state literature is the increasing unsustainability of
these welfare states in light of globalization and the erosion of corporate and capital
tax bases. Indeed concerns about corporate taxation abound in the policy community
as well - see for example Levin and McCain (2012) and OECD (2013). This dissertation
has argued that it is somewhat misleading to focus on the sustainability of the welfare
state and the erosion of parts of the tax base that we have demonstrated make up, and
have made up, very little of the welfare state’s funding base. Rather, of key import for
the economic sustainability of the welfare state is whether its funding is compatible
with a fully-functioning labor market. Also important is the question of whether
successive attempts at ‘reform’ of the welfare state have really equipped the welfare
state to respond to modern social risks. We have seen evidence in Chapter 5 that the
major reform of the welfare state in 1990s France (the Juppé Plan) while actuarially
improving the position of various social insurance funds, was insider-biased, and
preserved the sustainability of the welfare state for those with sufficient contribution
histories, who in fact were under-exposed to economic risks.
7.3 Scope Conditions
The theory outlined here is, of course, temporally and geographically contingent.
For example, in most developing countries the range of available taxes is limited by
state capacity, by literacy and numeracy amongst the population, and by adminis-
tration costs. In such environments, countries tend to reply more on excise taxes,
customs duties, and sometimes receipts from seignorage to finance the state (Selig-
man, 1911; Tosun, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009a,b). Thus, while here I have assumed
that income taxes and social security contributions are obvious policy possibilities for
all policymakers, in many countries they are administratively costly or economically
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unfeasible. In such instances then, the theory here will have little explanatory power,
and even the empirical approach specified here will be of little use, as the tax bases
considered (labor income, capital income, corporate income, payrolls, property) are
not available to the government. In such contexts, the choices the governments face
are over taxing very different bases. Indeed, the choice that is of most relevance in
such instances is likely between investing in new revenue-raising technologies (devel-
oping the capacity to levy an income tax, for example) and further exploiting existing
ones.3
Even middle-income countries, that may have the administrative capacity and fi-
nancial literacy amongst their business classes to level payroll or income taxes may
struggle to do so. This is often due to a lack of financial development - income taxes
are all but impossible to levy in the absence of a developed banking system, or where
there is to a large degree of informality in the labor market. Social security contribu-
tions are extremely difficult to levy in an informal environment where workers are
seldom under explicit contracts, and payrolls are ambiguously defined. Companies
may choose to shirk paying social security contributions on workers by employing
them informally. In such contexts, the salient ‘insider-outsider’ cleavage may be
between those employed in the formal or informal sector, not between those with
temporary or permanent contracts (Magaloni and Dìaz-Cayeros, 2009). This quali-
tatively different insider-outsider cleavage will likely result in different preferences
over tax policy than those specified in the theory here.
Even for those countries that are administratively and economically sufficiently
developed that such complicated taxes as VAT, social contributions, and capital and
corporate taxes are a realistic and affordable part of the tax mix, the dynamics here
outlined may not apply. This dissertation has focused on two countries that have had
social security contributions as a feature of the tax mix since the mid-fifties. Often,
the idea of national-level social contributions was comparatively easy to introduce,
3 For more on this, see Mares and Queralt (2013).
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because employees and employers had already been playing social contributions at
the industry or firm level (Dutton, 2002). Where such social security contributions
have not been previously introduced, it could be extremely hard to introduce them;
there is evidence that the costs of introducing new taxes is higher than the costs of
raising existing taxes (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2009). Thus the representation here
of workers preferences over two tax categories may be affected by the fact that in
many countries (Australia, New Zealand, Denmark) social security contributions do
not exist and would have to be introduced.
This dissertation has also made strong assumptions about the role of organized
labor in the policy process. The two cases both considered periods where the influ-
ence of trade unions on politics was relatively strong. However, the strength of trade
unions in other democracies - even developed ones where social contributions might
be a reasonable policy choice and where dualization may exist - is not uniform. Thus
that fraction of the theory that argued about the influence of trade union centraliza-
tion on the internalization of the preferences of outsiders may not carry to instances
where trade unions were not involved in policy-making at all. This is particularly
relevant in countries like Australia, where social security contributions are absent
and unions are relatively weak. This dissertation has not considered how - where
dualization exists but influential unions do not - the preferences of insiders are mani-
fested through the party system, the consideration of which is very important in such
contexts.4
In addition, this dissertation has assumed that the key logic driving the provision of
social insurance is that governments implement policies of concern to large number
of voters. But many middle-income countries that are just not developing social
insurance systems, many of which are contribution-financed, are authoritarian or
semi-authoritarian. The factors at work in determining the translation of preferences




over the tax mix into policy will be quite different in such contexts. As noted by Mares
and Carnes (2009), the logic of the provision of social insurance in non-democratic
contexts remains under-explored by social policy researchers.
7.4 Further Research
7.4.1 Developing the Theory
The theory as developed in Chapter 3 is partly formalized; we consider how varying
levels of labor market dualization - insider and outsider probabilities of employment
and unemployment - influence each groups’ preferences for income taxes and so-
cial security contributions. However, as emphasized throughout this dissertation,
the negative effects of social security contributions on employment are considerable.
They add to labor costs, and thus provide disincentives for employers to hire and
for workers to work (Saez, 2006). While these negative effects also exist with respect
to income taxes, there is evidence to suggest that their effects are less egregious -
income taxes tend to be lower among lower earning workers than social security con-
tributions, where the labor supply elasticity is larger. Thus income taxes will likely
do less damage to employment prospects than will social security contributions. A
fully-specified formal model would incorporate this idea in a general-equilibrium
context.
In the context of this dissertation, this would involve making αO, αI and possibility
β, a function of t and s - labor market outcomes would be endogenous to taxation.
This would complicate the comparative statics considerably, however, as each increase
in a tax t, for example, would enter into marginal utilities in several ways. As in the
existing model, increasing taxes would have a negative effect from lost income and
the positive effects from increased social insurance funds. What would change is as
follows - the negative effect in the existing model stemming from deadweight losses
would be unpacked into deadweight losses from a reduction in labor supply. This
deadweight loss is presently represented in two ways, firstly in the fact that τtt is
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negative (see Section 3.3), implying that the deadweight loss from the tax increases
as the tax rises. Second, the deadweight loss is represented in the fact that ξ(s)t < 0
(that income tax negatively affects social security contribution receipts). Of course,
in reality, both these effects come from the fact that both income taxes and social
security contributions cause labor supply to fall. Thus removing these somewhat
artificial deadweight loss parameters and replacing them with deadweight losses that
stem directly from reduced equilibrium labor use would clarify the intuition behind
the model, at some cost to computational complexity.
It is unlikely that such an addition, though complicated, would substantially change
the intuition behind the model. The reason is as follows: insofar as social security
contributions raise the costs of labor, they will result in a lower equilibrium labor
demand and supply. Thus, we may consider whose labor will be reduced most. It
is likely, because of the high assumed costs of firing insiders - see, for example, the
discussion of firing French workers in Section 5.3 - the most of reduction in labor
demand and supply in the case of higher labor costs would be borne by outsiders.
Thus, insiders again, would not necessarily be too worried about the results of higher
labor costs on labor supply, as most of the resulting labor market insecurity would be
borne by outsiders. It is likely that with this addition to the model their preferences
for social security contributions would be reduced somewhat. However, they would
still remain higher than those of outsiders - conditional on some level of dualization
of course. Moreover, the comparative statics regarding the effects on preferences of
outsider unemployment, inequality, and so on would remain intact.
7.4.2 Testing the theory at a micro-level
The dissertation has argued that tax policy preferences are a function of individuals’
perceptions of inequality, and of their economic and social risks and those of others.
However, throughout the empirical chapters I have focused on unions as the insti-
tutions through which workers preferences over tax policy are turned into reality.
While there is no question that the preferences of union leaders are important - we
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can recall the efforts of the ICTU leaders to ‘move members’ in certain directions
outlined in Chapter 5 - the preferences of rank-and-file members act as a constraint
on these leader preferences as well. These preferences have not been investigated in
this dissertation. It is possible that the mechanism of the theory operates not through
the preferences of individuals, and in turn on the pressure they place on their union
representatives, but through union representatives advocating polices that will ben-
efit their members, even where these members are not fully cognizant of the issues
involved. Indeed, I have mentioned the importance of tax salience (Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft, 2009) as a determining factor in tax preferences. Given the esoteric nature
of these tax policy issues, it is not obvious that these issues are fully understood or
important to voters, as opposed to the union leaders by whom they represented. Do
workers with greater or lower degree of economic risk prefer income taxes or social
security contributions? How does this depend on their perceptions of the risks faced
elsewhere in the economy? This remains an open question.
Further research should investigate these issues using survey data. As mentioned
in Section 3.2, there is a large empirical literature on social policy preferences - for
example, Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger (2012) on inequality aversion, on Margalit,
Bechtel, and Hainmueller (2013) on economic bailouts, Kuziemko et al. (2013) on
redistribution and Sørensen (2013) on welfare spending. Several of these studies,
including Kuziemko et al. (2013) and Margalit (2013) as well as Margalit, Bechtel, and
Hainmueller (2013), find that preferences over social and economic policy depend
crucially on one’s own social risk, as well as on information about policy deals. To
my knowledge, no study has examined how these factors affect preferences over tax
policy.
7.4.3 Other Cases
This dissertation has outlined how the mechanisms of the theory work in two coun-
tries - Ireland and France - where insider-outsider divisions are present, even though
in some instances they are not strong. The two countries considered in this disser-
261
Chapter 7. Conclusion
tation both had contribution-financed social welfare funds throughout the post-war
period - Ireland had a single Social Insurance Fund, while France had an enormous
number of different funds, as we have seen. However, the theory should apply to
other countries without such comparatively high levels of social contribution financ-
ing. In what follows, I briefly discuss how the theory would apply to two countries
with no social contribution financing at all: Australia and Denmark. In these coun-
tries, we should see low levels of dualization, or, in the presence of such dualization,
we should observe high levels of trade union centralization.
Denmark Denmark has among the highest levels of trade union density in the
OECD (70%). As the theory would predict then, Denmark has one of the highest
levels of income taxation in the OECD (Ganghof, 2005b). It also has among the low-
est levels of dualization of unemployment benefits; very little of what workers receive
when unemployed is a function of their previous earnings. As a consequence, the re-
placement rates are significantly lower for persons with above-average wages than
those in France or Germany (OECD, 2004). Moreover, low levels of dualization can
also be seen in the relatively uniform levels of eligibility for unemployment benefits,
as well as the high take-up rate; comparatively large fractions (about 85%) of un-
employed Danes receive unemployment benefit (Thompson, 2004; Clasen and Clegg,
2006).
In response to the recession and the concomitant increased unemployment, Den-
mark has implemented cuts to welfare programs, but these have come in the form of
reducing the duration of unemployment benefits, as opposed to differentiating un-
employment benefits by previous earnings or duration of contribution. Some changes
were introduced in 1985, such as stricter eligibility conditions for unemployment, and
differentiated receipts, but these were repealed by 1988. Similarly, increased benefits
for older workers introduced in 1992 were reduced after 1996 (Clasen and Clegg,
2006). Despite the absence of social security contributions, Denmark still taxes labor
very heavily, and so, to encourage unemployment, especially amongst the long-term
unemployed, Denmark, along with other Scandinavian countries engaged in active
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labor market policies during the 1990s to bring outsiders into the labor force (Larsen,
2005). Thus insofar as France marks an extreme in the reliance of social security
contributions, as well as on its degree of dualization, Denmark marks the other ex-
treme - very high levels of social inclusion, coupled with high levels of labor market
participation, and concomitant low levels of dualization.
Australia Like Denmark, Australia has comparatively high levels of income taxation
- among the highest, as a share of government revenue, in the OECD. It finances
all of its social insurance payments from the Federal Government’s general revenue
(Stanton and Daprè, 1995). While there had been a ‘social services contribution’
separate from income tax 1945 to 1950, at no stage were benefits linked to prior
payments. Moreover, while the government paid social welfare payments (pensions,
orphan’s and widow’s payments, unemployment benefits et cetera) from a national-
level social security fund from 1945 onwards, the fund was financed entirely from
the general revenue from 1950 onwards, thus making it really simply an accounting
device. The fund itself was disbanded in 1985, after which time there was no longer
any distinction between the ‘contributions’ and the general exchequer.
Benefits in Australia have historically been unlinked to the amount of contribu-
tions, with all benefits being paid out at a flat rate subject to means testing (Saunders,
1999). As mentioned however, in one instance, contribution-based financing was in-
troduced in Australia (1945 to 1950) and in several other instances, a renewal of such
as system was proposed. Proposals for the introduction of a contribution-financed
system in addition to the states basic pension were forwarded in 1965, 1968 and 1971
(Kewley, 1973).
In concordance with the theory, Australia’s level of labor market dualization is
quite low. Some evidence of this exists in their comparatively low levels of long-
term unemployment as a share of total unemployment in Australia (see Figure 4.5)
and in their high levels of labor force participation (see Figure 4.6) Thus there does
not seem to exist a sizable class of workers who are dependent on the state without
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contributing to it. Furthermore, trade union density has historically been quite high
in Australia.5
Historically, the Labor Party, which was formally linked to trade unions, have been
more in favor of these proposals for a shift to contribution-based financing than the
opposition. In 1973, suddenly in government for the first time since 1949, the Labor
government of Gough Whitlam set up a National Superannuation Inquiry which
issued recommendations for some level of social security contributions to be set up.6
These recommendations were rejected in 1979 by the Coalition Fraser government
who had come to power in 1975, on the grounds that ‘The Review argued that an
earnings-related contributory retirement pension would split the Australian social
security system into a social insurance scheme for the aged and social assistance for
all other categories of recipients, which could have the effect of undermining the
legitimacy and adequacy of payments for the latter’ (Stanton and Daprè, 1995).7
As unemployment began to rise in the 1980s (see Figure 5.3), trade unions be-
gan to push for more contribution-based financing (Stanton and Daprè, 1995). A
Labor government that had been recently returned to power began another review
of pensions policy in 1985. The Social Security Review was to examine and make
recommendations for reform of all major aspects of Australia’s social security sys-
tem. It concluded, however, in 1988 that the opportunity for introducing a national
superannuation scheme in Australia had passed. This, it claimed was due to the ef-
fects of contribution-based financing on fiscal prudence that was being felt in many
European countries who were themselves beginning a process of retrenchment. The
commission argued that the problems of fiscal inflexibility and future costs associated
with a maturing, unfunded social-insurance-based pension scheme in the context of
an aging population could not be justified.
5See Figure 4.3, and Howard (1977).
6Superannuation is Australian parlance for contribution-based financing (Stanton and Daprè, 1995)
7The ‘Coalition’ is a Coalition of the National Party and the Liberal Party, who have historically
governed, and more recently contested elections together from a centre-right position.
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Nonetheless, with employment spiking to almost 10% in 1983, 30% of which was
long-term unemployment, the unions were able to extract the next best thing to a
social-contribution system. A taxpayer subsidized scheme whereby employees and
employers could contribute to a defined-contribution ‘superannuation’ account was
made accessible to more and more employees. Between 1987 and 1991 the extent of
employees covered by these private savings schemes nearly doubled, from 31% in
1987 to 67% in 1991. In 1992, again the context of a spike in unemployment, a Coali-
tion government introduced the ‘The Superannuation Guarantee’ which provided for
a much broader levels of defined-contribution retirement funding, with significantly
more employers being obliged to deduct 5% pay from their employees to provide for
their retirement. Coverage of the system, then expanded even further, covering 90%
of the workforce in 1995. Stanton and Daprè (1995) report that much of the growth
in Australian social insurance (particularly pensions) now comes from these private
superannuation accounts, which are now mandatory and tax-subsidized.
While these moves towards a contribution-based system have provided the better
paid with a systematic way to save for retirement, they fundamentally lack the mu-
tual insurance aspect found in Continental European economies. These issues may
be related to the lack of unemployment (aside from two brief recessions in the early
80s and early 90s, the Australian labor market has performed well, avoid structural
unemployment problems. A focus on labor market activation has ensured a compar-
ative lack of dualization.8
These two brief descriptions provide some intuition as to how the theory travels to
contexts in which low levels of dualization exist. These low levels can be either due
to successful labor market activation measures (Denmark) or due to flexible labor
markets and an historical shortage of labor (Australia). Even in these cases, we can
see some evidence that in the context of increasing labor market risk, those in secure
8A Labor government’s 1994 White Paper, Working Nation argued that ‘there is strong community
support for increased penalties for job seekers who refuse to seek work or who turn down reasonable
job offers.’ (Thompson, 2004)
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employment sought increased contribution based financing, even if unions were not
successful in introducing it. We can also example the effects of comparatively high
levels of union density. In both cases, though the extent to which the welfare sate
covers all social risks is very different, in both cases the financing mix shows a marked
absence of social security contributions.
7.5 Implications of the Theory
Taxation is one of the most important means through which the state interacts with
its citizens. Recent years have seen an explosion in the study of taxation in developed
countries, particularly as it pertains to financing the large welfare states that many
of these countries now have. The import of taxation, however, does not solely stem
from concerns about the sustainability of welfare states, nor from concerns about the
vertical equity of progressivity of the tax code. This dissertation has demonstrated
that how a welfare state is financed has deep implications for the nature of social
insurance - for who controls it, for who benefits from it, and for who bears its costs.
Studying the tax mix as a whole allows us to see new cleavages over taxation, some
of which are obscured by a focus on progressivity alone. I have tried to argue in
this dissertation that an examination some under-explored areas of the tax mix can
shed light on some new cleavages stemming from economic change and new forms
of insecurity.
In the aftermath of widespread economic struggles in the 1980s, as well as growing
demographic problems, most governments in Europe, and the rest of the developed
world, have struggled with the sustainability of welfare costs. These problems are
only growing worse due to the increasingly problematic demographic picture for
Europe, as well as prolonged period of low growth resulting from the 2008 financial
crisis and subsequent debt crisis. Concerns about the sustainability of welfare state
models is widespread, and the nebulous concept of ‘reform’ is cited as a necessity.
In spite of these concerns, it remains the case that some countries have managed
to combine acceptable welfare state reform with a) debt sustainability, b) near-full
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employment and c) growth. How the welfare state is funded is a key part of a
successful policy mix in this regard. The high taxes on labour that have been used
to fund the welfare state are, as we have mentioned, detrimental to employment,
especially to those at or near the minimum wage. But in the absence of these taxes,
can welfare states be funded at all?
The countries studied here have provided different answers to these kinds of ques-
tions. I have tried to bring to light how economically secure actors can entrench
policy instruments that perpetuate economic problems and lead to lower employ-
ment, growth and security. In doing so, the systems with which we institutionalize
a commitment to broader social welfare, as well as the means through which we try
to fund these commitments, can have unintended consequences. This can be the case
for those whom to social security system was designed to protect, as well as for those
whom, through economic change and political failure, it comes to abandon.
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